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Foreword  Court of Justice
Foreword
1952–2012: In the past year the Court completed 60 years of existence, throughout which it has 
contributed to the European project. This anniversary, which was not especially significant in 
numerical terms, was marked by the Court with an emphasis on substance rather than festivities. 
In this context, the Court published a collective work devoted to the role of the institution and of 
its case-law in the construction of Europe, which was presented at a Forum to which the presidents 
of the constitutional and supreme courts of the Member States of the European Union were invited.
Also, in 2012 the Court’s new Rules of Procedure and certain amendments to its Statute were 
adopted, following a long but productive legislative process. These reforms are designed, first, 
to modernise procedures before the Court and, second, to enable it to continue to improve its 
efficiency.
This improvement in efficiency, which has been present throughout recent years, can also be 
observed in 2012. The duration of preliminary ruling proceedings was the shortest since the end 
of the 1980s and the General Court managed, after a particularly productive year, to reduce both 
the ‘stock’ of pending cases and the duration of proceedings, which was reduced by two months 
in 2012.
The past year also saw a partial replacement of the membership of the Court and the departure of 
four of its members. The governments of the Member States were again concerned, in this partial 
renewal, to make the appointments without delay and to safeguard the stability of the institution 
as far as possible, thereby enabling it to continue smoothly in the performance of its task. The 
Court cannot but welcome this.
This report provides a full record of changes concerning the institution and of its work in 2012. 
A substantial part of the report is devoted to succinct but exhaustive accounts of the main judicial 
activity of the Court of Justice, the General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal. Separate statistics 
for each court supplement and illustrate the analysis relating to the courts.
Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank warmly my colleagues in the three courts and 
the entire staff of the Court of Justice for the outstanding work carried out by them during this 
exceptionally demanding year.
 
V. Skouris 
President of the Court of JusticeChapter I
The Court of JusticeAnnual Report 2012  9
Changes and activity  Court of Justice
A — The Court of Justice in 2012: changes and activity
By Mr Vassilios Skouris, President of the Court of Justice
The first part of the Annual Report gives an overview of the activities of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in 2012. First, it describes how the institution evolved during the year, with the 
emphasis on the institutional changes affecting the Court of Justice and developments relating to 
its internal organisation and its working methods. Second, it includes an analysis of the statistics 
relating to changes in the Court of Justice’s workload and in the average duration of proceed-
ings. Third, it presents, as it does each year, the main developments in the case-law, arranged by 
subject-matter.
1. The important reforms of the rules governing procedure constitute the principal feature of the 
institution’s evolution in 2012, whilst the Court of Justice also celebrated its 60th anniversary.
On 4 December 2012, the Court of Justice of the European Union celebrated its 60th anniversary. 
Although 60 years amount to neither half nor three quarters of a century, the Court of Justice never-
theless decided not to let this anniversary pass unnoticed. Indeed, during the last 10 years the 
judicial system of the European Union has undergone major reforms which, viewed as a whole, 
constitute a real transformation. Reference can be made in this regard to the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Nice, two enlargements which resulted in the institution’s workforce almost doubling 
and in multiplication of the languages of the case and working languages, the creation of the Civil 
Service Tribunal, substantial modernisation of internal working methods, the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon with the resulting extension of the Court’s jurisdiction, the establishment of the 
urgent preliminary ruling procedure, and the computerisation of procedure with the launch of the 
e-Curia system. The view was taken that this transformation would be appropriately marked by 
celebration in two ways: first, the organisation of a Forum to which the presidents of the constitu-
tional and supreme courts of the Member States of the European Union were invited and, second, 
the publication of a collective work devoted to the role of the Court and of its case-law in the con-
struction of Europe. Edited by a committee which Judge Allan Rosas presided over and of which 
Judge Egils Levits and Advocate General Yves Bot were members, that work contains a collection 
of contributions by a group of authors which is representative both from a geographical point of 
view and from the point of view of their professional and academic profile.
At a purely judicial level, a new five-Judge chamber and a new three-Judge chamber were created 
when the Court’s membership was partially replaced on 7 October 2012. The simultaneous opera-
tion of 10 chambers will enable the Court to maintain and improve its efficiency.
As regards the rules governing procedure, the developments of the past year merit particular at-
tention. First of all, one should note the adoption of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 741/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 August 2012 amending the Protocol on the Statute of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union and Annex I thereto (OJ 2012 L 228, p. 1), which entered 
into force on 1 September 2012. The amendments made to the Statute pursuant to this regulation 
include the establishment of the office of Vice-President of the Court, the increase to 15 in the 
number of Judges composing the Grand Chamber, the limitation of participation of the Presidents 10  Annual Report 2012
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of the five-Judge chambers in the Grand Chamber (1) and removal of the obligation on the Judge-
Rapporteur in a case to draw up a report for the hearing.
Next, it is to be noted that the new Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 25 September 2012 
(OJ 2012 L 265, p. 1) entered into force on 1 November 2012. These Rules of Procedure constitute 
a complete recast of the previous Rules of Procedure. Their main objectives are restructuring of 
the rules contained in the former version in order henceforth to accord an important position to 
references for a preliminary ruling, reduction of the duration of proceedings, and clarification and 
simplification of certain provisions of the former version. Furthermore, the new Rules of Procedure 
renumber the provisions compared with the former version.
That recast was followed by adaptation to the new Rules of Procedure of the information note on 
references from national courts for a preliminary ruling, which was renamed ‘recommendations 
[of the Court] to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling pro-
ceedings’ (OJ 2012 C 338, p. 1). Finally, reference should also be made to the decision of the Court 
of Justice of 23 October 2012 concerning the judicial functions of the Vice-President of the Court 
(OJ 2012 L 300, p. 47), by which certain judicial powers formerly held by the President, in particular 
in relation to applications for interim measures, have now been transferred to the Vice-President.
2. The statistics concerning the Court’s activity in 2012 show, overall, sustained productivity and 
a very significant improvement in efficiency as regards the duration of proceedings. In addition, 
a slight decrease in the number of cases brought is to be noted, a fall which, having regard to the 
change in the caseload over the last five years, could be rather short-term in nature.
Thus, the Court completed 527 cases in 2012 (net figure, that is to say, taking account of the joinder 
of cases on the ground of similarity), a slight decrease compared with the previous year (550 cases 
completed in 2011). Of those cases, 357 were dealt with by judgments and 168 gave rise to orders.
The Court had 632 new cases brought before it (without account being taken of the joinder of 
cases on the ground of similarity), which amounts to a decrease of approximately 8% compared 
with 2011 (688 new cases) but nevertheless constitutes the second highest annual number of cases 
brought in the Court’s history. This decrease in the total number of cases brought relates princi-
pally to the slight decrease, compared with the previous year, in the number of appeals lodged. 
The number of references for a preliminary ruling submitted in 2012 is the second highest reached 
in the Court’s entire history.
So far as concerns the duration of proceedings, the statistics are very positive. In the case of refer-
ences for a preliminary ruling, the average duration amounted to 15.7 months. In the entire period 
for which the Court has reliable statistical data, the average time taken to deal with references for 
a preliminary ruling reached its shortest in 2012. The average time taken to deal with direct actions 
and appeals was 19.7 months and 15.3 months respectively.
In addition to the reforms in its working methods that have been undertaken in recent years, the 
improvement of the Court’s efficiency in dealing with cases is also due to the increased use of the 
various procedural instruments at its disposal to expedite the handling of certain cases (the ur-
gent preliminary ruling procedure, priority treatment, the accelerated or expedited procedure, the 
(1)  The Grand Chamber is now composed of the President, the Vice-President, three Presidents of five-Judge cham-
bers who are designated on the basis of a rotation mechanism and 10 Judges who are designated, also on the 
basis of a rotation mechanism, from among the other Judges.Annual Report 2012  11
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simplified procedure and the possibility of giving judgment without an Opinion of the Advocate 
General).
Use of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure was requested in five cases and the designated 
chamber considered that the conditions under Article 104b of the Rules of Procedure (Article 107 
et seq. of the new Rules of Procedure) were met in four of them. Those cases were completed in an 
average period of 1.9 months.
Use of the expedited or accelerated procedure was requested five times, but the conditions under 
the Rules of Procedure were met in only two of those cases. Following a practice established in 
2004, requests for the use of the expedited or accelerated procedure are granted or refused by rea-
soned order of the President of the Court. In addition, priority treatment was granted in two cases.
Also, the Court utilised the simplified procedure laid down in Article 104(3) of the Rules of Pro-
cedure, now Article 99 of the new Rules of Procedure, to answer certain questions referred to it 
for a preliminary ruling. A total of 26 cases were brought to a close by orders made on the basis of 
that provision.
Finally, the Court made fairly frequent use of the possibility offered by Article 20 of its Statute of 
determining cases without an Opinion of the Advocate General where they do not raise any new 
point of law. About 53% of the judgments delivered in 2012 were delivered without an Opinion.
As regards the distribution of cases between the various formations of the Court, it is to be noted 
that the Grand Chamber dealt with roughly 9%, chambers of five Judges with 54%, and chambers 
of three Judges with approximately 34%, of the cases brought to a close by judgments or by orders 
involving a judicial determination in 2012. Compared with the previous year, the proportion of 
cases dealt with by the Grand Chamber decreased (11% in 2011), while the proportion of cases dealt 
with by three-Judge chambers increased (32% in 2011).
For more detailed information regarding the statistics for the past judicial year the section of the 
report specifically devoted to that topic should be consulted.Annual Report 2012  13
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B — Case-law of the Court of Justice in 2012
Constitutional or institutional issues
As regards contentious proceedings before the Court of Justice, and more specifically proceed-
ings for failure to fulfil obligations, mention should be made of Case C-610/10 Commission v Spain 
(judgment of 11 December 2012), which concerned the Kingdom of Spain’s failure to comply with 
the judgment of the Court declaring that that Member State had failed to fulfil its obligations by 
not taking all the measures necessary to comply with a Commission decision declaring aid to be 
unlawful and incompatible with the common market.
First, the Court adjudicated on the rules applicable to the pre-litigation procedure that must pre-
cede an action for failure by a Member State to comply with a judgment of the Court finding a fail-
ure to fulfil obligations. The Treaty of Lisbon altered the conduct of that procedure by removing 
the stage relating to the issuing of a reasoned opinion. In its judgment, the Court held that a pre-
litigation procedure which was initiated before the date on which that amendment entered into 
force, but which was still pending after that date, is governed by the new rules, laid down in Art-
icle 260(2) TFEU. As regards the reference date for assessing whether there has been such a failure 
to fulfil obligations, in the absence of a reasoned opinion, the Court held that the relevant date 
is the date of expiry of the period prescribed in the letter of formal notice issued under Article 
260(2) TFEU.
Second, the Court ruled on the determination of the periodic penalty payments designed to pen-
alise failure to comply with a judgment making a finding of failure to fulfil obligations. It held 
that such a penalty must be decided upon according to the degree of pressure needed in order to 
persuade the defaulting Member State to comply with the judgment establishing a failure to fulfil 
obligations and to alter its conduct in order to bring to an end the infringement complained of, 
taking into consideration, in principle, the duration of the infringement, its degree of gravity and 
the ability of the Member State concerned to pay. In applying those criteria, the Court is required 
to have regard, in particular, to the effects on public and private interests of failure to comply and 
to the urgency with which the Member State concerned must be induced to fulfil its obligations.
As regards the hierarchy of rules within the legal order of the European Union and the correspond-
ing allocation of powers between the institutions, Case C-355/10 Parliament v Council (judgment 
of 5 September 2012) provided the Court with the opportunity to rule on the extent of the imple-
menting powers of the Commission in the context of the regulatory procedure with scrutiny. In 
that regard, the Court recalled that, since the adoption of rules essential to a matter of European 
law is reserved to the legislature of the European Union, those rules must be laid down in the basic 
legislation and may not be delegated. Thus, provisions which, in order to be adopted, require polit-
ical choices falling within the responsibility of the European Union legislature cannot be delegated. 
It follows that implementing measures cannot amend essential elements of basic legislation or 
supplement such legislation by new essential elements.14  Annual Report 2012
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In the case of an implementing measure such as Decision 2010/252 (1) supplementing the Schen-
gen Borders Code (2) as regards the surveillance of the sea external borders, the Court observed 
that, although the Schengen Borders Code, which is the basic legislation in this sphere, states in Art-
icle 12(4) that the aim of such surveillance is to apprehend individuals crossing the border illegally, 
it does not contain any rules concerning the measures which border guards are authorised to apply 
against persons or ships when they are apprehended and subsequently — such as the application 
of enforcement measures, the use of force or conducting the persons apprehended to a specific lo-
cation — or even measures against persons implicated in human trafficking. Accordingly, the Court 
held that, as Decision 2010/252/EU is an implementing measure adopted on the basis of Article 
12(5) of Regulation No 562/2006 (3) it cannot contain rules on the conferral of enforcement powers 
on border guards, the adoption of which entails political choices falling within the responsibilities 
of the European Union legislature in that it requires the conflicting interests at issue to be weighed 
up on the basis of a number of assessments. Furthermore, those provisions, which concern the 
conferral of powers of public authority on border guards, mean that the fundamental rights of the 
persons concerned may be interfered with to such an extent that the involvement of the European 
Union legislature is required. The Court therefore annulled Decision 2010/252 in its entirety.
In the area of public access to documents of the European Union institutions, which regularly pro-
vides a source of litigation, two judgments delivered on the same date merit special attention.
Case C-404/10 P Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob (judgment of 28 June 2012) and Case C-477/10 P 
Commission v Agrofert Holding (judgment of 28 June 2012) provided the Court with the opportunity 
to examine, for the first time, the relationship between Regulation No 1049/2001 on public ac-
cess to documents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission (4) and Regulation 
No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings. (5)
In those two cases appeals had been brought before the Court by the Commission against two 
judgments of the General Court (6) whereby that Court had annulled two Commission decisions 
refusing access to documents relating to two merger control procedures.
The Court of Justice held that, in order to justify refusal of access to a document, it is not sufficient, 
in principle, for that document to fall within an activity or an interest, such as protection of the 
(1)  Council Decision 2010/252/EU of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards the sur-
veillance of the sea external borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union (OJ 2010 L 111, p. 20).
(2)  Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing 
a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) 
(OJ 2006 L 105, p. 1).
(3)  See footnote 2.
(4)  Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43).
(5)  Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertak-
ings (the EC Merger Regulation) (OJ 2004 L 24, p. 1). This regulation repealed Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ 1989 L 395, p. 1, 
and corrigendum at OJ 1990 L 257, p. 13). However, Regulation No 4064/89 continues to apply to concentrations 
put into effect before 1 May 2004, which was the case in Case C-404/10 P.
(6)  Case T-237/05 Éditions Jacob v Commission, judgment of 9 June 2010, and Case T-111/07 Agrofert Holding 
v Commission, judgment of 7 July 2010. Annual Report 2012  15
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purpose of an investigation, set out in Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 (7), but the institution 
concerned must also supply explanations as to how access to that document could specifically and 
actually undermine the interest protected by an exception laid down in that article. However, it is 
open to the institution to base its decisions in that regard on general presumptions which apply to 
certain categories of documents, as similar general considerations are likely to apply to requests for 
disclosure relating to documents of the same nature. Such general presumptions are applicable to 
merger control operations because the legislation governing those procedures, notably Regulation 
No 139/2004 (8), also lays down strict rules applicable to the treatment of information obtained or 
established in those proceedings.
Therefore, generalised access, on the basis of Regulation No 1049/2001, to the documents ex-
changed in such a procedure between the Commission and the notifying parties or third parties 
would jeopardise the balance which the European Union sought to ensure in the merger regula-
tion between the obligation placed on the undertakings concerned to supply the Commission with 
possibly sensitive commercial information to enable it to assess the compatibility of the proposed 
transaction with the common market, on the one hand, and the guarantee of increased protection, 
by virtue of the requirement of professional secrecy and business secrecy, for the information thus 
provided to the Commission, on the other. A general presumption of that kind justifying refusal 
of access to those documents is required irrespective of whether the request for access concerns 
a control procedure which is already closed or a pending procedure. However, that general pre-
sumption does not exclude the possibility of demonstrating that a given document, disclosure 
of which has been requested, is not covered by that presumption, or that there is a higher public 
interest justifying the disclosure of the document concerned by virtue of Article 4(2) of Regulation 
No 1049/2001.
The issue of the protection of fundamental rights, which is necessarily complex owing to the diver-
sity of sources in that area, was addressed in Case C-571/10 Kamberaj (judgment of 24 April 2012), 
which concerned the interpretation of Directive 2003/109. (9) In its judgment, the Court ruled on 
the scope of Article 6(3) TEU, stating that the reference which that article makes to the European 
Convention on Human Rights does not require the national court, in the event of conflict between 
a provision of national law and that convention, to apply the provisions of that convention directly, 
disapplying the provision of national law incompatible with the convention.
That provision of the Treaty on European Union reflects the principle that fundamental rights form 
an integral part of the general principles of law the observance of which the Court ensures. How-
ever, it does not govern the relationship between the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the legal systems of the Member States, nor does it lay down the conclusions to be drawn by 
a national court in the event of conflict between the rights guaranteed by that convention and 
a provision of national law.
Given the place which it now occupies in proceedings before the Court, it is clear that the issue of 
the scope and implications of the creation of citizenship of the Union has by no means revealed all 
its aspects, as may be seen from a number of cases that should be mentioned.
(7)  See footnote 4.
(8)  See footnote 5.
(9)  Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are 
long-term residents (OJ 2004 L 16, p. 44).16  Annual Report 2012
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In Case C-348/09 P�I� (judgment of 22 May 2012), the Court held that criminal offences in areas of 
particularly serious crime, such as the sexual exploitation of children, may justify an expulsion 
measure against a citizen of the Union who has lived in the host Member State for more than 
10 years.
Under Article 28(3) of Directive 2004/38, (10) a host Member State may not take an expulsion deci-
sion against Union citizens who have resided continuously on its territory for 10 years except on 
‘imperative grounds of public security’. (11) In a case involving an expulsion decision against a citi-
zen of the Union who had served a term of imprisonment for rape of a minor, the Court ruled that 
Member States may regard criminal offences such as those referred to in Article 83 TFEU as con-
stituting a particularly serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of society, which might 
pose a direct threat to the calm and physical security of the population and thus be covered by 
the concept of ‘imperative grounds of public security’. None the less, those offences may justify an 
expulsion measure only if the manner in which they were committed discloses particularly serious 
characteristics. Furthermore, under European Union law issue of any expulsion measure is condi-
tional on the requirement that the personal conduct of the individual concerned must represent 
a genuine, present threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society or of the host Mem-
ber State, which implies, in general, the existence in the individual concerned of a propensity to 
act in the same way in the future. Last, before taking an expulsion decision, the host Member State 
must take account of considerations such as how long the individual concerned has resided on its 
territory, his age, state of health, family and economic situation, social and cultural integration into 
that State and the extent of his links with his country of origin. 
In Case C-83/11 Rahman and Others, (12) the Court provided significant clarification concerning the 
right for the family to be brought together for the purposes of Directive 2004/38. The main provi-
sion at issue was Article 3(2) of that directive, which provides that the host Member State of a Union 
citizen is to facilitate, in accordance with its national legislation, entry and residence for members 
of the ‘extended family’ of the person concerned. (13) As a preliminary point, the Court, relying on 
the wording and the structure of that directive, emphasised that the directive does not oblige the 
Member States to grant every application for entry or residence submitted by the ‘extended family’ 
of a migrant. None the less, it imposes an obligation on Member States to confer certain advan-
tages on the extended family by comparison with applications submitted by other third-country 
nationals who have no relationship with a Union national. Those advantages consist in being able 
to require a decision from the host Member State on their application that is based on an extensive 
examination of their personal situation and duly reasoned in the event of refusal. That examina-
tion must cover, for example, the extent of economic or physical dependence and the degree of 
(10) Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of 
the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amend-
ing Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 
75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004 L 158, p. 77, and corrigenda at OJ 2004 
L 229, p. 35, and OJ 2004 L 197, p. 34).
(11) Article 28(3) of Directive 2004/38.
(12) Judgment of 5 September 2012.
(13)  Article 2(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC confers extended rights on a first circle of beneficiaries, including the spouse 
or registered partner of the migrant, their direct common or respective descendants who are under the age of 21 
or are dependants, and also their dependent direct relatives in the ascending line. Article 3(2)(a) of the directive 
concerns another circle of beneficiaries, the ‘extended family’, defined as ‘any other family members, irrespective 
of their nationality, not falling under the definition in [Article 2(2)] who, in the country from which they have 
come, are dependants or members of the household of the Union citizen having the primary right of residence, or 
where serious health grounds strictly require the personal care of the family member by the Union citizen’.Annual Report 2012  17
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relationship between the applicant and the Union citizen. Each Member State has a wide discretion 
as regards the selection of the factors to be taken into account, which must, however, be consistent 
with the idea of preferential treatment of applicants and must not deprive Article 3 of the directive 
of its effectiveness. In addition, the applicant is entitled to a judicial review of whether the national 
legislation and its application have remained within the limits of the wide discretion set by the 
directive. The Court also considered whether the leeway conferred on the States by the directive 
enables them to impose requirements as to the nature and the duration of the dependence of the 
member of the extended family vis-à-vis the European Union citizen. The Court explained that the 
situation of dependence vis-à-vis the Union citizen must exist in the country from which the family 
member concerned comes at the time when he applies to join the Union citizen on whom he is de-
pendent. On the other hand, the Court ruled that the question whether the beneficiaries referred 
to in Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/38 may be refused a residence card in the host Member State on 
the ground that, after their entry into the host Member State, they have ceased to be dependants 
of that citizen ‘does not fall within the scope of the directive’.
In Case C-249/11 Byankov (judgment of 4 October 2012), the Court ruled on the question whether 
the provisions of the FEU Treaty on citizenship and Directive 2004/38 preclude a Bulgarian provi-
sion under which a debtor who fails to pay an unsecured private debt may be prohibited from 
leaving the territory. The Court held that, even if the view could reasonably be taken that some 
idea of safeguarding the requirements of public policy underlies the objective of protecting credi-
tors pursued by such a provision, it cannot be ruled out that a measure prohibiting a person from 
leaving the territory that is adopted on the basis of that provision pursues an exclusively economic 
objective. However, Article 27(1) of Directive 2004/38 expressly excludes the possibility of a Mem-
ber State invoking grounds of public policy to serve economic ends. Furthermore, as regards the 
proportionality of such a provision, the Court pointed out that there exists within European Union 
law a body of legal rules that are capable of protecting creditors without necessarily restricting the 
debtor’s freedom of movement. The Court also held that European Union law precludes a national 
provision under which an administrative procedure that has resulted in the adoption of a prohibi-
tion on leaving the territory, which has become final and has not been contested before the courts, 
may be reopened, in the event of the prohibition being clearly contrary to European Union law, 
only within one month of the prohibition being imposed and only at the initiative of certain bod-
ies, in spite of the fact that such a prohibition produces legal effects with regard to its addressee. 
A prohibition of that kind is the antithesis of the freedom conferred by Union citizenship to move 
and reside within the territory of the Member States.
In Case C-364/10 Hungary v Slovakia (judgment of 16 October 2012), an action for failure to fulfil 
obligations was brought before the Court by one Member State against another Member State, (14) 
a remedy rarely used. (15) The Court ruled on the delicate question whether a measure prohibiting 
the Head of State of another Member State from entering the national territory infringed the provi-
sions of the FEU Treaty on citizenship of the Union.
The Court held that a Head of State holding the nationality of a Member State unquestionably en-
joys the status of citizen of the Union, which, in accordance with Article 21 TFEU, confers a primary 
and individual right to move and reside within the territory of the Member States, subject to the 
(14)  Article 259 TFEU.
(15) This was only the sixth time in the history of European integration that a Member State had brought a direct 
action for failure to fulfil obligations against another Member State. Of the five earlier cases, only three were 
brought to a close by a judgment (Case 141/78 France v United Kingdom, judgment of 4 October 1979; Case 
C-388/95 Belgium v Spain, judgment of 16 May 2000, see also press release No 36/00; and Case C-145/04 Spain 
v United Kingdom, judgment of 12 September 2006, see also press release No 70/06).18  Annual Report 2012
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limitations and restrictions laid down by the Treaties and the measures adopted for their imple-
mentation. Such limitations may also be based on relevant rules of international law, which is part 
of the European Union legal order. In that context, the Court observed that, on the basis of cus-
tomary rules of general international law and those of multilateral agreements, the Head of State 
enjoys a particular status in international relations which entails, inter alia, privileges and immuni-
ties. The status of Head of State therefore has a specific character, resulting from the fact that it is 
governed by international law, with the consequence that the conduct of such a person at interna-
tional level, such as that person’s presence in another State, comes under that law, in particular the 
law governing diplomatic relations. Such a specific feature is capable of distinguishing the person 
who enjoys that status from all other Union citizens, with the result that that person’s access to the 
territory of another Member State is not governed by the same conditions as those applicable to 
other citizens. Consequently, the fact that a Union citizen performs the duties of a Head of State is 
such as to justify a limitation, based on international law, on the exercise of the right to freedom of 
movement conferred on that person by Article 21 TFEU. The Court concluded that European Union 
law did not oblige the Slovak Republic to guarantee access to its territory to the President of 
Hungary and dismissed the action in its entirety.
In Case C-40/11 Iida (judgment of 8 November 2012), the Court was asked whether a third-country 
national legally resident in the Member State of origin of his daughter and his spouse could, in cir-
cumstances where the daughter and spouse settled in another Member State, benefit from a right 
of residence under Directive 2004/38 or the provisions of the FEU Treaty on Union citizenship.
The Court observed, first of all, that that directive confers a right of residence only on relatives in 
the ascending line who are dependent on their child, who is a Union citizen. On the other hand, 
the separated, but not divorced, spouse of a Union citizen must be regarded as a member of the 
family within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the directive. However, the directive confers a derived 
right of residence solely on members of the family of a Union citizen who accompany or join that 
person. Last, the Court recalled that a third-country national can claim a right of residence on the 
basis of the provisions of the FEU Treaty on Union citizenship (16) only if the refusal to grant a right 
of residence might deny the Union citizen the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights 
associated with his status as a Union citizen or impede the exercise of his right to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States. Purely hypothetical prospects of exercising the 
right to freedom of movement of Union citizens do not establish a sufficient connection with 
European Union law to justify the application of those provisions.
Agriculture
In respect of agricultural aid schemes, Case C-489/10 Bonda (judgment of 5 June 2012) provided 
the Court with the opportunity to rule on the legal nature of the measures provided for in the 
second and third subparagraphs of Article 138(1) of Regulation No 1973/2004. (17) Those measures 
consist in excluding a farmer from receiving aid for the year in respect of which he has made a false 
declaration as to the area eligible for aid and in reducing the aid to which he would be entitled 
for the following three calendar years up to an amount which corresponds to the difference be-
tween the area declared and the area determined. The Court began by recalling that penalties laid 
down in rules of the common agricultural policy, such as the temporary exclusion of an economic 
(16) Articles 20 TFEU and 21 TFEU.
(17)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1973/2004 of 29 October 2004 laying down detailed rules for the application of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 as regards the support schemes provided for in Titles IV and IVa of that 
Regulation and the use of land set aside for the production of raw materials (OJ 2004 L 345, p. 1).Annual Report 2012  19
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operator from the benefit of an aid scheme, are not of a criminal nature. It further observed that, 
in the context of a European Union aid scheme in which the granting of the aid is necessarily sub-
ject to the condition that the beneficiary offers all guarantees of probity and trustworthiness, the 
penalty imposed in the event of non-compliance with those requirements constitutes a specific 
administrative instrument forming an integral part of the scheme of aid and intended to ensure 
the sound financial management of public funds of the European Union. Consequently, the Court 
held that the exclusion of a farmer from receiving agricultural aid, on account of a false declaration 
of the area of his holding, is not a criminal penalty. Accordingly, such exclusion does not preclude 
the imposition of a criminal penalty in respect of the same facts.
Free movement of persons, services and capital
In the area of freedom of movement for persons, freedom to provide services and the free move-
ment of capital, a number of judgments are worthy of attention. In the interests of clarity, these 
judgments will be presented in groups, on the basis of the particular freedom with which they 
deal, and then, as the case may be, of the fields of activity concerned.
In the area of freedom of movement for workers, two cases are worthy of mention. First, refer-
ence will be made to Joined Cases C-611/10 and C-612/10 Hudzinski and Wawrzyniak (judgment of 
12 June 2012), concerning the interpretation of Regulation No 1408/71, as amended by Regulation 
No 647/2005, (18) and of Articles 45 TFEU and 48 TFEU. In this instance, the German authorities re-
fused to grant family allowances to two Polish nationals, residing in Poland and covered by social 
security in that country, who had worked in Germany as a seasonal worker and a worker posted to 
that Member State by his employer, respectively, on the ground that comparable family allowances 
could be received in Poland. In that context, the Court held that Articles 14(1)(a) and 14a(1)(a) of 
Regulation No 1408/71 do not preclude a Member State which is not designated under those pro-
visions as being the competent State from granting child benefits in accordance with its national 
law to a migrant worker who is working temporarily within the territory of that Member State — 
where he is subject to unlimited income tax liability, but covered by the social security regime of 
the competent State — including where it is established, first, that that worker has not suffered any 
legal disadvantage by reason of the fact that he has exercised his freedom of movement, since he 
has retained his entitlement to family benefits of the same kind in the competent Member State, 
and, second, that neither that worker nor the child for whom the benefit is claimed habitually res-
ides within the territory of the Member State in which the temporary work was carried out. The 
Court made clear, however, that the rules of the FEU Treaty on the free movement of workers pre-
clude the application, in a situation where a worker is temporarily posted in a Member State other 
than the competent Member State, of a rule of national law designed to prevent the overlapping 
of child benefits, if that rule entails, not a reduction of the amount of the benefit corresponding 
to the amount of a comparable benefit received in another State, but exclusion from that benefit.
Second, reference will be made to Case C-367/11 Prete (judgment of 25 October 2012), which con-
cerned the grant of a tideover allowance to young persons looking for their first job. In this case, 
the Court held that Article 39 EC precludes a national provision which makes the right to that allow-
ance subject to the condition that the person concerned has completed at least six years’ studies in 
an educational establishment of the host Member State, in so far as that condition prevents other 
(18)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed 
persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community (OJ, English 
Special Edition 1971(II), p. 416), in the version resulting from Council Regulation (EC) No 118/97 of 2 Decem-
ber 1996 (OJ 1997 L 28, p. 1), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 647/2005 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 13 April 2005 (OJ 2005 L 117, p. 1).20  Annual Report 2012
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representative factors liable to establish the existence of a real link between the person claiming 
the allowance and the geographic employment market concerned from being taken into account 
and, accordingly, goes beyond what is necessary to attain the aim pursued by that provision, which 
is to ensure the existence of link exists. According to the Court, such a condition, which may well 
place nationals of other Member States, above all, at a disadvantage, could be justified only if, by its 
application, the national legislature wished to ensure the existence of a real link between the per-
son claiming that allowance and the geographic employment market concerned. That is not the 
case of national legislation under which, for the purpose of appraising the existence of such a link, 
the fact that the claimant, making use of the freedom of movement guaranteed to Union citizens 
by Article 18 EC, moved to the host Member State in order to establish his marital residence there, 
following his marriage to a national of that State, and has lived there for a certain time, and also 
the fact that he has been registered for a certain time as a job seeker with an employment service 
of that Member State while actively looking for work there, cannot be taken into account. In fact, 
those various circumstances are capable of establishing the existence of such a link.
In the area of freedom of establishment, the Court clarified its case-law in relation to restrictions 
imposed on the transfer of the seat of a company within the European Union.
First, in Case C-378/10 VALE Építési (judgment of 12 July 2012), the Court considered the refusal of 
the Hungarian authorities to register a company of Italian origin in the national commercial register 
following its removal from the register in Italy and its application to be converted into a company 
governed by Hungarian law. In that context, the Court held that Articles 49 TFEU and 54 TFEU pre-
clude national legislation which, although enabling a company established under national law to 
convert, does not allow, in a general manner, a company governed by the law of another Member 
State to convert to a company governed by national law by incorporating such a company. Accord-
ing to the Court, overriding reasons in the public interest, such as the protection of the interests 
of creditors, minority shareholders and employees, the preservation of the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision and the fairness of commercial transactions, cannot justify such legislation, when that 
legislation precludes, in a general manner, cross-border conversions and therefore prevents such 
operations from being carried out even if the abovementioned interests are not threatened. In 
any event, such a rule goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective designed to protect 
those interests. The Court recalled, moreover, that the host Member State is entitled to determine 
the national law applicable to such operations and thus to apply the national law provisions on 
domestic conversions governing the incorporation and functioning of a company. However, the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness, respectively, preclude that State from refusing to re-
cord the company which has applied to convert as the ‘predecessor in law’, if such a record is made 
of the predecessor company in the commercial register for domestic conversions, and from refus-
ing to take due account, when examining a company’s application for registration, of documents 
obtained from the authorities of the Member State of origin.
Second, in Case C-380/11 DI VI Finanziaria di Diego della Valle (judgment of 6 September 2012), the 
Court held that Article 49 TFEU precludes national legislation under which the grant of a reduc-
tion in capital tax is conditional upon a company’s remaining liable to that tax for the next five 
tax years, where the company transfers its seat to another Member State. According to the Court, 
such a restriction cannot be justified by the requirement of balanced allocation of powers of taxa-
tion between the Member States. Indeed, withdrawing from a company the capital tax reduction 
which it was receiving and requiring immediate payment when the company transfers its seat to 
another Member State do not ensure either the powers of taxation of the latter Member State or 
the balanced allocation of the powers of taxation between the Member States concerned, since 
the very nature of the mechanism of withdrawing an advantage implies that the Member State 
had agreed, in advance, to grant that advantage and, consequently, to reduce the capital tax of Annual Report 2012  21
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resident taxpayers if the conditions laid down in the national legislation were satisfied. Moreover, 
that restriction cannot be justified by the need to ensure the coherence of the national tax system.
As regards the Treaty rules on freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services, refer-
ence will be made to Joined Cases C-72/10 and C-77/10 Costa and Cifone (judgment of 16 February 
2012), which follows on from Joined Cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04 Placanica (judgment 
of 6 March 2007). A number of questions were referred to the Court relating to measures taken by 
the Italian Republic to remedy the exclusion of certain betting and gaming operators, which was 
declared unlawful by the Court in 2007. The Court held, first of all, that Articles 43 EC and 49 EC 
and the principles of equal treatment and effectiveness preclude a Member State which seeks to 
remedy that infringement of European Union law by putting out to tender a significant number of 
new licences from protecting the market positions acquired by the existing operators by providing, 
inter alia, that a minimum distance must be observed between the establishments of new licence 
holders and those of existing operators. According to the Court, a system of minimum distances 
between outlets would be justifiable only if such rules did not have as their true objective the pro-
tection of the market positions of the existing operators, rather than the objective of channelling 
demand for betting and gaming into controlled systems. The Court then stated that Articles 43 EC 
and 49 EC preclude the imposition of penalties for engaging in the organised activity of collecting 
bets without a licence or police authorisation on persons who are linked to an operator which was 
excluded, in breach of European Union law, from an earlier tendering procedure, even following 
the new tendering procedure intended to remedy that breach of European Union law, in so far as 
that tendering procedure and the subsequent award of new licences have not in fact remedied 
the unlawful exclusion of that operator from the earlier tendering procedure. Last, according to 
the Court, it follows from Articles 43 EC and 49 EC, the principle of equal treatment, the obligation 
of transparency and the principle of legal certainty that the conditions and detailed rules of a ten-
dering procedure relating to gambling on events other than horse racing and, in particular, the 
provisions concerning the withdrawal of licences granted under that tendering procedure must be 
drawn up in a clear, precise and unequivocal manner.
In the area of freedom of establishment and free movement of capital, reference will be made to 
Case C-35/11 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation (judgment of 13 November 2012), which fol-
lows on from a first judgment delivered in 2006 (Case C-446/04, judgment of 12 December 2006). 
A number of questions were again referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling on the United 
Kingdom tax regime applying an exemption method to nationally sourced dividends and an impu-
tation method to foreign-sourced dividends, and the Court provided clarification of the scope of its 
2006 judgment. It thus ruled, in particular, that Articles 49 TFEU and 63 TFEU preclude the regime 
at issue if it is established, first, that the tax credit to which the company receiving the dividends 
is entitled under the imputation method is equivalent to the amount of the tax actually paid on 
the profits underlying the distributed dividends and, second, that the effective level of taxation 
of company profits in the Member State concerned is generally lower than the prescribed nomi-
nal rate of tax in that State. Furthermore, the Court provided clarification of the scope of Art-
icle 63 TFEU. In that regard, it held that a company that is resident in a Member State and has a share-
holding in a company resident in a third country giving it definite influence over the decisions of 
the latter company and enabling it to determine its activities may rely on Article 63 TFEU in order 
to call into question the consistency with that provision of legislation of that Member State which 
relates to the tax treatment of dividends originating in the third country and does not apply ex-
clusively to situations in which the parent company exercises decisive influence over the company 
paying the dividends.
Last, the Treaty provisions on free movement of capital were interpreted in the context of the lend-
ing for cross-border use, free of charge, of a motor vehicle. In Joined Cases C-578/10 to C-580/10 van 22  Annual Report 2012
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Putten and Others (judgment of 26 April 2012), the Court, after finding that such a loan of a vehicle 
constitutes movement of capital within the meaning of Article 56 EC (now Article 63 TFEU), ruled 
that that article precludes legislation of a Member State which requires residents who have bor-
rowed a motor vehicle registered in another Member State from a resident of that State to pay, 
on first use of that vehicle on the national road network, the full amount of a tax normally due on 
registration of a vehicle in the first Member State, without taking account of the duration of the 
use of that vehicle on that road network and without that person being able to invoke a right to 
exemption or reimbursement where that vehicle is neither intended to be used essentially in the 
first Member State on a permanent basis nor, in fact, used in that way. According to the Court, in 
such circumstances, the connection of those vehicles with the territory of the Member State would 
be insufficient to justify the charging of a tax normally due on registration of a vehicle in that State.
Visas, asylum and immigration
A number of judgments relating to these various areas merit attention. In Case C-620/10 Kastrati 
(judgment of 3 May 2012), the Court was requested to rule on the consequences of the withdrawal 
of an application for asylum within the meaning of Regulation No 343/2003. (19) The Court held that 
that regulation must be interpreted as meaning that the withdrawal of an application for asylum 
within the meaning of Article 2(c) of that regulation which occurs before the Member State respon-
sible for examining that application has agreed to take charge of the applicant has the effect that 
that regulation can no longer be applicable. In such a case, it is for the Member State within whose 
territory the application was lodged to take the decisions required as a result of that withdrawal 
and, in particular, to discontinue the examination of the application, with a record of the informa-
tion relating to it being placed in the applicant’s file.
Where the applicant withdraws his single asylum application before the requested Member State 
has agreed to take charge of him, the principal objective of Regulation No 343/2003, namely the 
identification of the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application in order to 
guarantee effective access to an appraisal of the refugee status of the applicant, can no longer be 
attained.
In Joined Cases C-71/11 and C-99/11 Y and Z (judgment of 5 September 2012), the Court consid-
ered the conditions governing the grant of refugee status, and more particularly the concept of 
an act of persecution on religious grounds for the purposes of Articles 2(c) and 9(1)(a) of Directive 
2004/83 (20). Y and Z, who were from Pakistan, lived in Germany, where they had sought asylum 
and protection as refugees. They claimed that they had been forced to leave Pakistan because they 
were members of the Ahmadiyya community.
The Court stated, first of all, that only certain forms of serious interference with the right to reli-
gious freedom — and not any interference with that right — can constitute an act of persecution 
that would oblige the competent authorities to grant refugee status. Thus, first, limitations on the 
exercise of that right which are provided for by law cannot be regarded as persecution provided 
(19) Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for deter-
mining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States 
by a third-country national (OJ 2003 L 50, p. 1).
(20) Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection 
and the content of the protection granted (OJ 2004 L 304, p. 12).Annual Report 2012  23
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that they respect the essential content of that right. Second, the actual violation of that right con-
stitutes persecution only if it is sufficiently serious and if it has a significant effect on the person 
concerned.
Next, the Court observed that acts that may constitute a severe violation include serious acts which 
interfere with the freedom of the person concerned not only to practise his faith in private circles 
but also to live that faith publicly.
Furthermore, the Court held that, where it is established that, upon his return to his country of ori-
gin, the person concerned will carry out religious acts which will expose him to a real risk of perse-
cution, he should be granted refugee status. In that regard, the Court considered that, in assessing 
an application for refugee status on an individual basis, the national authorities cannot reasonably 
expect the applicant to refrain from demonstrating or practising certain religious acts in order to 
avoid the risk of persecution.
Last, in determining the level of risk to which the applicant would be exposed in his country of 
origin on account of his religion, the Court explained that the subjective circumstance that the 
observance of a certain religious practice in public, which is subject to the restrictions at issue, 
is of particular importance to the person concerned in order to preserve his religious identity is 
a relevant factor.
In Case C-245/11 K (judgment of 6 November 2012), the Court held that Article 15(2) of Regulation 
No 343/2003 (21) must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances where a person enjoying 
asylum in a Member State is dependent, because, in particular, of serious illness, on a member of 
his family who is an asylum seeker but whose asylum application is, under the criteria set out in 
Chapter III of that regulation, being examined in another Member State, the Member State in which 
those persons reside becomes responsible for examining the application for asylum.
The Court considered that it is for that Member State to assume the obligations which go along 
with that responsibility and to inform the Member State previously responsible that it is doing so, 
even where the latter Member State has not made a request to that effect in accordance with the 
second sentence of Article 15(1) of that regulation.
Article 15(2) of Regulation No 343/2003 is applicable in a situation of dependency where it is not 
the asylum seeker himself who is dependent on the assistance of the family member present in 
a Member State other than that identified as responsible by reference to the criteria set out in 
Chapter III of Regulation No 343/2003, but the family member present in that other Member State 
who is dependent on the assistance of the asylum seeker.
That provision is also applicable where the humanitarian grounds referred to therein are satisfied 
in relation to a dependent person within the meaning of that provision who, not being a family 
member within the meaning of Article 2(i) of that regulation, has family ties with the asylum seeker 
and is a person to whom the asylum seeker can actually provide the assistance needed in accord-
ance with Article 11(4) of Commission Regulation No 1560/2003 (22) laying down detailed rules for 
the application of Regulation No 343/2003.
(21) See footnote 19.
(22)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1560/2003 of 2 September 2003 laying down detailed rules for the application 
of Regulation No 343/2003 (OJ 2003 L 222, p. 3).24  Annual Report 2012
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Still in the area of asylum law, in Case C-364/11 Abed El Karem El Kott and Others (judgment of 19 De-
cember 2012) the Court interpreted the second sentence of Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2004/83 (23) 
in harmony with the Geneva Convention (24) which provides the cornerstone of the international 
legal regime for the protection of refugees. The Court held that cessation of protection or assist-
ance from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Com-
mission for Refugees ‘for any reason’ includes the situation in which a person who, after actually 
availing himself of such protection or assistance, ceases to receive it for a reason beyond his control 
and independent of his volition. It is for the competent national authorities of the Member State 
responsible for examining the asylum application made by such a person to ascertain, by carrying 
out an assessment of the application on an individual basis, whether that person was forced to 
leave the area of operations of such an organ or agency, which will be the case where that person’s 
personal safety was at serious risk and it was impossible for that organ or agency to guarantee that 
his living conditions in that area would be commensurate with the mission entrusted to that organ 
or agency.
The Court also observed that the second sentence of Article 12(1)(a) of Directive 2004/83 must be 
interpreted as meaning that, where the competent authorities of the Member State responsible 
for examining the application for asylum have established that the condition relating to the ces-
sation of the protection or assistance provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is satisfied as regards the applicant, the fact that that 
person is ipso facto ‘entitled to the benefit of [the] directive’ means that that Member State must 
recognise him as a refugee within the meaning of Article 2(c) of that directive and that person must 
automatically be granted refugee status, provided always that he is not caught by Article 12(1)(b) 
or (2) and (3) of the directive.
In the area of immigration, in Case C-571/10 Kamberaj (judgment of 24 April 2012) the Tribunale di 
Bolzano (District Court, Bolzano, Italy) requested the Court to rule on the compatibility with Direc-
tive 2003/109 (25) of a mechanism for allocation of the funds for housing benefit which treated 
long-term residents of third countries worse than European Union nationals. 
The Court observed, first of all, that a third-country national who has acquired the status of long-
term resident in a Member State is, with respect to housing benefit, in a situation comparable to 
that of a citizen of the Union with the same economic need.
Next, according to the Court, it is for the national court to assess whether housing benefit falls 
within one of the sectors referred to in Directive 2003/09, taking into account both the integration 
objective pursued by that directive and the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Ac-
cording to that directive, in the sectors of social assistance and social protection Member States 
may limit the application of equal treatment to core benefits. The Court explained that the mean-
ing and scope of the concept of core benefits must be sought taking account of the objective pur-
sued by that directive, namely the integration of third-country nationals who have resided legally 
and continually in the Member States. That concept must be interpreted in a manner that complies 
with the principles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (26), which recognises and respects the 
(23) See footnote 20.
(24) Geneva Convention of 28  July  1951 Relating to the Status of Refugees (United Nations Treaty Collection, 
Vol. 189, p. 150, No 2545 (1954)).
(25) Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are 
long-term residents (OJ 2004 L 16, p. 44).
(26) Article 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.Annual Report 2012  25
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right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack 
sufficient resources.
In addition, the Court recalled that, as the right of third-country nationals to equal treatment in the 
sectors listed in that directive is the general rule, any derogation in that regard must be interpreted 
strictly and can be relied on only if the bodies in the Member State concerned responsible for the 
implementation of the directive have stated clearly that they intended to rely on that derogation.
Consequently, the Court ruled that Article 11(1)(d) of Directive 2003/109 must be interpreted as 
precluding a national or regional law which — when funds intended for housing assistance are al-
located — provides for different treatment of third-county nationals and nationals of the Member 
State in which they reside, in so far as the housing assistance falls within the sectors covered by the 
principle of equal treatment laid down in that directive concerning third-country nationals who are 
long-term residents and constitutes a core benefit within the meaning of that directive, matters 
which it is for the national court to determine.
As regards border controls, more than two years after Melki and Abdeli (27) the Court, in Case 
C-278/12 PPU Adil (judgment of 19  July  2012), interpreted Articles 20 and 21 of Regulation 
No 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons 
across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (28), this time on a reference for a preliminary ruling from 
the Council of State of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The proceedings before that court were 
between a third-country national, who had been placed in administrative detention owing to the 
unlawful nature of his situation on Netherlands territory after having been stopped during a check 
carried out in the Netherlands in the frontier area with Germany, and the Minister voor Immigratie, 
Integratie en Asiel (Minister for Immigration, Integration and Asylum) and they concerned the law-
fulness of that check and, consequently of his detention.
The Court held that Articles 20 and 21 of that regulation do not preclude national legislation which 
enables officials responsible for border surveillance and the monitoring of foreign nationals to car-
ry out checks, in a geographic area 20 kilometres from the land border between a Member State 
and the State parties to the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, with a view to 
establishing whether the persons stopped satisfy the requirements for lawful residence applicable 
in the Member State concerned, when those checks are based on general information and expe-
rience regarding the illegal residence of persons at the places where the checks are to be made, 
when they may also be carried out to a limited extent in order to obtain such general information 
and experience-based data in that regard, and when the carrying out of those checks is subject to 
certain limitations concerning, inter alia, their intensity and frequency. Those checks are not border 
checks prohibited by Article 20 of Regulation No 562/2006 and Article 21(a) of that regulation pro-
hibits such checks only where they have an effect equivalent to border checks.
Last, in Case C-83/12 PPU Vo (judgment of 10 April 2012), the Court provided clarification of its case-
law on visa policy, in the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof 
(Federal Court of Justice, Germany) in criminal proceedings against a Vietnamese national for hav-
ing secured the entry into German territory of third-country nationals holding visas obtained by 
fraud. The Court ruled that Articles 21 and 34 of Regulation No 810/2009 establishing a Community 
(27) Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10, judgment of 22 June 2010.
(28) See footnote 2.26  Annual Report 2012
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Code on Visas (Visa Code) (29) do not preclude national provisions under which assisting illegal 
immigration constitutes an offence subject to criminal penalties where the persons smuggled, 
third-country nationals, hold visas which they obtained fraudulently by deceiving the competent 
authorities of the Member State of issue as to the true purpose of their journey, without prior an-
nulment of those visas.
Judicial cooperation in civil matters and private international law
In 2012 the Court delivered a number of decisions relating to judicial cooperation in civil matters.
In Case C-92/12 PPU Health Service Executive (judgment of 26 April 2012), the Court ruled in urgent 
preliminary ruling proceedings on various aspects of Regulation No 2201/2003 (30) concerning jur-
isdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the mat-
ters of parental responsibility. First of all, the Court ruled that a judgment of a court of a Member 
State which orders a child to be placed in a secure institution providing therapeutic and educa-
tional care situated in another Member State and which entails that, for her own protection, the 
child is deprived of her liberty for a specific period, falls within the material scope of Regulation 
No 2201/2003. Next, the Court held that the consent referred to in Article 56(2) of the regulation 
must be given, prior to the making of the judgment on placement of a child, by a competent au-
thority, governed by public law. It stated that where there is uncertainty as to whether a consent 
was validly given in the requested Member State, because it was not possible to identify with cer-
tainty the competent authority in that State, an irregularity may be corrected in order to ensure 
that the requirement of consent imposed by Article 56 of the regulation has been fully complied 
with.
As regards the enforceability of a judgment of a court of a Member State which orders the compul-
sory placement of a child in a secure care institution situated in another Member State, the Court 
ruled that such a judgment must, before its enforcement in the requested Member State, be de-
clared to be enforceable in that Member State. In order not to deprive the regulation of its effec-
tiveness, the application for a declaration of enforceability must be dealt with with particular expe-
dition and appeals brought against such a decision of the court of the requested Member State 
must not have a suspensive effect. Last, the Court ruled that consent to placement in the requested 
Member State is valid only for the period stated in the judgment of the court of the requesting 
Member State and that, where the judgment is renewed, new consent must be sought from the 
requested Member State. Likewise, a judgment on placement for a specific period declared to 
be enforceable can be enforced in the requested Member State only for the period stated in the 
judgment on placement.
In Case C-527/10 ERSTE Bank Hungary (judgment of 5 July 2012), the Court was required to deter-
mine whether Article 5(1) of Regulation No 1346/2000 (31) on insolvency proceedings, which con-
cerns the rights in rem of third parties over the debtor’s assets situated on the territory of a Mem-
ber State other than that of the place in which the insolvency proceedings were opened, is also 
applicable where the asset in question is on the territory of a State which became a member of 
(29) Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing 
a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) (OJ 2009 L 243, p. 1).
(30) Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regula-
tion (EC) No 1347/2000 (OJ 2003 L 338, p. 1).
(31) Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings (OJ 2000 L 160, p. 1).Annual Report 2012  27
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the European Union only after the proceedings against the debtor had been opened. First of all, 
the Court recalled that Article 4 of the regulation lays down a general principle that the law of the 
Member State in which the insolvency proceedings are opened is to apply to the proceedings and 
to their effects. However, in order to protect legitimate expectations and the legal certainty of 
transactions in Member States other than the State in which proceedings are opened, the regula-
tion lays down a number of exceptions to that rule. Those exceptions include Article 5(1), which 
states that the opening of insolvency proceedings does not affect the rights in rem of creditors in 
respect of assets belonging to the debtor which are situated within the territory of another Mem-
ber State at the time of the opening of the proceedings. According to the Court, Article 5(1) is to be 
understood as a provision which, derogating from the rule of the law of the State in which the pro-
ceedings are opened, allows the law of the Member State on whose territory the asset concerned 
is situated to be applied to the right in rem of a creditor or a third party. The Court held that that 
provision is also applicable to insolvency proceedings opened before the accession of a new Mem-
ber State to the European Union where, on the date of accession, the assets of the debtor — an 
insolvent company whose seat is in an ‘old’ Member State — on which the right in rem concerned 
was based were situated in the new Member State.
In a number of other decisions the Court was required to interpret Regulation No 44/2001 (32), in 
particular in Case C-292/10 G (judgment of 15 March 2012), where the Court held that Article 4(1) of 
that regulation must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude the application of Art-
icle 5(3) of that regulation to an action for liability arising from the operation of an Internet site 
against a defendant who is probably a European Union citizen but whose whereabouts are unknown 
if the court seised of the case does not hold firm evidence to support the conclusion that the defend-
ant is in fact domiciled outside the European Union. The Court also ruled that European Union 
law must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude the issue of a judgment by default 
against a defendant on whom, given that it is impossible to locate him, the document instituting 
proceedings has been served by public notice under national law, provided that the court seised 
of the matter has first satisfied itself that all investigations required by the principles of diligence 
and good faith have been taken to trace the defendant. Furthermore, in the same decision and 
with regard this time to Regulation No 805/2004 (33), the Court made clear that European Union 
law must be interpreted as precluding certification as a European Enforcement Order within the 
meaning of Regulation No 805/2004 of a judgment by default issued against a defendant whose 
address is unknown.
In another decision, in Case C-133/11 Folien Fischer and Fofitec (judgment of 25 October 2012), the 
Court explained the scope of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 44/2001, ruling that an action for a nega-
tive declaration seeking to establish the absence of liability in tort, delict, or quasi-delict falls within 
the scope of that provision.
In Case C-619/10 Trade Agency (judgment of 6 September 2012), the Court had the opportunity to 
interpret the grounds for refusal to recognise and enforce judgments delivered by default which 
are provided for in Article 34(1) and (2) of Regulation No 44/2001.
Article 34(2) allows the court of the Member State in which enforcement is sought to refuse to 
recognise and enforce a judgment given in default of appearance against a defendant on whom 
(32)  Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1).
(33) Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21  April  2004 creating 
a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims (OJ 2004 L 143, p. 15).28  Annual Report 2012
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the document instituting the proceedings was not served or notified in sufficient time and in such 
a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence. Under Article 54 of that regulation, the Member 
State which seeks enforcement of a court judgment must send a certificate to the State in which 
enforcement is sought, indicating the date of service of the document instituting the proceedings. 
The Court recalled that the function ascribed to the certificate is to facilitate, at the beginning of 
the procedure established by that regulation, the adoption of the declaration of enforceability of 
the judgment given in the Member State of origin. However, that objective cannot be attained by 
undermining in any way the rights of the defence. Respect for the rights of the defence means that 
the defendant should, where necessary, be able to appeal in an adversarial procedure against the 
declaration of enforceability if he considers one of the grounds for non-enforcement to be pre-
sent. Where the defendant brings such an action, claiming that he was not served with the docu-
ment instituting the proceedings, the court of the Member State in which enforcement is sought 
has jurisdiction to carry out an independent assessment of all the evidence and ascertain whether 
that evidence is consistent with the information in the certificate, for the purpose of establishing 
whether the defendant in default of appearance was in fact served with the document instituting 
proceedings and if service was effected in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to 
arrange for his defence.
The Court also ruled on the possibility for the court to rely on the clause relating to public policy 
provided for in Article 34(1) of the regulation, on the ground that the judgment to be enforced 
would infringe the defendant’s right to a fair trial. According to the Court, the court of the Member 
State in which enforcement is sought may refuse to enforce a judgment given in default of appear-
ance which disposes of the substance of the dispute but which does not contain an assessment of 
the subject-matter or the basis of the action and which lacks any argument of its merits only if it 
appears to that court, in the light of all the relevant circumstances, that that judgment is a manifest 
and disproportionate breach of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
Last, in Case C-190/11 Mühlleitner (judgment of 6 September 2012), the Court held that the possibil-
ity for a consumer to bring proceedings against a foreign trader before the national courts, pursu-
ant to Article 15(1)(c) of Regulation No 44/2001, does not require that the contract at issue was con-
cluded at a distance. That is applied, in particular, where a consumer travels to the Member State 
of the trader in order to sign the contract. The Court made clear that the essential condition to 
which the application of that rule is subject is that relating to a commercial or professional activity 
directed to the consumer’s domicile. In that regard, both the establishment of contact at a distance 
and the reservation of goods or services at a distance or, a fortiori, the conclusion of a consumer 
contract at a distance, are indications that the contract is connected with such an activity.
Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters
In this area, two cases relating to Framework Decision 2002/584 (34) and to the European arrest 
warrant deserve special mention.
In the first decision, in Case C-192/12 PPU West (judgment of 28 June 2012), the Court considered 
the concept of ‘executing Member State’ within the meaning of Article 28(2) of the Framework 
Decision. That article provides that a person who has been surrendered to the issuing Member 
State pursuant to a European arrest warrant may be surrendered by that State to a Member State 
other than the ‘executing Member State’ under a European arrest warrant issued for any offence 
(34) Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1).Annual Report 2012  29
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committed prior to his surrender only with the consent of that ‘executing Member State’. The prob-
lem in West related to the determination of the ‘executing Member State’ that had to give its con-
sent to a subsequent surrender to another Member State, since the person sought had been sub-
ject to successive requests for surrender. Relying on the objective of the establishment of an area 
of freedom, security and justice pursued by the Framework Decision, and in accordance with the 
mutual confidence which must exist between the Member States, the Court held that Article 28(2) 
of the Framework Decision must be interpreted as meaning that, where a person has been subject 
to more than one surrender between Member States under successive European arrest warrants, 
the subsequent surrender of that person to a Member State other than the Member State having 
last surrendered him is subject to the consent only of the Member State which carried out that last 
surrender.
In the second case, Case C-42/11 Lopes Da Silva Jorge (judgment of 5 September 2012), the Court 
interpreted Article 4(6) of the Framework Decision, which states that the execution of a Euro-
pean arrest warrant may be refused where the person sought for the purposes of the execution of 
his sentence is staying in, or is a national or a resident of, the executing Member State and that 
State undertakes to execute the sentence or detention order in accordance with its domestic law. 
The Court was required to rule on the legality of the French legislation transposing that provision, 
which excluded automatically and absolutely the possibility for nationals of other Member States 
who were resident or staying in France of serving their sentence in France. In application of the 
principle of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality, set out in Article 18 TFEU, the Court 
held that a Member State cannot limit to its own nationals the benefit of non-execution of a Euro-
pean arrest warrant with a view to executing on its own territory a sentence of imprisonment 
imposed in another Member State.
Competition 
In the area of competition, the Court again delivered in the past year a number of judgments which 
merit attention.
As regards agreements, decisions and concerted practices, reference will be made, first, to Case 
C-17/10 Toshiba Corporation and Others (judgment of 14 February 2012), which concerns the applica-
tion of the European Union competition rules to a cartel which produced its effects in a Member 
State before that State’s accession to the European Union. The Court ruled that, in the context of 
a proceeding initiated after 1 May 2004, the provisions of Article 81 EC and Article 3(1) of Regula-
tion No 1/2003 do not apply to a cartel which produced effects, in the territory of a Member State 
which acceded to the European Union on 1 May 2004, during periods before that date. Further-
more, the opening by the European Commission of a proceeding against a cartel under Chap-
ter III of Regulation No 1/2003 does not, pursuant to Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003, read in 
combination with Article 3(1) of that regulation, cause the competition authority of the Member 
State concerned to lose its power, by the application of its national competition law, to penalise 
the anti-competitive effects produced by that cartel on the territory of that Member State dur-
ing periods before its accession to the European Union. As regards the application of the ne bis 
in idem principle, the Court also made clear that that principle does not preclude penalties which 
the national competition authority of the Member State concerned imposes on undertakings par-
ticipating in a cartel on account of the anti-competitive effects to which the cartel gave rise in the 
territory of that Member State before its accession to the European Union, where the fines imposed 
on the same cartel members by a Commission decision taken before the decision of that national 
competition authority was adopted were not designed to penalise those effects.30  Annual Report 2012
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Second, in Joined Cases C-628/10 P and C-14/11 P Alliance One International and Standard Commer-
cial Tobacco v Commission and Commission v Alliance One International and Others (judgment of 
19 July 2012), the Court provided clarification of its case-law on the presumption of decisive influ-
ence exercised by a parent company over its wholly-owned subsidiary. The Court held that, while 
there is nothing to prevent the Commission from establishing that a parent company actually exer-
cises decisive influence over its subsidiary by means of other evidence or by a combination of such 
evidence and that presumption, the principle of equal treatment requires that where the Commis-
sion adopts a particular method in order to determine whether liability should be attributed to 
parent companies whose subsidiaries have taken part in the same cartel, it must, save in specific 
circumstances, rely on the same criteria in the case of all those parent companies. Furthermore, 
where there are allegations of discrimination, the Commission’s rights of defence do not extend 
to the possibility that it may defend the lawfulness of its decision by producing, during the pro-
ceedings, evidence which serves to establish the liability of a parent company but which is not 
mentioned in that decision. The Court also stated that a parent company and its subsidiary, which 
is itself the parent company of the company which has committed an infringement, may both be 
deemed to be members of an economic unit which includes the latter company. The mere fact that 
that parent company and its subsidiary exercise, during a certain period, only joint control of the 
subsidiary which has committed the infringement does not preclude a finding that those com-
panies formed an economic unit, provided that it is established that both parent companies did in 
fact exercise decisive influence over the commercial policy of the subsidiary which committed the 
infringement.
Third and last, reference will be made to Case C-199/11 Otis and Others (judgment of 6 November 
2012), which arose in the context of a civil action brought by the European Commission before 
the Belgian courts for damages in respect of loss caused to the European Union by a cartel in the 
lift sector which may have affected certain public contracts awarded by various European Union 
institutions and bodies. The Court, before which a number of questions were referred for a pre-
liminary ruling concerning the Commission’s powers and respect for the right to effective judicial 
protection, ruled, first, that European Union law does not preclude the European Commission from 
representing the European Union before a national court hearing such an action, and there is no 
need for the Commission to have authorisation for that purpose from those institutions or bodies. 
Second, the Court held that Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
does not preclude the European Commission from bringing an action before a national court, on 
behalf of the European Union, for damages in respect of loss sustained by the European Union as 
a result of an agreement or practice which has been found by a Commission decision to infringe 
Article 81 EC or Article 101 TFEU. After recalling that the right to effective judicial protection con-
sists, in particular, in the right of access to a tribunal and the principle of equality of arms, the Court 
observed, first of all, that the rule that the national courts are bound by the finding of unlawful 
conduct made in a Commission decision does not mean that the parties do not have access to 
a tribunal, as European Union law provides for a system of judicial review of Commission decisions 
in competition matters which affords all the safeguards required by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. Next, according to the Court, while it is true that the national courts are bound by the Com-
mission’s findings as to the existence of anti-competitive conduct, the fact remains that they alone 
have jurisdiction to assess the existence of loss and a direct causal link between that conduct and 
the loss sustained. Even when the Commission has in its decision determined the precise effects of 
the infringement, it still falls to the national courts to determine individually the loss caused to each 
of the persons who have brought an action for damages. For those reasons, the Commission is not 
judge and party in its own cause. Last, as regards the principle of equality of arms, the Court re-
called that the aim of that principle is to ensure a balance between the parties to proceedings, thus 
ensuring that any document submitted to a court may be examined and challenged by any party 
to the proceedings. The Court found that the information received by the Commission during the Annual Report 2012  31
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infringement proceedings had not been supplied to the national court by the Commission. In any 
event, according to the Court, European Union law prohibits the Commission from using informa-
tion gathered in the course of a competition investigation for purposes other than those of the 
investigation.
In the area of abuse of a dominant position, in Case C-209/10 Post Danmark (judgment of 27 March 
2012) the Court was requested to rule on the circumstances in which a policy, pursued by an under-
taking in a dominant position, in this instance a historical postal operator, of charging low prices to 
certain former customers of a competitor must be regarded as constituting an exclusionary abuse 
contrary to Article 82 EC. In its judgment, the Court held that Article 82 EC prohibits, among other 
things, an undertaking in a dominant position from adopting practices that have an exclusion-
ary effect on competitors considered to be as efficient as it is itself and strengthen its dominant 
position by the use of methods other than those which come within the scope of competition on 
the merits. Thus, with specific regard to the practices at issue, the Court ruled that Article 82 EC 
must be interpreted as meaning that a policy by which a dominant undertaking charges low prices 
to certain major customers of a competitor may not be considered to amount to an exclusionary 
abuse merely because the price that undertaking charges to one of those customers is lower than 
the average total costs attributed to the activity concerned, but higher than the average incre-
mental costs pertaining to that activity, defined as the costs that would disappear in the short 
or medium term if the undertaking were to give up the activity concerned. In order to assess the 
existence of anti-competitive effects in such circumstances, it is necessary to consider whether that 
pricing policy, without objective justification, produces an actual or likely exclusionary effect, to 
the detriment of competition and thus of consumers’ interests. Also, the Court ruled that the fact 
that a pricing policy applied by an undertaking in a dominant position may be characterised as 
price discrimination cannot in itself suggest the presence of an exclusionary abuse. Furthermore, 
the Court ruled that it is open to an undertaking in a dominant position to provide justification for 
behaviour that is liable to be caught by the prohibition laid down in Article 82 EC. In particular, 
such an undertaking may demonstrate, for that purpose, either that its conduct is objectively 
necessary or that the exclusionary effect produced may be counterbalanced, or even outweighed, 
by advantages in terms of efficiency that also benefit consumers.
The other case to be noted in the area of abuse of a dominant position, Case C-457/10 P AstraZen-
eca v Commission (judgment of 6 December 2012), was an appeal against a judgment of the Gen-
eral Court which had essentially upheld a Commission decision finding abusive practices imput-
able to AstraZeneca, a pharmaceutical undertaking. In its decision, the Commission took issue with 
the undertaking, first, for an abusive practice consisting in deliberately misleading representations 
made to patent offices in certain Member States in order to obtain or maintain supplementary 
protection certificates — which extend the patent protection — so as to keep manufacturers of 
generic products away from the market. The second abusive practice complained of consisted in 
the withdrawal of marketing authorisations for a medicinal product in certain Member States, in 
order to delay and render more difficult the marketing of generic medicinal products and also to 
prevent parallel imports.
As regards, in particular, the first abuse, concerning supplementary protection certificates, the 
Court recalled that European Union law prohibits an undertaking in a dominant position from elim-
inating a competitor and thereby strengthening its position by using methods other than those 
which come within the scope of competition on the merits. The Court concluded, in this regard, 
that the General Court had been correct to find that the pharmaceutical undertaking’s consist-
ent and linear conduct, which was characterised by the notification of misleading representations 
to the patent offices and a lack of transparency by which the undertaking had deliberately at-
tempted to mislead the patent offices and judicial authorities in order to maintain its monopoly on 32  Annual Report 2012
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the medicinal products market for as long as possible, was a practice which fell outside the scope 
of competition on the merits and was therefore an abuse of a dominant position. As regards the 
second abuse of a dominant position, the Court held that the deregistration, without objective 
justification and after expiry of the exclusive right recognised by European Union law, of the mar-
keting authorisations, with the aim of impeding the introduction of generic products and parallel 
imports, also fell outside the scope of competition on the merits. Last, as regards the fine imposed 
on the companies, the Court held that the General Court had not erred in law in concluding, in 
particular, that, in the absence of mitigating circumstances or special circumstances, the abuses 
must be characterised as serious infringements. Consequently, there was no need to reduce the 
amount of the fine.
In the area of concentrations, appeals were brought before the Court against two judgments of the 
General Court delivered in connection with the transaction whereby Vivendi Universal had sold its 
book publishing assets to Lagardère, through a nominee holding arrangement involving the bank 
Natexis Banques Populaires. Part of the assets had then been sold to Wendel following approval by 
the Commission, in the context of the implementation of the undertakings given by Lagardère in 
order to obtain approval of the concentration.
In the first case, Case C-551/10 P Éditions Odile Jacob v Commission (judgment of 6 November 2012), 
the Court upheld the decision whereby the General Court had dismissed an action against the 
Commission decision declaring the concentration to be compatible with the common market. 
In particular, the Court held that the fact that the transaction had been completed before being 
notified to the Commission was of no relevance to the legality of that decision. Although such 
a circumstance may possibly entail penalties prescribed by European Union law, in particular the 
imposition of a fine, it cannot lead to the annulment of the Commission’s decision, since it has no 
relevance to the compatibility of the concentration at issue with the common market.
In the second judgment, in Joined Cases C-553/10 P and C-554/10 P Commission and Lagardère 
v Éditions Odile Jacob (judgment of 6 November 2012), the Court upheld the judgment whereby 
the General Court had annulled the Commission decision approving the acquisition by Wendel of 
part of the assets held by Lagardère at the close of the concentration. The Court held that, when 
the Commission declares a concentration to be compatible with the common market subject to 
compliance by the buyer with certain undertakings, including the obligation to sell assets and to 
appoint a trustee who will be responsible for ensuring that that sale proceeds, such a trustee must, 
first, be independent of the parties and, in addition, act independently of the parties, with the 
result that a lack of independence is sufficient ground for annulment of the Commission’s decision. 
The question whether that trustee did act independently arises only if it has first been established 
that the trustee was in fact independent of the parties. Thus, where a Court of the European Union 
correctly finds that the trustee was not independent, it is under no obligation to examine whether 
that trustee actually acted in a way which demonstrated that lack of independence.
Last, as regards anti-competitive measures attributable to Member States, and more specifically 
aid, Case C-124/10 P Commission v EDF (judgment of 5 June 2012) concerned the Commission’s clas-
sification as State aid of a waiver by the French Republic of a tax claim which it held over Électricité 
de France, a public undertaking which at the time was wholly owned by the French Republic. The 
question for the Court was whether a Member State which is a tax creditor of a public undertak-
ing and at the same time its sole shareholder may rely on the application of the ‘private investor in 
a market economy’ test, and therefore avoid its action being classified as State aid, where it brings 
about an increase in the capital of that undertaking by waiving that tax claim or whether it is 
appropriate to rule out that test, as the Commission had done in this instance, on the ground that Annual Report 2012  33
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the claim is fiscal in nature and that the State uses its prerogatives as a public authority in waiving 
the claim.
In its judgment, the Court recalled that a measure cannot be classified as State aid if the recipient 
public undertaking could, in circumstances which correspond to normal market conditions, have 
obtained the same advantage as that which has been made available to it through State resources. 
For the purpose of assessing whether the same advantage would have been conferred in such 
conditions by a private investor, the Court held that only the benefits and obligations linked to 
the situation of the State as shareholder, to the exclusion of those linked to its situation as a public 
authority, are to be taken into account. Accordingly, the applicability of the private investor test ul-
timately depends on the Member State concerned having conferred, in its capacity as shareholder 
and not in its capacity as public authority, an economic advantage on an undertaking belonging to 
it. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the financial situation of the recipient public undertak-
ing depends not on the means used to place it at an advantage, however that may have been ef-
fected, but on the amount that the undertaking ultimately receives. The Court therefore held that 
the private investor test could be applicable even where fiscal means had been employed.
However, the Court made clear that, if a Member State relies on the applicability of the private 
investor test, it must establish unequivocally and on the basis of objective and verifiable evidence 
that the measure has been implemented in its capacity as shareholder. In particular, that evidence 
must show clearly that, before or at the same time as conferring the economic advantage, the 
Member State concerned took the decision to make an investment, by means of the measure actu-
ally implemented, in the public undertaking which it controls. If the Member State concerned pro-
duces such evidence, it is for the Commission to carry out a global assessment, taking into account 
any evidence enabling it to determine whether the Member State took the measure in question in 
its capacity as shareholder or as a public authority. Consequently, the Court held that the objec-
tive pursued by the French Republic could be taken into account for the purposes of determining 
whether the latter had acted in its capacity as shareholder.
Still in the area of State aid, Case C-610/10 Commission v Spain (judgment of 11 December 2012) 
concerned the Kingdom of Spain’s failure to comply with the judgment of the Court finding that 
that Member State had failed to fulfil its obligations by not taking the measures necessary to com-
ply with a Commission decision declaring aid to be unlawful and incompatible with the common 
market.
On the question of the recovery of the aid declared to be unlawful and incompatible with the com-
mon market, the Court recalled that, if the undertaking which received the aid has been declared 
insolvent, the restoration of the previous situation and the elimination of the distortion of competi-
tion resulting from the unlawfully paid aid may in principle be achieved through registration of the 
liability relating to the repayment of such aid in the schedule of liabilities. However, such registra-
tion can meet the recovery obligation only if, where the State authorities are unable to recover 
the full amount of the aid, the insolvency proceedings result in the winding up of the undertaking 
which received the unlawful aid, that is to say, in the definitive cessation of its activities. Conse-
quently, the Court held that, where the undertaking which received the unlawful aid is insolvent 
and a company has been created to continue some of its activities, the pursuit of those activities 
may, where the aid concerned is not recovered in its entirety, prolong the distortion of competition 
brought about by the competitive advantage which it enjoyed on the market by comparison with 
its competitors. Thus, such a newly created company may, if it retains that advantage, be required 
to repay the aid in question. In such a case, the registration in the schedule of liabilities of the 
liability relating to such aid is not sufficient, on its own, to make the distortion of competition thus 
created disappear.34  Annual Report 2012
Court of Justice  Case-law
Fiscal provisions
As regards value added tax, Case C-500/10 Belvedere Costruzioni (judgment of 29 March 2012) is 
particularly noteworthy. The case concerned the application, with respect to value added tax, of 
an exceptional Italian provision under which proceedings pending before the tax court of third 
instance were automatically concluded where they originated in an application brought at first 
instance more than 10 years before the date of the entry into force of that provision and the tax 
authorities had been unsuccessful at first and second instance; the consequence of that automatic 
closure was that the decision of the court of second instance became final and binding and the 
debt claimed by the tax authorities was extinguished. The Court held that Article 4(3) TEU and 
Articles 2 and 22 of Sixth Directive 77/388 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to turnover taxes (35) do not preclude such legislation. According to the Court, the obliga-
tion to ensure effective collection of the European Union’s resources cannot run counter to compli-
ance with the principle that judgment should be given within a reasonable time, which, under the 
second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must 
be observed by the Member States when they implement European Union law and which must 
also be observed under Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Transport 
In the field of air transport, three judgments gave the Court the opportunity to interpret a number 
of provisions of Regulation No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assis-
tance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights (36).
After the judgment in Sturgeon and Others (37), Joined Cases C-581/10 and C-629/10 Nelson and 
Others and TUI Travel and Others (judgment of 23 October 2012) enabled the Court to confirm its case-
law that passengers whose flights are significantly delayed may be compensated. The Court held 
that Articles 5, 6 and 7 of Regulation No 261/2004 (38) must be interpreted as meaning that pas-
sengers whose flights are delayed are entitled to compensation under that regulation where they 
suffer, on account of those flights, a loss of time equal to or in excess of three hours, that is to say, 
where they reach their final destination three hours or more after the arrival time originally sched-
uled by the air carrier. Such a delay does not, however, entitle passengers to compensation if the 
air carrier can prove that the long delay is caused by extraordinary circumstances which could not 
have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been taken, namely circumstances beyond 
the actual control of the air carrier. Furthermore, the Court observed that the requirement to com-
pensate passengers whose flights are delayed is compatible with the Montreal Convention. (39) The 
Court also considered that that obligation is not incompatible with the principle of legal certainty or  
the principle of proportionality.
(35)  Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relat-
ing to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1).
(36) Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing 
common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancella-
tion or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).
(37) Joined Cases C-402/07 and C-432/07, judgment of 19 November 2009. See Annual Report 2009, p. 29.
(38) See footnote 36.
(39) Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (the Montreal Convention), 
approved on behalf of the European Community by Decision 2001/539/EC of 5 April 2001 (OJ 2001 L 194, p. 38).Annual Report 2012  35
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Two cases decided on the same date enabled the Court to clarify the scope of the concept of 
‘denied boarding’. 
In Case C-22/11 Finnair (judgment of 4 October 2012), the Court held that the concept of ‘denied 
boarding’, within the meaning of Articles 2(j) and 4 of Regulation No 261/2004, (40) must be inter-
preted as relating not only to cases where boarding is denied because of overbooking but also to 
those where boarding is denied on other grounds, such as operational reasons. According to the 
Court, limiting the scope of ‘denied boarding’ exclusively to cases of overbooking would have the 
practical effect of substantially reducing the protection afforded to passengers under Regulation 
No 261/2004 and would therefore be contrary to the aim of that regulation — referred to in recital 
1 in the preamble thereto — of ensuring a high level of protection for passengers, which means 
that a broad interpretation of the rights granted to passengers is justified. Furthermore, the Court 
held that Articles 2(j) and 4(3) of Regulation No 261/2004 must be interpreted as meaning that 
the occurrence of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ resulting in an air carrier rescheduling flights af-
ter those circumstances arose cannot give grounds for denying boarding on those later flights or 
for exempting that carrier from its obligation, under Article 4(3) of that regulation, to compensate 
a passenger to whom it denies boarding on such a flight.
In Case C-321/11 Rodríguez Cachafeiro and Martínez-Reboredo Varela-Villamor (judgment of 4 Octo-
ber 2012), the Court held that Article 2(j) of Regulation No 261/2004, (41) read in conjunction with 
Article 3(2) of that regulation, must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘denied board-
ing’ includes a situation where, in the context of a single contract of carriage involving a number of 
reservations on immediately connecting flights and a single check-in, an air carrier denies boarding 
to some passengers on the ground that the first flight included in their reservation has been sub-
ject to a delay attributable to that carrier and the latter mistakenly expected those passengers not 
to arrive in time to board the second flight.
Approximation of laws
Since the approximation of laws is applied in a great variety of areas, it is not surprising that the 
case-law relating thereto should be very varied. The Court ruled twice on the legal protection of 
computer programs by interpreting the two directives of 1991 (42) and 2009 (43) concerning such 
protection, ruling, first, on the object of that protection and, second, on the exhaustion of the 
exclusive right to distribute a copy of a computer program. The facts giving rise to the first case 
on which it adjudicated, Case C-406/10 SAS Institute (judgment of 2 May 2012), had led the United 
Kingdom court to refer a number of questions to it for a preliminary ruling. The Court was re-
quested to clarify the object of the protection, by copyright, of computer programs and, in par-
ticular, whether that protection extended to functionality and the programming language. The 
Court held, first of all, that neither the functionality of a computer program nor the programming 
language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of 
its functions constitute a form of expression. For that reason, they are not covered by copyright 
protection. The Court stated, however, that if a third party were to procure the part of the source 
code or the object code relating to the programming language or to the format of data files used 
(40) See footnote 36.
(41) See footnote 36.
(42) Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs (OJ 1991 L 122, 
p. 42).
(43)  Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of 
computer programs (OJ 2009 L 111, p. 16).36  Annual Report 2012
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in a computer program, and if that party were to create, with the aid of that code, similar elements 
in its own computer program, that conduct would be liable to be prohibited by the author of the 
program. The Court then observed that, according to Directive 91/250, the purchaser of a software 
licence is entitled to observe, study and test the functioning of that software in order to determine 
the ideas and principles which underlie any element of the program, and that any contractual pro-
visions contrary to that right will be null and void. The Court also held that the determination of 
those ideas and principles may be carried out within the framework of the acts permitted by the 
licence. Consequently, according to the Court, the owner of the copyright in a computer program 
may not, by relying on the licensing agreement, prevent the person who has obtained that licence 
from observing, studying or testing the functioning of the program in order to determine the ideas 
and principles which underlie all the elements of the program in the case where that person car-
ries out acts covered by that licence and the acts of loading and running necessary for the use of 
the program, on condition that that person does not infringe the exclusive rights of the owner of 
the copyright in the program. Nor, according to the Court, is there any infringement of copyright 
where, as in the case in point, the lawful acquirer of the licence did not have access to the source 
code of the computer program but merely studied, observed and tested that program in order to 
reproduce its functionality in a second program. The Court then stated that the reproduction, in 
a computer program or a user manual for that program, of certain elements described in the user 
manual for another computer program protected by copyright can constitute an infringement of 
the copyright in that manual if that reproduction constitutes the expression of the intellectual crea-
tion of the author of the manual. In that regard, the Court considered that, in the case in point, 
the keywords, syntax, commands and combinations of commands, options, defaults and iterations 
consisted of words, figures or mathematical concepts which, considered in isolation, were not, as 
such, an intellectual creation of the author of the program, since they were not an expression of 
the creativity of the author. Therefore, according to the Court, it was for the national court to ascer-
tain whether the reproduction alleged in the main proceedings constituted the expression of the 
intellectual creation — which is protected by copyright — of the author of the user manual for the 
computer program. 
In the second case, Case C-128/11 UsedSoft (judgment of 3 July 2012), the Court, on a reference for 
a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof, explained that the principle of the exhaustion 
of the right to distribute applies not only where the owner of the copyright markets copies of his 
software on a material medium (CD-ROM or DVD), but also where he distributes them by down-
loading from his Internet site. Where the owner of the copyright makes available to his customer 
a copy — whether tangible or intangible — and at the same time concludes, in return for payment, 
a licence agreement granting the customer the right to use that copy for an unlimited period, the 
owner sells that copy to the customer and thus extinguishes his exclusive right of distribution. 
Such a transaction involves a transfer of the right of ownership of that copy. Accordingly, even if 
the licence agreement prohibits a further transfer, the owner of the right can no longer oppose the 
resale of that copy.
The Court observed, in particular, that if the application of the principle of the exhaustion of the 
right of distribution were limited solely to copies of computer programs that are sold on a material 
medium, the owner of the copyright would be able to control the resale of copies downloaded via 
the Internet and to demand further remuneration on the occasion of each new sale, even though 
the first sale of the copy had already enabled the rightholder to obtain an appropriate remunera-
tion. Such a restriction of the resale of copies of computer programs downloaded from the Internet 
would go beyond what is necessary to safeguard the specific subject-matter of the intellectual 
property concerned. Furthermore, the exhaustion of the right of distribution extends to the copy 
of the computer program sold as corrected and updated by the copyright holder. Even if the main-
tenance agreement is for a limited period, the functionalities corrected, altered or added on the Annual Report 2012  37
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basis of such an agreement form an integral part of the copy originally downloaded and can be 
used by the customer for an unlimited period.
The Court emphasised, however, that if the licence acquired by the first acquirer relates to a greater 
number of users than he needs, he is not, however, authorised by the effect of the exhaustion of 
the distribution right to divide the licence and resell it in part. Furthermore, an original acquirer 
who resells a tangible or intangible copy of a computer program for which the copyright holder’s 
right of distribution is exhausted must make the copy downloaded onto his own computer unus-
able at the time of its resale. If he continued to use it, he would infringe the copyright holder’s 
exclusive right of reproduction of his computer program. Unlike the exclusive right of distribution, 
the exclusive right of reproduction is not exhausted by the first sale. However, Directive 2009/24 
authorises any reproduction necessary to enable the lawful acquirer to use the computer program 
in accordance with its intended purpose. Such reproductions cannot be prohibited by contract.
In that context, the Court answered the question referred to it by stating that any subsequent 
acquirer of a copy for which the copyright holder’s right of distribution is exhausted is a lawful ac-
quirer for that purpose. He can therefore download on to his computer the copy sold to him by the 
first acquirer. Such a download must be regarded as a reproduction that is necessary to enable the 
new acquirer to use the program in accordance with its intended purpose. Thus, the new acquirer 
of the user licence may, as lawful acquirer of the corrected and updated copy of the computer pro-
gram concerned, download that copy from the copyright holder’s website.
Still in the field of copyright, the Court ruled on the concept of holder of copyright, and the rights 
flowing therefrom, in a dispute between the principal director of a documentary film and the pro-
ducer of that film concerning the implementation of the contract whereby the principal director 
had transferred his copyright and certain exploitation rights in the film to the producer. A number 
of provisions of European Union law were concerned by this reference for a preliminary ruling from 
an Austrian court, more specifically Directives 92/100, (44) 93/83, (45) 93/98 (46) and 2001/29. (47)
The Court thus held, in Case C-277/10 Luksan (judgment of 9 February 2012), that Articles 1 and 2 
of Directive 93/83, and Articles 2 and 3 of Directive 2001/29 in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 of 
Directive 2006/115 and with Article 2 of Directive 2006/116, (48) must be interpreted as meaning 
that rights to exploit a cinematographic work (reproduction right, satellite broadcasting right and 
any other right of communication to the public through the making available to the public) vest 
by operation of law, directly and originally, in the principal director. Consequently, those provisions 
must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which allocates those exploitation rights by 
operation of law exclusively to the producer of the work in question. The Court went on to state 
that Article 2 of Directive 93/83 and Articles 2 and 3 of Directive 2001/29 cannot be interpreted, 
(44) Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights 
related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (OJ 1992 L 346, p. 61).
(45) Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright 
and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission (OJ 1993 L 248, 
p. 15).
(46) Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 harmonising the term of protection of copyright and certain 
related rights (OJ 1993 L 290, p. 9).
(47) Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (OJ 2001 L 167, p. 10).
(48) Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the term of 
protection of copyright and certain related rights (OJ 2006 L 372, p. 12).38  Annual Report 2012
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in the light of Article 1(4) of the World Intellectual Property Organisation Treaty, as meaning that 
a Member State might in its national legislation, on the basis of Article 14 bis of the Berne Conven-
tion for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and in reliance upon the power which that 
convention article is said to accord to it, deny the principal director of a cinematographic work the 
rights to exploit that work, because such an interpretation, first, would not respect the competence 
of the European Union in the matter, second, would not be compatible with the aim pursued by 
Directive 2001/29 and, finally, would not be consistent with the requirements flowing from Article 
17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union guaranteeing the protection of 
intellectual property.
The Court then held that European Union law allows the Member States the option of laying down 
a presumption of transfer, in favour of the producer of a cinematographic work, of rights to exploit 
the cinematographic work (satellite broadcasting right, reproduction right and any other right of 
communication to the public through the making available to the public), provided that such a pre-
sumption is not an irrebuttable one that would preclude the principal director of that work from 
agreeing otherwise.
On the other hand, it held that, in his capacity as author of a cinematographic work, the principal 
director of that work must be entitled, by operation of law, directly and originally, to the right to 
the fair compensation provided for in Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29.
The Court thus stated that European Union law does not allow the Member States the option of 
laying down a presumption of transfer, in favour of the producer of a cinematographic work, of 
the remuneration rights vesting in the principal director of that work, whether that presumption 
is couched in irrebuttable terms or may be departed from. Unless it is to be deprived of all practi-
cal effect, Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright 
and related rights in the information society imposes on a Member State which has introduced 
the private copying exception into its national law an obligation to achieve a certain result, in the 
sense that that State must ensure, within the framework of its powers, that the fair compensation 
intended to compensate the rightholders harmed for the prejudice sustained is actually recovered. 
The fact that such an obligation to achieve the result of recovery of the fair compensation for the 
rightholders is imposed on the Member States is conceptually irreconcilable with the possibility for 
a rightholder to waive that fair compensation and, a fortiori, with the option for Member States to 
lay down such a presumption of transfer of the relevant rights.
In another case, Case C-5/11 Donner (judgment of 21 June 2012), the Court ruled on the possibility 
of restricting the free movement of goods for copyright protection reasons. A German national 
had been convicted by the Landgericht München II (Regional Court, Munich II) for aiding and abet-
ting the prohibited exploitation of copyright-protected works. According to the findings of the 
Landgericht München II, the national concerned had participated between 2005 and 2008 in the 
distribution in Germany of replicas of furnishings protected by copyright in Germany. Those copies 
originated in Italy, where the furnishings were not protected by copyright between 2002 and 2007, 
or not fully protected at the material time because, according to the Italian case-law, that protec-
tion was unenforceable as against manufacturers who had reproduced or marketed the replicas 
for a certain time. The replicas had been offered for sale to customers residing in Germany through 
advertisements and supplements in magazines, direct publicity letters and a German website.
The seller, based in Italy, recommended to its purchasers an Italian freight forwarder, which was 
managed by the German national concerned. When the goods were delivered to customers in Ger-
many, the freight forwarder’s drivers collected the purchase price of the replicas of the works and 
the freight charges. From a legal viewpoint, the ownership of the goods sold had been transferred Annual Report 2012  39
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to the German customers in Italy. The actual power of disposal over those goods had, on the other 
hand, been transferred to the customers, with the assistance of the freight forwarder, only in Ger-
many, when they were delivered. Thus, according to the Landgericht München II, distribution for 
copyright purposes had not taken place in Italy, but in Germany, where it was prohibited without 
the authorisation of the holders of the copyright.
The Bundesgerichtshof, on appeal, sought to ascertain whether the application of German criminal 
law constituted in this instance an unjustified restriction on the free movement of goods guaran-
teed by European Union law.
The Court observed, first, that the application of criminal law in this instance presupposed that 
there was, on the national territory, a ‘distribution to the public’ within the meaning of European 
Union law. (49) In that regard, it held that a trader who directs his advertising at members of the 
public residing in a given Member State and creates or makes available to them a specific delivery 
system and payment method, or allows a third party to do so, thereby enabling those members 
of the public to receive delivery of copies of works protected by copyright in that same Member 
State, makes such a distribution in the Member State where the delivery takes place. The Court 
therefore left to the national court the task of determining whether there was evidence supporting 
a conclusion that that trader made such a distribution to the public.
Second, the Court stated that the prohibition on distribution under criminal law in Germany consti-
tutes an obstacle to the free movement of goods. Such a restriction may, however, be justified on 
grounds of protection of industrial and commercial property. The restriction in question is based 
on the disparity, in the different Member States, in the practical conditions of protection of the 
respective copyrights. That disparity is inseparably linked to the very existence of the exclusive 
rights. Here, the protection of the right of distribution cannot be deemed to give rise to a dispro-
portionate or artificial partitioning of the markets. The application of criminal law may be consid-
ered necessary to protect the specific subject-matter of the copyright, which confers, in particular, 
the exclusive right of exploitation. The restriction in question thus appears to be justified and pro-
portionate to the aim pursued.
The Court’s answer was therefore that European Union law does not preclude a Member State 
from bringing a prosecution under national criminal law against the freight forwarder for the of-
fence of aiding and abetting the prohibited distribution of copyright-protected works where they 
are distributed to the public on the territory of that Member State in the context of a sale, aimed 
specifically at the public of that State, concluded in another Member State where those works are 
not protected by copyright or the protection of which is not enforceable as against third parties.
The Court twice had occasion to adjudicate on the concept of communication to the public in 
the context of Directive 2006/115, (50) which, in contrast to private use, requires payment of a fee 
to the owner of the rights to exploit the broadcast work. Both cases concerned broadcasts in the 
course of a trade or business — by the operator of a hotel in the first case and by a dentist in the 
second case — of phonograms in business premises. In the two judgments delivered on the same 
(49) See footnote 47.
(50)  Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and 
lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 28). 
This directive, which entered into force on 16 January 2007, codified and repealed Council Directive 92/100/EEC 
of 19 November 1992 on lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual 
property (OJ 1992 L 346, p. 61).40  Annual Report 2012
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date, in Case C-135/10 SCF and Case C-162/10 Phonographic Performance (Ireland) (judgments of 
15 March 2012), the Court considered the criteria that must be used in order to determine whether 
or not the communication of the work is made to the public.
The Court began by observing that it had already held that the concept of ‘communication to the 
public’ requires an individual assessment and that, for the purpose of such an assessment, account 
must be taken of several complementary criteria, which are not autonomous and are interdepend-
ent. Among these criteria is, first, the indispensable role of the user. That user makes a communica-
tion to the public when it intervenes, in full knowledge of the consequences of its action, to give 
access to a broadcast containing the protected work to its customers. The Court identified certain 
aspects of the concept of public. In that regard, the ‘public’ must consist of an indeterminate num-
ber of potential listeners and a fairly large number of persons. The Court added that it is relevant 
that a ‘communication to the public’ is of a profit-making nature. It is thus understood that the 
public which is the subject of the communication is both targeted by the user and receptive, in one 
way or another, to that communication, and not merely ‘caught’ by chance.
As regards the number of potential listeners, the Court has already held that the guests of a hotel 
constitute a fairly large number of persons, such that they must be considered to be a public, and 
that the broadcasting of phonograms by a hotel operator is of a profit-making nature. Indeed, the 
action of the hotel operator by which it gives access to the broadcast work to guests constitutes 
an additional service which has an influence on the hotel’s standing and, therefore, on the price 
of rooms. Moreover, it is likely to attract additional guests who are interested in that additional 
service.
Consequently, such an operator is a ‘user’ carrying out an act of ‘communication to the public’ of 
a broadcast phonogram within the meaning of European Union law.
As such, that operator is obliged to pay equitable remuneration for the distribution of a broadcast 
phonogram, in addition to that paid by the broadcaster. When a hotel operator communicates 
a broadcast phonogram in its guest bedrooms, it is using that phonogram in an autonomous way 
and transmitting it to a public which is distinct from and additional to the one targeted by the 
original act of communication. Moreover, the hotel operator derives economic benefits from that 
transmission which are independent of those obtained by the broadcaster or the producer of the 
phonograms.
The Court also held that a hotel operator which provides in guest bedrooms, not televisions and/or 
radios, but other apparatus and phonograms in physical or digital format capable of being broad-
cast or heard by means of that apparatus, is a ‘user’ making a ‘communication to the public’ of 
a phonogram for the purposes of European Union law. It is therefore obliged to pay equitable 
remuneration for the transmission of those phonograms.
In addition, according to the Court, although European Union law limits the right to equitable re-
muneration in the case of ‘private use’, it does not allow Member States to exempt a hotel operator 
which makes a ‘communication to the public’ of a phonogram from the obligation to pay such 
remuneration.
In that context, the Court explained that it is not the private nature or otherwise of the use of the 
work by the guests of a hotel, but whether the use made of the work by the operator is private or 
not, that is relevant for the purpose of determining whether the operator may rely on the limitation 
based on ‘private use’. However, the ‘private use’ of a protected work communicated to the public 
by its user constitutes a contradiction in terms, since ‘public’ is, by definition, ‘not private’.Annual Report 2012  41
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It was by reference to the same criteria, and by adopting the same reasoning, that the Court held 
that, unlike the operator of a hotel, a dentist who broadcast phonograms free of charge in his den-
tal practice, for the benefit of his patients and enjoyed by them without any active choice on their 
part, is not making a ‘communication to the public’ for the purposes of European Union law.
Although a dentist intervenes deliberately in the broadcast of phonograms, his patients gener-
ally form a very consistent group of persons and thus constitute a determinate circle of poten-
tial recipients, and not persons in general. As regards the number of persons to whom the same 
broadcast phonogram is made audible by the dentist, the Court stated that, in the case of patients 
of a dentist, the number of persons is not large, indeed it is insignificant, given that the number 
of persons present in his practice at the same time is, in general, very limited. Moreover, although 
there are a number of patients in succession, the fact remains that, as those patients attend one 
at a time, they do not generally hear the same phonograms, in the case of broadcast phonograms 
in particular. Last, such a broadcast is not of a profit-making nature. The patients of a dentist visit 
a dental practice with the sole objective of receiving treatment, as the broadcasting of phono-
grams is in no way a part of dental treatment. They have access to certain phonograms by chance 
and without any active choice on their part, according to the time of their arrival at the practice and 
the length of time they wait and the nature of the treatment they receive. In those circumstances, 
the Court concluded that it cannot be presumed that the usual customers of a dentist are recep-
tive as regards the broadcast in question and that such a broadcast does not confer entitlement to 
remuneration in favour of the producers of phonograms.
The Court also considered on a number of occasions the question of unfair terms in consumer 
contracts, in particular in three cases, Case C-453/10 Pereničová and Perenič (judgment of 15 March 
2012), Case C-472/10 Invitel (judgment of 26 April 2012) and Case C-618/10 Banco Español de Crédito 
(judgment of 14 June 2012). Two of those references for a preliminary ruling concerned the com-
patibility of national laws with European Union law while the third concerned the powers of the 
national courts.
In the first case, a Slovak court requested the Court to analyse, by reference to the provisions of 
Directive 93/13, (51) the terms of a credit agreement concluded by individuals, in order to ascertain 
whether the provisions of that directive authorised it to declare a consumer contract containing 
unfair terms void when such a solution would be more advantageous for the consumer. The refer-
ring court observed that a declaration that the credit agreement was invalid in its entirety, made on 
account of the unfair nature of certain of its terms, would be more advantageous for the applicants 
than maintaining the validity of the non-unfair terms in the agreement. In the former case, the con-
sumers in question would be obliged to pay only interest for late payment, at the rate of 9%, rather 
than all the charges relating to the loan granted, which would be much higher than that interest.
In its judgment, the Court observed, first of all, that the objective of the directive is to eliminate 
unfair terms in consumer contracts, while maintaining, if possible, the validity of the contract as 
a whole, and not to annul all contracts containing such terms. As regards the criteria for assessing 
whether a contract can indeed continue to exist without the unfair terms, the Court observed that 
it is necessary to use an objective approach, so that the situation of one of the parties to the con-
tract, in this case the situation of the consumer, cannot be regarded as the decisive criterion for the 
purpose of determining the fate of the contract. Consequently, the directive precludes that, when 
assessing whether a contract containing one or more unfair terms can continue to exist without 
(51) Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (‘the unfair terms directive’) 
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those terms, only the advantageous effects for the consumer of the annulment of the contract as 
a whole are taken into consideration.
However, the Court observed that the directive carried out only a partial and minimum harmonisa-
tion of national legislation concerning unfair terms, while allowing Member States the option of 
giving consumers a higher level of protection than that for which the directive provides. Conse-
quently, that directive does not preclude a Member State from enacting, in compliance with Euro-
pean Union law, legislation under which a contract concluded between a trader and a consumer 
which contains one or more unfair terms may be declared void as a whole where that will provide 
better protection of the consumer.
Last, the Court stated in answer that a commercial practice which consists in indicating in a credit 
agreement an annual percentage rate lower than the real rate must be regarded as ‘misleading’ un-
der the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, (52) in so far as it causes or is likely to cause the aver-
age consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise. According 
to the Court, although that circumstance may be taken into account, among other elements, for 
the purposes of establishing the unfairness of the terms of a contract under the Unfair Terms Direc-
tive, it is not such as to establish, automatically and on its own, that the terms are unfair. Indeed, all 
the circumstances of the particular case must be examined before the clauses in question can be 
classified. Also, a finding that a commercial practice is unfair has no direct effect on the validity of 
the contract as a whole.
Another case, this time a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling from a Hungarian court, 
gave rise to the judgment in Invitel relating to the compatibility with European Union law of na-
tional legislation on unfair terms in contracts concluded with consumers.
The Hungarian consumer protection authority is empowered to request the courts to declare an 
unfair term in a consumer contract invalid if the use of such a term by a trader affects a significant 
number of consumers or causes significant harm. According to the Hungarian legislation, a declara-
tion of invalidity made by a court following public-interest proceedings (class action) applies to any 
consumer who has concluded a contract with a seller or supplier which includes that term.
The Hungarian consumer protection authority had received a large number of complaints from 
consumers concerning a fixed-line telephone operator which had unilaterally inserted into the 
general conditions of subscriber contracts a term under which it was entitled to invoice custom-
ers retroactively for the fees charged in the event of payment of invoices by money order. Fur-
thermore, the method of calculation of those money order fees had not been specified in those 
contracts.
Taking the view that the term in question constituted an unfair contractual term, the authority 
requested the Hungarian courts to declare it void and to order reimbursement to the telephone 
operator’s customers of the amounts wrongly invoiced by way of those fees.
A Hungarian district court hearing the case asked the Court of Justice whether the national pro-
vision that allowed all affected consumers to benefit from the legal effects of a declaration that 
(52) Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair busi-
ness-to-consumer practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 
97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) 
No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive) 
(OJ 2005 L 149, p. 22).Annual Report 2012  43
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an unfair terms is void, made following public-interest proceedings, is compatible with the Unfair 
Terms Directive. (53)
In its judgment, the Court observed, first of all, that that directive obliges Member States to permit 
persons or organisations having a legitimate interest in protecting consumers to bring an action 
for an injunction in order to obtain a judicial decision as to whether contract terms drawn up for 
general use are unfair and, where appropriate, to have them prohibited. The Court none the less 
made clear that the directive does not seek to harmonise the penalties applicable where a term has 
been found to be unfair in proceedings brought by those persons or organisations.
Next, the Court observed that the effective implementation of the deterrent objective of public-
interest proceedings requires that terms declared unfair in such an action brought against the seller 
or supplier concerned are not binding on either consumers who are parties to the proceedings or 
those who have concluded with that seller or supplier a contract to which the same general condi-
tions apply. In that connection, the Court stated that public-interest proceedings aimed at eliminat-
ing unfair terms may also be brought before those terms have been used in contracts.
In those circumstances, the Court stated that the Hungarian legislation at issue is consistent with 
the aim of the directive whereby the Member States are required to ensure that adequate and ef-
fective means exist to prevent the use of unfair terms. Consequently, that legislation is compatible 
with the directive.
The Court then added that the national courts are required of their own motion, also with regard to 
the future, to draw the appropriate conclusions from the finding, in an action for an injunction, of 
invalidity, so that consumers who have concluded a contract containing such a term and to which 
the same general conditions apply are not bound by the unfair term.
Last, as regards assessment of whether the term which it was requested to appraise was unfair, the 
Court replied that that assessment fell within the jurisdiction of the national court. As part of that 
assessment, the Hungarian court would have to determine whether, in the light of all the terms 
appearing in the contract and of the applicable national legislation, the reasons for, or the method 
of, the amendment of the fees connected with the service to be provided were set out in plain, 
intelligible language and whether consumers had a right to terminate the contract.
The third case relating to unfair terms in consumer contracts originated in Spain, where applica-
tion may be made to the courts for an order for payment of an outstanding and payable pecuniary 
debt which does not exceed EUR 30 000 provided that the amount of that debt is duly established. 
If such an application is made in accordance with those requirements, the debtor must pay his 
debt or may object to payment within a period of 20 days, in which case his case will be heard in 
an ordinary civil procedure. None the less, the Spanish legislation does not authorise the courts 
dealing with an application for an order for payment to hold, of their own motion, that unfair terms 
in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer are void. Thus, assessment 
of the unfairness of the terms of such a contract is permitted only where the consumer objects to 
payment.
Furthermore, where a Spanish court is authorised to find that an unfair term in a consumer contract 
is void, the national legislation allows it to modify the contract by revising the content of that term 
in such a way as to remove its unfairness.
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A private individual had entered into a loan agreement for the sum of EUR 30 000 with a Spanish 
bank in order to purchase a motor vehicle. Although the term of the contract had been fixed at 
2014, the creditor bank took the view that it had expired before that date since, in September 2008, 
reimbursement of seven monthly repayments had not yet been made. Thus, the bank made appli-
cation to the court of first instance for an order for payment corresponding to the unpaid monthly 
repayments plus contractual interest and costs. The court declared of its own motion that the term 
relating to interest for late payment was void on the ground that it was unfair, the rate having been 
fixed at 29%, and fixed the new rate of such interest at 19%, referring to the statutory rate of inter-
est and to the rate of interest for late payment. It also ordered the credit institution to recalculate 
the amount of the interest.
In the proceedings on the appeal against that decision, the Spanish court asked the Court, first, 
whether the Unfair Terms Directive (54) precludes legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue 
in the main proceedings, which does not permit a court dealing with an application for an order 
for payment to assess of its own motion whether a term in a consumer contract is unfair; second, 
the Spanish court sought to ascertain whether the Spanish legislation which permitted the courts 
not only to strike out but also to revise the content of the unfair terms was compatible with that 
directive. In its judgment, the Court stated, first, that the national court is required to assess of 
its own motion whether a contractual term in a consumer contract in unfair, provided that it has 
the legal and factual elements necessary for that task available to it. The Court observed that the 
Spanish legislation does not permit a court dealing with an application for an order for payment to 
assess of its own motion, even though it already has available to it the legal and factual elements 
necessary for that task, whether the terms in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier 
and a consumer are unfair. In those circumstances, the Court considered that such a procedural 
arrangement is liable to undermine the effectiveness of the protection which the Unfair Terms 
Directive was intended to confer on consumers. The Court concluded that the Spanish procedural 
legislation is not compatible with that directive in so far as it makes impossible or excessively dif-
ficult, in proceedings initiated by sellers or suppliers against consumers, the application of the pro-
tection which the directive seeks to confer on consumers. The Court stated, however, second, that, 
according to that directive, an unfair term in a contract concluded between a seller or supplier and 
a consumer is not binding on the consumer and that the contract containing such a term will con-
tinue to bind the parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence without that 
unfair term. Accordingly the Court held that the directive precludes the Spanish legislation in that it 
allows a national court, where it finds that an unfair term is void, to revise the content of that term.
The Court considered that the power to do so, if it were conferred on the national court, would 
be liable to eliminate the dissuasive effect on sellers and suppliers of the straightforward non-
application with regard to the consumer of the unfair terms. The protection afforded to consumers 
if that power were used would thus be less efficient than that resulting from the non-application 
of those terms. Indeed, if it were open to the national court to revise the content of unfair terms, 
sellers and suppliers would remain tempted to use those terms in the knowledge that, even if they 
should be declared invalid, the contract could none the less be modified by the court in such a way 
as to safeguard their interests.
Consequently, where they find the existence of an unfair term, the national courts are required 
solely to exclude the application of such a term so that it will not produce binding effects on con-
sumers, and are not authorised to revise the content of the unfair term. The contract containing the 
term must continue in existence, in principle, without any amendment other than that resulting 
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from the deletion of the unfair terms, in so far as, in accordance with the rules of domestic law, such 
continuity of the contract is legally possible.
In a completely different area, the case concerning genetically modified organisms (‘GMO’s) with 
which the Court had to deal — in Case C-36/11 Pioneer Hi Bred Italia (judgment of 6 Septem-
ber 2012) — originated in a dispute before an Italian court concerning an authorisation for the 
cultivation of GMOs.
A Commission decision authorising the placing on the market of inbred lines and hybrids derived 
from maize line MON 810 had been adopted on application by Monsanto Europe on the basis of 
Directive 90/220. (55) That company notified to the Commission, in particular under the provisions 
of Regulation No 1829/2003, (56) the varieties of MON 810 maize as ‘existing products’, and then 
the Commission approved the inclusion of 17 varieties derived from MON 810 maize in the com-
mon catalogue. However, Monsanto Europe did not effect a notification under the provisions of 
Directive 2001/18 (57) to the competent national authority within the prescribed period, but subse-
quently applied for renewal of the authorisation to place varieties of MON 810 maize on the market 
pursuant to the provisions of Regulation No 1829/2003.
A company whose main business is the global production and distribution of conventional and 
genetically modified seeds planned to cultivate the MON 810 maize varieties listed in the common 
catalogue. It therefore applied to the competent Italian ministry for authorisation to cultivate those 
varieties in accordance with the relevant national legislation. The ministry informed that company, 
by a note, that it could not consider its application for authorisation to cultivate hybrids of geneti-
cally modified maize already listed in the common catalogue ‘pending the adoption by the regions 
of rules to ensure the coexistence of the conventional, organic and genetically modified crops, as 
provided for in the circular from Mipaaf [Ministero delle Politiche agricole alimentari e forestali; 
Ministry for Agriculture, Food and Forestry Policy] of 31 March 2006’.
In its action for annulment of that note, the company disputed the requirement for national au-
thorisation for the cultivation of products such as GMOs listed in the common catalogue. Further-
more, it disputed the interpretation of Article 26a of Directive 2001/18, according to which the cul-
tivation of GMOs in Italy would not be authorised until the regions had adopted rules to implement 
measures ensuring the coexistence of conventional, organic and genetically modified crops.
In those circumstances, the Italian Council of State decided to stay proceedings and to refer a ques-
tion to the Court for a preliminary ruling concerning the system for national authorisation of the 
cultivation of GMOs.
The Court held that the cultivation of GMOs such as the MON 810 maize varieties cannot be made 
subject to a national authorisation procedure when the use and marketing of those varieties are 
authorised under Regulation No 1829/2003 and those varieties have been accepted for inclu-
sion in the common catalogue of varieties of agricultural plant species provided for in Directive 
(55) Council Directive 90/220/EEC of 23 April 1990 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically 
modified organisms (OJ 1990 L 117, p. 15).
(56)  Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on geneti-
cally modified food and feed (OJ 2003 L 268, p. 1).
(57)  Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate release 
into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC (OJ 2001 
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2002/53 (58) on the common catalogue of varieties of agricultural plant species, as amended by 
Regulation No 1829/2003. Regulation No 1829/2003 and Directive 2002/53 both seek to enable the 
free use and marketing of GMOs throughout the European Union, provided that they are author-
ised in accordance with that regulation and accepted for inclusion in the common catalogue pur-
suant to that directive. Furthermore, the Court considered that the conditions imposed by those 
two acts, for authorisation or inclusion in the common catalogue, cover the requirements for the 
protection of health and the environment.
The Court then explained that Article 26a of Directive 2001/18 does not permit a Member State to 
prohibit in a general manner the cultivation on its territory of such GMOs pending the adoption 
of coexistence measures to avoid the unintended presence of GMOs in other crops. Indeed, an in-
terpretation of that article which would enable the Member States to establish such a prohibition 
would run counter to the system implemented by Regulation No 1829/2003, which consists in en-
suring the immediate free movement of products authorised at Community level and accepted for 
inclusion in the common catalogue, once the requirements of protection of health and the envi-
ronment have been taken into consideration during the authorisation and acceptance procedures. 
Thus, according to the Court, Article 26a of Directive 2001/18 can give rise to restrictions, or even 
to geographically restricted prohibitions, only through the effect of coexistence measures actually 
adopted in compliance with the objective of such measures.
In an area unrelated to the preceding one, the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court, Spain) asked the 
Court whether, on the basis of Directive 2002/20 (59) (‘the Authorisation Directive’), the Member 
States may impose charges for the installation, on municipal public land, of the infrastructures nec-
essary for the supply of telecommunications services to users of the telecommunications network. 
In its judgment in Joined Cases C-55/11, C-57/11 and C-58/11 Vodafone España and France Telecom 
España (judgment of 12 July 2012), the Court held, first of all, that, within the framework of the Au-
thorisation Directive, Member States may not levy any fees or charges in relation to the provision 
of networks and electronic communication services other than those provided for by that directive. 
According to the Court, Member States are entitled, in particular, to impose charges for the rights 
to install facilities on, over or under public or private property. In that regard, the Court stated that 
that directive does not define either the concept of installation of facilities on, over or under public 
or private property or the person responsible for paying the fee for rights relating to that instal-
lation. However, the Court observed that, according to Directive 2002/21, (60) the rights to permit 
the installation on public or private property of installations — that is to say, of physical infrastruc-
ture — are granted to an undertaking authorised to provide public communications networks and 
entitled, on that basis, to install the necessary facilities. Consequently, the fee for the right to install 
facilities can be imposed only on the holder of those rights, that is to say, on the proprietor of the 
infrastructures installed on, over or under the public or private property concerned.
In those circumstances, the Court held that European Union law does not permit Member States to 
impose that fee on operators which, without being proprietors of the infrastructures, use them to 
provide mobile telephony services. It then stated that as Article 13 of the Authorisation Directive, 
on the imposition of fees, is couched in unconditional and precise terms, it may be invoked directly 
(58) Council Directive 2002/53/EC of 13 June 2002 on the common catalogue of varieties of agricultural plant 
species (OJ 2002 L 193, p. 1).
(59) Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of 
electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive) (OJ 2002 L 108, p. 21).
(60) Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) (OJ 2002 L 108, p. 33).Annual Report 2012  47
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by individuals before the national courts in order to dispute the application of a decision by a pub-
lic authority that is incompatible with that provision.
Last, the Bundesgerichtshof requested the Court to clarify the concept of ‘information of a precise 
nature’ in Directive 2003/6, (61) which, with the aim of ensuring the integrity of the financial markets 
in the European Union and enhancing investor confidence in those markets, prohibits insider deal-
ing and requires issuers of financial instruments to disclose, as soon as possible, inside information 
which is of direct concern to them. ‘Inside information’ is defined as information of a precise nature, 
which has not yet been made public, which relates, directly or indirectly, to one or more financial 
instruments or their issuers and which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant 
effect on the prices of those financial instruments or the price of related derivative financial instru-
ments. Directive 2003/124 (62) provides a more specific definition of the concept of ‘information of 
a precise nature’. Thus, the information must refer to a set of circumstances which exists or may 
reasonably be expected to come into existence or an event which has occurred or may reasonably 
be expected to do so.
The background to the reference for a preliminary ruling from the German court was a dispute be-
tween a German national and Daimler AG concerning the loss which he claimed to have suffered as 
a result of the allegedly late public disclosure by that company of information relating to the early 
departure of the Chairman of its Board of Management. The company’s share price rose steeply 
following the publication of the decision of Daimler’s Supervisory Board that the Chairman of the 
Board of Management would leave his post at the end of the year and that he would be replaced; 
however, the German national concerned had sold his shares in Daimler shortly before that 
announcement was published.
The national court was uncertain whether precise information concerning the departure of the 
Chairman of the Board of Management might have existed before the decision of the Supervisory 
Board was taken, since the Chairman of the Board of Management had already discussed his inten-
tion to leave with the Chairman of the Supervisory Board and other members of the Supervisory 
Board and the Board of Management had also subsequently been informed.
The Court responded in Case C-19/11 Gelti (judgment of 28 June 2012) by stating that, in the case 
of a protracted process intended to bring about a particular circumstance or to generate a par-
ticular event, not only that future circumstance or future event, but also the intermediate steps 
of that process which are connected with bringing about that future circumstance or event, may 
be regarded as precise information. Indeed, an intermediate step in a protracted process may in 
itself constitute a set of circumstances or an event within the meaning normally attributed to those 
terms. That interpretation not only holds true for those steps which have already come into exist-
ence or have already occurred, but also concerns steps which may reasonably be expected to come 
into existence or occur.
Any other interpretation would risk undermining the objectives of that directive, which are to pro-
tect the integrity of the European Union financial markets and to enhance investor confidence in 
those markets. If it were precluded that information relating to an intermediate step in a protracted 
process could be deemed to be of a precise nature, that would remove the obligation to disclose 
(61) Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and 
market manipulation (market abuse) (OJ 2003 L 96, p. 16).
(62) Commission Directive 2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003 implementing Directive 2003/6 as regards the fair 
presentation of investment recommendations and the disclosure of conflicts of interest (OJ 2003 L 339, p. 70).48  Annual Report 2012
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that information, even if it were quite specific and even though the other elements making up 
inside information were also present. In such a situation, certain parties in possession of that infor-
mation could be in an advantageous situation vis-à-vis other investors and would be able to profit 
from that information, to the detriment of those who are unaware of it.
As regards the concept of a set of circumstances or an event which may reasonably be expected 
to come into existence or to occur, the Court explained that this refers to future circumstances or 
events from which it appears, on the basis of an overall assessment of the factors existing at the 
relevant time, that there is a realistic prospect that they will come into existence or occur. Accord-
ingly, it is not necessary to demonstrate a high likelihood that such circumstances or events will 
come into existence or occur. Furthermore, the magnitude of the possible effect on the prices of 
the financial instruments concerned is of no relevance to the interpretation of that concept.
Trade marks 
In a case relating to trade mark law, Case C-307/10 Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys (judgment 
of 19 June 2012), the Court considered the requirements for the identification of the goods or ser-
vices in respect of which trade mark protection is sought.
An application to register a term as a national trade mark had been filed in the United Kingdom 
and, in order to identify the services covered by that registration, the applicant had used general 
terms corresponding exactly to those of the heading of the class of services concerned. The na-
tional authority competent for the registration of trade marks refused that application on the basis 
of the national provisions transposing Directive 2008/95. (63) That authority concluded that the ap-
plication covered not only services of the kind specified by the applicant for registration but also 
every other service falling within the relevant class. The term at issue therefore lacked distinctive 
character and it was also descriptive. Moreover, there was no evidence that the word sign con-
cerned had acquired a distinctive character through use in relation to the services in question be-
fore the date of the application for registration. Nor had the applicant requested that such services 
be excluded from its trade mark application.
The applicant for registration appealed against the refusal to register and the High Court of Justice 
asked the Court about the requirements of clarity and precision for identification of the goods and 
services in respect of which trade mark protection is applied for and the possibility of using, for 
that purpose, general indications of the class headings of the official classification of goods and 
services.
In its judgment, the Court held, first, that the directive must be interpreted as meaning that it re-
quires the goods and services for which trade mark protection is sought to be identified by the 
applicant with sufficient clarity and precision to enable the competent authorities and economic 
operators, on that basis alone, to determine the extent of the protection conferred by the trade 
mark. The competent authorities must know with sufficient clarity and precision the goods or ser-
vices covered by a trade mark in order to be able to fulfil their obligations in relation to the prior 
examination of applications for registration and the publication and maintenance of an appropri-
ate and precise register of trade marks. In addition, economic operators must be able to acquaint 
themselves, with clarity and precision, with registrations or applications for registration made by 
(63) Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the 
laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 2008 L 299, p. 25).Annual Report 2012  49
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their actual or potential competitors and thus to obtain relevant information about the rights of 
third parties.
Second, the Court held that the directive does not preclude the use of the general indications of 
the class headings of the Nice classification in order to identify the goods and services for which 
trade mark protection is sought. However, that identification must be sufficiently clear and precise 
to allow the competent authorities and economic operators to determine the scope of the pro-
tection sought. In that context, the Court observed that some of the general indications in class 
headings of the official classification are, in themselves, sufficiently clear and precise, while others 
are too general and cover goods or services which are too variable to be compatible with the trade 
mark’s function as an indication of origin. It is therefore for the competent authorities to make an 
assessment on a case-by-case basis, according to the goods or services for which the applicant 
seeks the protection conferred by the trade mark, in order to determine whether those indications 
meet the requirements of clarity and precision.
Last, the Court made clear that an applicant for a national trade mark who uses all the general 
indications of a particular class heading to identify the goods or services for which trade mark pro-
tection is sought must specify whether its application is intended to cover all the goods or services 
included in the alphabetical list of that class or only some of those goods or services. Where the ap-
plication concerns only some of those goods or services, the applicant is required to specify which 
of the goods or services in that class are intended to be covered.
Thus, it was for the referring court to determine whether, when it used all the general indications 
of a class heading in the Nice classification, the applicant for registration did or did not specify in its 
application whether or not that application covered all the services in that class.
Economic and monetary policy
Following a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court (Ireland), received on 3 Au-
gust 2012, the Court, sitting as a full Court and applying the accelerated procedure, ruled in Case 
C-370/12 Pringle (judgment of 27 November 2012) that European Union law does not preclude the 
conclusion and ratification by the Member States whose currency is the euro of the Treaty estab-
lishing the European stability mechanism (‘the ESM Treaty’).
Applying the simplified revision procedure introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, (64) the European 
Council had adopted on 25 March 2011 Decision 2011/199, (65) which provides for the addition to 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) of a new provision (66) according to 
which the Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be 
activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The States of the 
euro area had then concluded the ESM Treaty on 2 February 2012.
In answer to a question on the validity of Decision 2011/199, the Court recalled that the simplified 
revision procedure may be applied only to the internal policies and actions of the European Union 
and cannot extend the powers conferred on the European Union by the Treaties.
(64)  Article 48(6) TEU.
(65)  European Council Decision 2011/199/EU of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro 
(OJ 2011 L 91, p. 1).
(66) The new paragraph 3 of Article 136 TFEU.50  Annual Report 2012
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As regards the first of those conditions, the Court held, first of all, that the amendment at issue 
does not encroach on the exclusive competence of the European Union in the area of monetary 
policy for Member States whose currency is the euro. Whereas the primary objective of the Euro-
pean Union’s monetary policy is to maintain price stability, the ESM Treaty pursues an objective that 
is clearly distinct, namely the stability of the euro area as a whole. The mere fact that that economic 
policy measure may have indirect effects on the stability of the euro does not mean that it can be 
treated as equivalent to a monetary policy measure. Furthermore, the ESM Treaty serves to com-
plement the new regulatory framework for strengthened economic governance of the European 
Union, which establishes closer coordination and surveillance of the economic and budgetary poli-
cies conducted by the Member States. The objective of the establishment of the ESM Treaty is the 
management of financial crises which might arise in spite of preventive action taken in accordance 
with the new regulatory framework. The ESM Treaty therefore forms part of economic policy and 
not monetary policy. Nor does the amendment at issue affect the competence conferred on the 
European Union in the area of the coordination of the Member States’ economic policies. As the 
provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the TFEU do not confer any specific power on the 
European Union to establish a stability mechanism of the kind envisaged by Decision 2011/199, the 
Member States whose currency is the euro are entitled to conclude an agreement between them-
selves for the establishment of a stability mechanism. Furthermore, the reason why the grant of 
financial assistance by the ESM Treaty is subject to strict conditionality under the contested amend-
ment of the TFEU is in order to ensure that that mechanism will operate in a way that will comply 
with European Union law, including the measures adopted by the European Union in the context 
of the coordination of the Member States’ economic policies.
As regards the second condition for application of the simplified revision procedure, the Court held 
that the amendment of the TFEU does not create any legal basis on which the European Union 
might undertake any action which was not previously possible and therefore does not increase the 
powers conferred on the European Union by the Treaties.
The Court held, moreover, that neither the various provisions of the Treaty on European Union and 
the TFEU mentioned by the Supreme Court, nor the principle of effective judicial protection, 
preclude the conclusion of an agreement such as the ESM Treaty.
The Court stated, in particular, that the aim of the ‘no bail-out clause’, (67) pursuant to which the 
European Union or a Member State is not to be liable for or assume the commitments of another 
Member State, is to ensure that the Member States follow a sound budgetary policy by ensuring 
that they remain subject to the logic of the market when they enter into debt. Accordingly, it does 
not prohibit the granting of financial aid by one or more Member States to a Member State which 
remains responsible for its commitments to its creditors, provided that the conditions attached to 
such assistance are such as to prompt that Member State to implement a sound budgetary policy. 
In addition, the allocation by the ESM Treaty of new tasks to the Commission, the European Central 
Bank and the Court of Justice is compatible with their powers as defined in the Treaties. (68) Last, 
when they create a stability mechanism such as the ESM for the establishment of which the EU and 
FEU Treaties do not confer any specific competence on the European Union, the Member States do 
not implement European Union law, so that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, (69) which guarantees that everyone has the right to effective judicial protection, does not 
apply.
(67)  Article 125 TFEU.
(68)  Article 13 TEU.
(69) Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.Annual Report 2012  51
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Social policy 
Under the heading of social policy, two judgments must be mentioned, one relating to annual 
leave and the other to the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of age.
In the area of paid annual leave, Case C-282/10 Dominguez (judgment of 24 January 2012) provided 
the Court with the opportunity to interpret Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88 concerning certain 
aspects of the management of working time. (70) First, the Court held that Article 7(1) of Directive 
2003/88 precludes national provisions or practices which make entitlement to paid annual leave 
conditional on a minimum period of 10 days’ or one month’s actual work during the reference 
period. Although Member States are free to lay down, in their domestic legislation, conditions for 
the exercise and implementation of the right to paid annual leave, they are not entitled to make 
the very existence of that right subject to any preconditions whatsoever. Second, the Court stated 
that, in the event of a dispute between individuals where national law, in that it does not, for the 
purpose of entitlement to paid annual leave, treat the absence of the worker due to an accident 
on the journey to or from work as equivalent to absence due to an accident at work, is contrary to 
Article 7 of Directive 2003/88, it is for the national court to determine — taking the whole body of 
domestic law into consideration, in particular the relevant employment law, and applying the in-
terpretative methods recognised by domestic law, with a view to ensuring that Directive 2003/88 is 
fully effective and achieving an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by the directive — 
whether it can find an interpretation of that national law that allows the absence of the worker 
due to an accident on the journey to or from work to be treated as being equivalent to one of the 
situations covered by the relevant provison of national employment law. If such an interpretation 
is not possible, it is for the referring court to determine whether, in the light of the legal nature of 
the respondents in the main proceedings, the direct effect of Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88 may 
be relied upon as against them. If the national court is unable to achieve the objective laid down in 
Article 7 of that directive, the party injured as a result of domestic law not being in conformity with 
European Union law can none the less rely on the judgment in Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy (71) 
in order to obtain, if appropriate, compensation for the loss sustained. Third, the Court held that 
Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88 does not preclude a national provision which, depending on the 
reason for the worker’s absence on sick leave, provides for a period of paid annual leave equal to or 
exceeding the minimum period of four weeks laid down in that directive.
Case C-286/12 Commission v Hungary (judgment of 6 November 2012) concerned national legisla-
tion entailing the compulsory retirement of judges, prosecutors and notaries who had reached the 
age of 62 years. First of all, the Court held, in the light of Article 2(1) of Directive 2000/78, (72) that 
such legislation establishes a difference in treatment between persons engaged in those profes-
sions who have reached the age of 62 years and younger individuals engaged in the same pro-
fessions, since the former, owing to their age, are required automatically to cease their functions. 
According to the Court, that discrimination is not justified in so far as such legislation is not an 
appropriate and necessary means of achieving its legitimate objectives. Admittedly, under Art-
icle 6(1) of Directive 2000/78, the objective of standardising, in the context of professions in the 
public sector, the age-limits for compulsory retirement may constitute a legitimate objective. 
However, provisions which abruptly and significantly lower the age-limit for compulsory retirement, 
(70) Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain 
aspects of the organisation of working time (OJ 2003 L 299, p. 9).
(71) Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, judgment of 19 November 1991.
(72) Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16).52  Annual Report 2012
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without introducing transitional measures of such a kind as to protect the legitimate expectations 
of the persons concerned, go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective. Likewise, the 
objective of establishing a more balanced age structure facilitating access for young lawyers to the 
professions of judge, prosecutor and notary may constitute a legitimate objective of employment 
and labour market policy. However, provisions the effects of which are apparently positive in the 
short term but are liable to call into question the possibility of achieving a truly balanced age 
structure in the medium and long terms are not an appropriate means of achieving that objective. 
Accordingly, the Court held that Hungary had failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 2 and 6(1) 
of Directive 2000/78.
Environment
As in previous years, the Court of Justice ruled on many occasions on questions relating to the en-
vironment protection policy pursued by the European Union.
First of all, in the area of waste regulation, in Case C-1/11 Interseroh Scrap and Metals Trading (judg-
ment of 29 March 2012) the Court ruled on the scope of the right to protection of business se-
crets with respect to the information that is to accompany shipments of non-hazardous waste. The 
Court ruled that Article 18(4) of Regulation No 1013/2006, (73) which provides that the information 
accompanying a shipment of certain waste is to be treated as confidential where this is required 
by Community and national legislation, does not permit an intermediary dealer arranging a ship-
ment of waste not to disclose the name of the waste producer to the consignee of the shipment, as 
provided for in Regulation No 1013/2006, even though such non-disclosure might be necessary in 
order to protect the business secrets of that intermediary dealer. In addition, the Court ruled that 
Article 18(1) of Regulation No 1013/2006 requires an intermediary dealer, in the context of a ship-
ment of waste covered by that provision, to complete Field 6 of the document accompanying the 
shipment of waste, in which he must mention the name of the waste producer, and to transmit it to 
the consignee, without any possibility of the scope of that requirement being restricted by a right 
to protection of business secrets. Even if the obligation to reveal the name of the waste producer to 
the consignee of a shipment of waste were to constitute a breach of the protection of the business 
secrets of intermediary dealers, that could not have the consequence of restricting the scope of 
a provision of secondary law that is clear and unconditional.
Next, a number of cases that are to be mentioned provided clarification of the scope of the right to 
information and to public participation in environmental matters.
In Case C-182/10 Solvay (judgment of 16 February 2012), the Court ruled on the implementation 
of Directive 85/337 (74) on environmental impact assessments, Directive 92/43 (75) and the Aarhus 
(73) Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on shipments of 
waste (OJ 2006 L 190, p. 1), as amended by Commission Regulation No 308/2009 of 15 April 2009 amending, for 
the purposes of adaptation to scientific and technical progress, Annexes IIIA and VI to Regulation No 1013/2006 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on shipments of waste (OJ 2009 L 97, p. 8).
(74) Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private 
projects on the environment (OJ 1985 L 175, p. 40), as amended by Directive 2003/35/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 26 May 2003 (OJ 2003 L 156, p. 17).
(75)  Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora 
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Convention (76) in relation to infrastructure projects approved by a legislative authority, and also 
on the rules applicable to projects that will adversely affect the integrity of a protected site but are 
based on an imperative reason of overriding public interest.
First of all, the Court confirmed that only projects which satisfy the twofold condition that, first, 
the details of the projects were adopted by a specific legislative act and, second, the projects were 
adopted in such a way that the objectives of Directive 85/337 and the Aarhus Convention were 
achieved through a legislative process are excluded from the scope of that directive and that con-
vention, before recalling that the question whether the legislative act satisfies those conditions 
must be capable of being submitted to a court of law or another independent and impartial body 
established by law. Failing that, any national court before which an action falling within its jurisdic-
tion is brought would have the task of carrying out such a review and, as the case may be, drawing 
the necessary conclusions by disapplying that legislative act.
Next, the Court ruled that Directive 92/43 does not allow a national authority, even if it is a legisla-
tive authority, to authorise a plan or project without having ascertained that it will not adversely af-
fect the integrity of the protected site concerned. That directive does not lay down any special rule 
for plans or projects approved by a legislative authority. Those plans and projects must therefore 
be subject to the assessment procedure laid down in Article 6(3) of Directive 92/43.
Last, still in relation to Directive 92/43, the Court set out the circumstances in which an impera-
tive reason of overriding public interest is capable of justifying the implementation of a plan or 
project that will adversely affect the integrity of a protected site, on the basis of Article 6(4) of that 
directive. The Court ruled that the interest capable of justifying the implementation of a project 
in such a situation must be both ‘public’ and ‘overriding’, which means that it must be of such im-
portance that it can be weighed up against that directive’s objective of the conservation of natural 
habitats and wild fauna and flora. Consequently, works intended for the location or expansion of 
an undertaking satisfy those conditions only in exceptional circumstances. It cannot be ruled out 
that that is the case where a project, although of a private character, in fact by its very nature and 
by its economic and social context presents an overriding public interest and it has been shown 
that there are no alternative solutions. However, the creation of infrastructure intended to accom-
modate a management centre cannot be regarded as an imperative reason of overriding public 
interest — which reasons include those of a social or economic nature — capable of justifying the 
implementation of a plan or project that will adversely affect the integrity of the site concerned.
Case C-204/09 Flachglas Torgau (judgment of 14 February 2012) concerned the limits that Member 
States may place on the right of public access to environmental information held by a national au-
thority, in the light of Directive 2003/4. (77) In its judgment, the Court first of all ruled that Member 
States may make provision for ministries to refuse public access to environmental information to 
the extent that those ministries participate in the legislative process, in particular by tabling draft 
laws or giving opinions. However, once the legislative process has been completed, the ministry 
which participated in it can no longer rely on that exception, since the smooth running of that 
process can, in principle, no longer be impeded by the environmental information being made 
available. On the other hand, it is not precluded that the ministry may refuse to provide that infor-
(76) Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environ-
mental matters, approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17 Febru-
ary 2005 (OJ 2005 L 124, p. 1).
(77) Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to 
environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC (OJ 2003 L 41, p. 26).54  Annual Report 2012
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mation on other grounds recognised by European Union law. Thus, Member States may provide 
for a request for environmental information to be refused if its disclosure would adversely affect 
the confidentiality of the proceedings of public authorities, where such confidentiality is ‘provided 
for by law’. The Court held that the latter condition may be regarded as fulfilled by the existence, 
in the national law of the Member State concerned, of a rule which provides, generally, that the 
confidentiality of the proceedings of public authorities is a ground for refusing access to environ-
mental information held by those authorities, in so far as national law clearly defines the concept 
of ‘proceedings’. In addition, the Court recalled that a public authority which intends to rely on the 
confidentiality of its proceedings in order to refuse a request for access to environmental informa-
tion must balance the interests involved in each particular case.
In Case C-567/10 Inter-Environnement Bruxelles and Others (judgment of 22 March 2012), the Court 
provided clarification of the concept of ‘plans and programmes’ referred to in Directive 2001/42, (78) 
and therefore of the scope of the rules on environmental impact assessment laid down in that 
directive. The Court first of all explained that the concept of plans and programmes ‘which are 
required by legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions’ also concerns land development 
plans the adoption of which is not compulsory. Next, the Court held that a national procedure for 
the total or partial repeal of a land management plan falls in principle within the scope of Directive 
2001/42. However, the Court also stated that, in principle, that is not the case if the repealed meas-
ure falls within a hierarchy of town and country planning measures, as long as those measures lay 
down sufficiently precise rules governing land use, they have themselves been the subject of an 
assessment of their environmental effects and it may reasonably be considered that the interests 
which Directive 2001/42 is designed to protect have been taken into account sufficiently within 
that framework.
Last, in Case C-41/11 Inter-Environnement Wallonie and Terre wallonne (judgment of 28 February 
2012), the Court was asked about the role of the national court with jurisdiction to annul a meas-
ure when hearing an action against a national measure adopted in breach of the obligation laid 
down in Directive 2001/42 (79) to carry out a prior environmental assessment for certain plans and 
programmes, in circumstances where that national measure constitutes the transposition of an-
other environmental directive, in this instance Directive 91/676 (80) (the Nitrates Directive). In its 
judgment, the Court first of all recalled that where a national court has before it an action for an-
nulment of a national measure constituting a ‘plan’ or ‘programme’ within the meaning of Directive 
2001/42 that was adopted in breach of the obligation to carry out a prior environmental assess-
ment, that court is obliged to take all the measures provided for by its national law in order to rem-
edy the failure to carry out such an assessment, including the possible suspension or annulment 
of the contested plan or programme. However, the Court held that, in view of the specific circum-
stances of the case referred to it, the referring court could exceptionally be authorised to make 
use of a national provision empowering it to maintain certain effects of a national measure which 
has been annulled in so far as: the national measure was a measure which correctly transposed 
Directive 92/676; the adoption and entry into force in the meantime of a new national measure 
implementing that directive did not enable the adverse effects on the environment resulting from 
the annulment of the contested measure to be avoided; the annulment of that contested measure 
would result in a legal vacuum in relation to the transposition of Directive 91/676 which would be 
(78) Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the 
effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment (OJ 2001 L 197, p. 30).
(79) See preceding footnote.
(80) Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution 
caused by nitrates from agricultural sources (OJ 1991 L 375, p. 1).Annual Report 2012  55
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more harmful to the environment, in the sense that that annulment would result in a lower level of 
protection of waters and would thereby run specifically counter to the fundamental objective of 
that directive; and the effects of such a measure were exceptionally maintained only for the period 
of time which was strictly necessary to adopt the measures enabling the irregularity which had 
been established to be remedied.
European civil service
In Case C-566/10 P Italy v Commission (judgment of 27 November 2012), the Court ruled on the 
languages to be used by the European Personnel Selection Office (‘EPSO’) (81) when publishing in 
the Official Journal of the European Union (‘the OJEU’) notices of competitions for the recruitment 
of officials to the institutions of the European Union. The Italian Republic had brought an action 
before the Court of First Instance (now ‘the General Court’) against certain notices of competi-
tion published only in German, French and English. (82) As regards entry to and the taking of the 
admission tests, a thorough knowledge of one of the official languages of the European Union and 
a satisfactory knowledge of German, English or French as a second language, different from the 
main language, were required. In addition, it was stipulated that invitations to the various tests, 
correspondence between EPSO and candidates and the admissions tests would be in German, Eng-
lish or French. The same conditions were stipulated for admission to the written tests and also for 
the conduct of those tests. The General Court dismissed that action (83) and the Italian Republic 
appealed to the Court of Justice.
The Court began by observing that the language rules of the European Union define the 23 current 
languages of the European Union as official languages and working languages of the European 
Union institutions, that the OJEU must appear in all the official languages (84) and that, according to 
the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, (85) a notice for an open competition must 
be published in the OJEU. Accordingly, those rules, taken together, mean that the competitions at 
issue ought to have been published in full in all the official languages.
The Court then examined the limitation of the choice of the second language for participation 
in a competition. It considered that the requirements of specific language knowledge laid down 
in a competition notice may be justified by the interest of the service, which may be a legitimate 
objective. The Court made clear, however, that that interest of the service must be objectively jus-
tified and that the level of language knowledge required must be proportionate to the genuine 
needs of the service. Furthermore, in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 27 of the Staff 
Regulations, the recruitment of officials is to be directed to securing for the institution the services 
of officials of the highest standards of ability, efficiency and integrity. Since that objective can best 
be achieved when the candidates are allowed to sit the selection tests in their mother tongue or in 
(81)  European Personnel Selection Office, created by Decision 2002/620/EC of the European Parliament, the Council, 
the Commission, the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors, the Economic and Social Committee, the Commit-
tee of the Regions and the European Ombudsman of 25 July 2002 (OJ 2002 L 197, p. 53).
(82) Competitions EPSO/AD/94/07, EPSO/AST/37/07 and EPSO/AD/95/07.
(83)  Joined Cases T-166/07 and T-285/07 Italy v Commission (judgment of 13 September 2010).
(84) Regulation No 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community (OJ, English 
Special Edition 1952–58, p. 59).
(85) Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 of 29 February 1968 laying down the Staff Regulations of 
Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities and instituting 
special measures temporarily applicable to officials of the Commission (OJ, English Special Edition 1968(I), 
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the second language of which they think they have the best command, it is, in that regard, for the 
institutions to weigh the legitimate objective justifying the limitation of the number of languages 
of the competition against the objective of identifying the most competent candidates. The Court 
therefore set aside the judgment of the General Court and annulled the notices of competition at 
issue.
Common foreign and security policy
In the area of the common foreign and security policy, four decisions in 2012 deserve attention.
As regards the restrictive measures taken against the Islamic Republic of Iran with the aim of pre-
venting nuclear proliferation, an appeal was lodged with the Court by Melli Bank, a United King-
dom bank wholly owned by Bank Melli Iran, an Iranian bank controlled by the Iranian State. In that 
appeal, in Case C-380/09 P Melli Bank v Council (judgment of 13 March 2012), the Court was asked 
to set aside the judgment of the General Court (86) dismissing Melli Bank’s action for annulment of 
Decision 2008/475/EC, (87) in so far as it concerned Melli Bank. A few months earlier, an appeal had 
been lodged with the Court, in Case C-548/09 P Bank Melli Iran v Council (judgment of 16 Novem-
ber 2011), (88) by Bank Melli Iran, Melli Bank’s parent company, seeking to have set aside the judg-
ment of the General Court (89) dismissing its action for annulment of the same Decision 2008/475/EC, 
in so far as it concerned Bank Melli Iran. The Court had dismissed the appeal and, consequently, 
upheld the decision freezing the funds of Bank Melli Iran.
In Case C-380/09 P Melli Bank v Council, the Court held that the General Court had not erred in 
considering that Article 7(2)(d) of Regulation No 423/2007 concerning restrictive measures against 
the Islamic Republic of Iran (90) required the Council to freeze the funds of an entity ‘owned or con-
trolled’ by an entity identified as engaged in nuclear proliferation. Accordingly, the reason for the 
freezing of the funds of Melli Bank — an undertaking wholly owned by Bank Melli Iran, an entity 
identified as engaged in nuclear proliferation — did not need to be that Melli Bank itself participat-
ed in nuclear proliferation. Also, the freezing of funds, when applied to an entity wholly owned by 
an entity regarded as participating in nuclear proliferation, does not affect the presumption of in-
nocence. The adoption of fund-freezing measures under Article 7(2)(d) of Regulation No 423/2007 
is specifically not directed against the autonomous behaviour of such an entity and therefore does 
not require that entity to have behaved in a manner contrary to the provisions of that regulation.
Furthermore, according to the Court, the General Court had been correct to take the view that 
the freezing of Melli Bank’s funds was consistent with the principle of proportionality, since it was 
appropriate and necessary in order to attain the legitimate objective of maintaining international 
peace and security. Where the funds of an entity identified as participating in nuclear prolifera-
tion are frozen, there is a considerable likelihood that that entity will exert pressure on the entities 
which it owns or controls, in order to circumvent the measures adopted against it. In those circum-
stances, the freezing of the funds of the entities owned or controlled by an entity participating 
in nuclear proliferation is necessary and appropriate in order to ensure the effectiveness of the 
(86)  Joined Cases T-246/08 and T-332/08 Melli Bank v Council, judgment of 9 July 2009.
(87)  More specifically, point 4 in Table B in the annex to Council Decision 2008/475/EC of 23 June 2008 implementing 
Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ 2008 L 163, p. 29).
(88) See  Annual Report 2011, p. 64.
(89)  Case T-390/08 Bank Melli Iran v Council, judgment of 14 October 2009.
(90) Council Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 of 19 April 2007 concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ 2007 
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measures taken against the latter entity and to ensure that those measures will not be circum-
vented. The Court also upheld the General Court’s finding that there were no appropriate alterna-
tive measures for attaining the same objective. Given the prime importance of the preservation 
of peace and international security, the restrictions on the freedom to carry on economic activity 
and the right to property of a bank that were occasioned by the fund-freezing measures were not 
disproportionate to the ends sought.
Last, the Court also recalled that Security Council resolutions, on the one hand, and Council com-
mon positions and regulations, on the other, originate from distinct legal orders. Measures adopt-
ed within the framework of the United Nations and the European Union are adopted by organs 
with autonomous powers, granted to them by their basic charters, that is to say, the Treaties that 
created them. However, in drawing up Community measures aimed at giving effect to a Security 
Council resolution envisaged in a common position, the European Union must take due account 
of the terms and objectives of the resolution concerned. Similarly, it is necessary to take account of 
the wording and purpose of a Security Council resolution when interpreting the regulation which 
seeks to implement that resolution.
In Case C-376/10 P Tay Za v Council (judgment of 13 March 2012), the Court was requested, in an 
appeal, to adjudicate on the circumstances in which a system of sanctions put in place by the 
Council against a third country may be directed against natural persons, and on the intensity of 
the relationship required between those persons and the ruling regime. In that regard, the Court 
recalled that, in order for it to be possible for them to be adopted on the basis of Articles 60 EC 
and 301 EC as restrictive measures imposed on third countries, the measures in respect of natural 
persons must be directed only against the leaders of such countries and the persons associated 
with those leaders. The Court explained that, in holding in Kadi (91) that the restrictive measures 
adopted against a third country could not be directed at persons associated with that country ‘in 
some other way’, the Court intended to restrict the categories of natural persons at whom targeted 
restrictive measures may be directed to the categories of natural persons whose connection with 
the third country in question is quite obvious, namely the leaders of third countries and the indi-
viduals associated with them. Accordingly, the Court held that the application of such measures 
to natural persons on the sole ground of their family connection with persons associated with 
the leaders of the third country concerned, irrespective of the personal conduct of such natural 
persons, was contrary to European Union law. Consequently, the measure freezing the funds and 
economic resources belonging to Mr Pye Phyo Tay Za could have been adopted only in reliance 
upon precise, concrete evidence which would have enabled it to be established that he benefited 
from the economic policies of the leaders of Myanmar.
In Case C-130/10 Parliament v Council (judgment of 19 July 2012), an action was brought before 
the Court by the European Parliament, seeking annulment of Regulation No 1286/2009 amend-
ing Regulation No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain 
persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban. (92)
In support of its action, the Parliament claimed, principally, that the contested regulation was 
wrongly based on Article 215 TFEU, when the correct legal basis was Article 75 TFEU. In order 
(91) Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commis-
sion, judgment of 3 September 2008.
(92)  Council Regulation (EU) No 1286/2009 of 22 December 2009 amending Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing 
certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin 
Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban (OJ 2009 L 346, p. 42).58  Annual Report 2012
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to determine, in the light of the aim and the content of the contested regulation, whether Art-
icle 215(2) TFEU constituted the appropriate legal basis for that regulation, the Court therefore 
exam  ined the wording of that article, its context and the objectives which it pursued, in relation to 
those pursued by Article 75 TFEU.
Following that examination, the Court held that Article 215(2) TFEU may constitute the legal basis of 
restrictive measures, including those designed to combat terrorism, taken against natural or legal 
persons, groups or non-State entities by the European Union when the decision to adopt those 
measures is part of its action in the sphere of the CFSP. While admittedly the combating of terror-
ism and its financing may well be among the objectives of the area of freedom, security and justice, 
as they appear, in particular, in Article 3(2) TEU, the objective of combating international terrorism 
and its financing in order to preserve international peace and security corresponds, nevertheless, 
to the objectives of the Treaty provisions on external action by the European Union, as set out in 
Article 21(2)(c) TEU. Accordingly, the object of actions undertaken by the European Union in the 
sphere of the CFSP and of the measures taken in order to implement that policy in the sphere 
of the external action of the European Union, and in particular of restrictive measures within the 
meaning of Article 215(2) TFEU, may be to combat terrorism. It follows that Article 215(2) TFEU con-
stitutes the appropriate legal basis for Regulation No 1286/2009. That regulation, which contains 
safeguards for the respect of the fundamental right of the persons whose names appear in the 
list, may therefore be adopted on the basis of Article 215(2) TFEU and not of Article 75 TFEU. The 
difference between Article 75 TFEU and Article 215 TFEU, so far as the Parliament’s involvement 
is concerned, is the result of the choice made by the framers of the Treaty of Lisbon of conferring 
a more limited role on the Parliament with regard to the European Union’s action under the CFSP. 
Furthermore, the duty to respect fundamental rights is imposed, in accordance with Article 51(1) of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, on all the institutions and bodies of the 
European Union.
Furthermore, the fact that the Treaty on European Union no longer provides for common positions 
but for decisions in matters relating to the CFSP does not have the effect of rendering non-existent 
the common positions adopted before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. Common positions, 
like Common Position 2002/402, (93) which have not been repealed, annulled or amended after the 
Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, may be considered to correspond, for the purpose of imple-
menting Article 215 TFEU, to the decisions adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the 
Treaty on European Union to which that article refers.
As regards, this time, the specific restrictive measures taken against certain persons and entities in 
the context of the combating of terrorism, two appeals were brought before the Court by Sticht-
ing Al-Aqsa, a Netherlands foundation, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, respectively. By the 
two appeals in Joined Cases C-539/10 P and C-550/10 P Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa 
(judgment of 15 November 2012), the appellants requested the Court to set aside the judgment 
of the General Court (94) in which that Court had annulled a number of Council measures placing 
Stichting Al-Aqsa on the list of persons and entities whose assets were frozen.
(93) Council Common Position 2002/402/CFSP of 27 May 2002 concerning restrictive measures against Usama bin 
Laden, members of the Al-Qaida organisation and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and 
entities associated with them and repealing Common Positions 96/746/CFSP, 1999/727/CFSP, 2001/154/CFSP 
and 2001/771/CFSP (OJ 2002 L 139, p. 4).
(94)  Case T-348/07 Al-Aqsa v Council, judgment of September 2010.Annual Report 2012  59
Case-law  Court of Justice
First of all, the Court dismissed Stichting Al-Aqsa’s appeal as inadmissible, since it concerned only 
the amendment of certain grounds of the judgment of the General Court.
Next, as regards the appeal brought by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Court held that the 
General Court erred in law in taking the view, following the repeal of the Sanctieregeling, (95) that 
there was no longer any ‘substratum’ in national law that justified continuing to include Stichting 
Al-Aqsa on the list, without taking due account of the reason why that measure was repealed. The 
sole reason justifying that repeal was to prevent an overlap between the national fund-freezing 
measure, imposed by the Sanctieregeling, and the freezing measure prescribed at European Union 
level by Regulation No 2580/2001, (96) following the inclusion of Stichting Al-Aqsa on the list. The 
Court therefore set aside the judgment of the General Court. After doing so, the Court itself gave 
final judgment on the initial action brought by Stichting Al-Aqsa before the General Court for 
annulment of the Council’s fund-freezing decisions.
First of all, the Court observed that the Council held precise information and evidence in the file 
showing that a decision satisfying the criteria laid down in European Union law had been taken 
by a competent Netherlands authority against Stichting Al-Aqsa. The Court emphasised, in that 
context, that, in accordance with European Union law, such a reference to the national decision 
implies the existence of serious and credible evidence, regarded as reliable by the competent na-
tional authorities, of the involvement of a person in terrorist activities. Next, the Court considered 
that the Council had not failed to comply with its obligation to review the existence of the grounds 
justifying the fund-freezing decisions. It stated that the repeal of the Sanctieregeling did not suffice 
to declare that continuing to include Stichting Al-Aqsa on the list was incompatible with European 
Union law. In effect, there was no evidence that could have led the Council to find that Stichting Al-
Aqsa had suspended or ceased to contribute to the financing of terrorist activities, irrespective of 
the fact that the freezing of its funds made such contributions more difficult, if not impossible. Last, 
the Court considered that the Council’s decisions did not infringe Stichting Al-Aqsa’s right to prop-
erty. As the freezing of funds constitutes a temporary precautionary measure, it is not intended 
to deprive the persons concerned of their property. Since alternative and less restrictive measures 
are not as effective in achieving the goal pursued by the European Union, namely to combat 
the financing of terrorism, the restrictions on Stichting Al-Aqsa’s right to property imposed by 
the Council satisfy the requirement of necessity. Likewise, owing to the importance of combating 
the financing of terrorism, those restrictions are not disproportionate to the aims pursued. 
Consequently the Court dismissed the initial action brought by Stichting Al-Aqsa.
(95)  The regulation on sanctions for the suppression of terrorism adopted against Stichting Al-Aqsa by the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands.
(96) Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against 
certain persons and with a view to combating terrorism (OJ 2001 L 344, p. 70).Annual Report 2012  61
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Academic Council of the Academy of European Law, Trier (from 1995); 
member of the Administrative Board of the Greek National Judges’ Col-
lege (1995–96); member of the Scientific Committee of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (1997–99); President of the Greek Economic and Social 
Council in 1998; Judge at the Court of Justice since 8 June 1999; Presi-
dent of the Court of Justice since 7 October 2003.
Koen Lenaerts
Born 1954; lic. iuris, Ph.D. in Law (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven); Mas-
ter of Laws, Master in Public Administration (Harvard University); Lec-
turer (1979–83), subsequently Professor of European Law, Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven (since 1983); Legal Secretary at the Court of Jus-
tice (1984–85); Professor at the College of Europe, Bruges (1984–89); 
member of the Brussels Bar (1986–89); Visiting Professor at the Harvard 
Law School (1989); Judge at the Court of First Instance of the European 
Communities from 25 September 1989 to 6 October 2003; Judge at the 
Court of Justice since 7 October 2003; Vice-President of the Court of 
Justice since 9 October 2012.64  Annual Report 2012
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Antonio Tizzano
Born 1940; Professor of European Union Law at La Sapienza University, 
Rome; Professor at the Istituto Universitario Orientale, Naples (1969–
79), Federico II University, Naples (1979–92), the University of Catania 
(1969–77) and the University of Mogadishu (1967–72); member of the 
Bar at the Italian Court of Cassation; Legal Adviser to the Permanent 
Representation of the Italian Republic to the European Communities 
(1984–92); member of the Italian delegation at the negotiations for 
the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic 
to the European Communities, for the Single European Act and for the 
Treaty on European Union; author of numerous publications, including 
commentaries on the European Treaties and collections of European 
Union legal texts; Founder and Director since 1996 of the journal Il Di-
ritto dell’Unione Europea; member of the managing or editorial board of 
a number of legal journals; rapporteur at numerous international con-
gresses; conferences and courses at various international institutions, 
including The Hague Academy of International Law (1987); member of 
the independent group of experts appointed to examine the financ-
es of the Commission of the European Communities (1999); Advocate 
General at the Court of Justice from 7 October 2000 to 3 May 2006; 
Judge at the Court of Justice since 4 May 2006.
José Narciso da Cunha Rodrigues
Born 1940; various offices within the judiciary (1964–77); government 
assignments to carry out and coordinate studies on reform of the judi-
cial system; Government Agent at the European Commission of Human 
Rights and the European Court of Human Rights (1980–84); expert on 
the Human Rights Steering Committee of the Council of Europe (1980–
85); member of the Review Commission for the Criminal Code and the 
Code of Criminal Procedure; Principal State Counsel (1984–2000); mem-
ber of the Supervisory Committee of the European Union Anti-Fraud 
Office (OLAF) (1999–2000); Judge at the Court of Justice from 7 Octo-
ber 2000 to 8 October 2012.Annual Report 2012  65
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Allan Rosas
Born 1948; Doctor of Laws (1977) of the University of Turku (Finland); 
Professor of Law at the University of Turku (1978–81) and at the Åbo 
Akademi University (Turku/Åbo) (1981–96); Director of the latter’s In-
stitute for Human Rights (1985–95); various international and national 
academic positions of responsibility and memberships of learned soci-
eties; coordinated several international and national research projects 
and programmes, including in the fields of EU law, international law, 
humanitarian and human rights law, constitutional law and compara-
tive public administration; represented the Finnish Government as 
member of, or adviser to, Finnish delegations at various international 
conferences and meetings; expert functions in relation to Finnish 
legal life, including in governmental law commissions and committees 
of the Finnish Parliament, as well as the UN, Unesco, OSCE (CSCE) and 
the Council of Europe; from 1995 Principal Legal Adviser at the Legal 
Service of the European Commission, in charge of external relations; 
from March 2001, Deputy Director-General of the European Commis-
sion Legal Service; Judge at the Court of Justice since 17 January 2002.
Rosario Silva de Lapuerta
Born 1954; Bachelor of Laws (Universidad Complutense, Madrid); 
Abogado del Estado in Malaga; Abogado del Estado at the Legal Ser-
vice of the Ministry of Transport, Tourism and Communication and, 
subsequently, at the Legal Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
Head Abogado del Estado of the State Legal Service for Cases before 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities and Deputy Direc-
tor-General of the Community and International Legal Assistance De-
partment (Ministry of Justice); member of the Commission think tank 
on the future of the Community judicial system; Head of the Spanish 
delegation in the ‘Friends of the Presidency’ Group with regard to the 
reform of the Community judicial system in the Treaty of Nice and of 
the Council ad hoc working party on the Court of Justice; Professor of 
Community Law at the Diplomatic School, Madrid; Co-director of the 
journal Noticias de la Unión Europea; Judge at the Court of Justice since 
7 October 2003.
Juliane Kokott 
Born 1957; law studies (Universities of Bonn and Geneva); LL.M. (Ameri-
can University/Washington DC); Doctor of Laws (Heidelberg University, 
1985; Harvard University, 1990); Visiting Professor at the University of 
California, Berkeley (1991); Professor of German and Foreign Public Law, 
International Law and European Law at the Universities of Augsburg 
(1992), Heidelberg (1993) and Düsseldorf (1994); Deputy Judge for the 
Federal Government at the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration of the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); Deputy 
Chairperson of the Federal Government’s Advisory Council on Global 
Change (WBGU, 1996); Professor of International Law, International 
Business Law and European Law at the University of St Gallen (1999); 
Director of the Institute for European and International Business Law 
at the University of St Gallen (2000); Deputy Director of the Master of 
Business Law programme at the University of St Gallen (2001); Advo-
cate General at the Court of Justice since 7 October 2003.66  Annual Report 2012
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Konrad Hermann Theodor Schiemann
Born 1937; law degrees from Cambridge University; Barrister (1964–80); 
Queen’s Counsel (1980–86); Justice of the High Court of England and 
Wales (1986–95); Lord Justice of Appeal (1995–2003); Bencher from 1985 
and Treasurer in 2003 of the Honourable Society of the Inner Temple; 
Judge at the Court of Justice from 8 January 2004 to 8 October 2012.
Endre Juhász
Born 1944; graduated in law from the University of Szeged, Hungary 
(1967); Hungarian Bar Entrance Examinations (1970); postgraduate stud-
ies in comparative law, University of Strasbourg, France (1969, 1970, 
1971, 1972); official in the Legal Department of the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade (1966–74); Director for Legislative Matters (1973–74); First Com-
mercial Secretary at the Hungarian Embassy, Brussels, responsible for 
European Community issues (1974–79); Director at the Ministry of For-
eign Trade (1979–83); First Commercial Secretary, then Commercial 
Counsellor, to the Hungarian Embassy in Washington DC, USA (1983–
89); Director-General at the Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Interna-
tional Economic Relations (1989–91); chief negotiator for the Associa-
tion Agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the European 
Communities and their Member States (1990–91); Secretary-General of 
the Ministry of International Economic Relations, head of the Office of 
European Affairs (1992); State Secretary at the Ministry of International 
Economic Relations (1993–94); State Secretary, President of the Office 
of European Affairs, Ministry of Industry and Trade (1994); Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Chief of Mission of the Republic of 
Hungary to the European Union (January 1995 to May 2003); chief ne-
gotiator for the accession of the Republic of Hungary to the European 
Union (July 1998 to April 2003); Minister without portfolio for the coor-
dination of matters of European integration (from May 2003); Judge at 
the Court of Justice since 11 May 2004.
George Arestis
Born 1945; graduated in law from the University of Athens (1968); MA 
in Comparative Politics and Government, University of Kent at Canter-
bury (1970); practice as a lawyer in Cyprus (1972–82); appointed District 
Court Judge (1982); promoted to President of a District Court (1995); 
Administrative President of the District Court of Nicosia (1997–2003); 
Judge at the Supreme Court of Cyprus (2003); Judge at the Court of 
Justice since 11 May 2004.Annual Report 2012  67
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Anthony Borg Barthet U.O.M. 
Born 1947; Doctorate in Law at the Royal University of Malta in 1973; 
entered the Maltese Civil Service as Notary to the Government in 1975; 
Counsel for the Republic in 1978, Senior Counsel for the Republic in 
1979, Assistant Attorney General in 1988 and appointed Attorney Gen-
eral by the President of Malta in 1989; part-time Lecturer in Civil Law at 
the University of Malta (1985–89); member of the Council of the Univer-
sity of Malta (1998–2004); member of the Commission for the Admin-
istration of Justice (1994–2004); member of the Board of Governors of 
the Malta Arbitration Centre (1998–2004); Judge at the Court of Justice 
since 11 May 2004.
Marko Ilešič
Born 1947; Doctor of Law (University of Ljubljana); specialism in com-
parative law (Universities of Strasbourg and Coimbra); judicial service 
examination; Professor of Civil, Commercial and Private International 
Law; Vice-Dean (1995–2001) and Dean (2001–04) of the Faculty of Law 
at the University of Ljubljana; author of numerous legal publications; 
Honorary Judge and President of Chamber at the Labour Court, Lju-
bljana (1975–86); President of the Sports Tribunal of Slovenia (1978–86); 
President of the Arbitration Chamber of the Ljubljana Stock Exchange; 
Arbitrator at the Chamber of Commerce of Yugoslavia (until 1991) and 
Slovenia (from 1991); Arbitrator at the International Chamber of Com-
merce in Paris; Judge on the Board of Appeals of UEFA and FIFA; Presi-
dent of the Union of Slovene Lawyers’ Associations (1993–2005); mem-
ber of the International Law Association, of the International Maritime 
Committee and of several other international legal societies; Judge at 
the Court of Justice since 11 May 2004.
Jiří Malenovský
Born 1950; Doctor of Law from the Charles University in Prague (1975); 
senior faculty member (1974–90), Vice-Dean (1989–91) and Head of the 
Department of International and European Law (1990–92) at Masaryk 
University, Brno; Judge at the Constitutional Court of Czechoslovakia 
(1992); Envoy to the Council of Europe (1993–98); President of the Com-
mittee of Ministers’ Deputies of the Council of Europe (1995); Senior 
Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1998–2000); President of the 
Czech and Slovak branch of the International Law Association (1999–
2001); Judge at the Constitutional Court (2000–04); member of the 
Legis  lative Council (1998–2000); member of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration at The Hague (from 2000); Professor of Public International 
Law at Masaryk University, Brno (2001); Judge at the Court of Justice 
since 11 May 2004.68  Annual Report 2012
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Uno Lõhmus
Born 1952; Doctor of Law in 1986; member of the Bar (1977–98); Visiting 
Professor of Criminal Law at Tartu University; Judge at the European 
Court of Human Rights (1994–98); Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
of Estonia (1998–2004); member of the Legal Expertise Committee on 
the Constitution; consultant to the working group drafting the Criminal 
Code; member of the working group for the drafting of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure; author of several works on human rights and con-
stitutional law; Judge at the Court of Justice since 11 May 2004. 
Egils Levits
Born 1955; graduated in law and in political science from the University 
of Hamburg; Research Assistant at the Faculty of Law, University of Kiel; 
Adviser to the Latvian Parliament on questions of international law, 
constitutional law and legislative reform; Ambassador of the Republic 
of Latvia to Germany and Switzerland (1992–93), Austria, Switzerland 
and Hungary (1994–95); Vice Prime Minister and Minister for Justice, 
acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (1993–94); Conciliator at the Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE (from 1997); member of 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (from 2001); elected as Judge at the 
European Court of Human Rights in 1995, re-elected in 1998 and 2001; 
numerous publications in the spheres of constitutional and administra-
tive law, law reform and European Community law; Judge at the Court 
of Justice since 11 May 2004.
Aindrias Ó Caoimh
Born 1950; Bachelor in Civil Law (National University of Ireland, Uni-
versity College Dublin, 1971); Barrister (King’s Inns, 1972); Diploma in 
European Law (University College Dublin, 1977); Barrister (Bar of Ire-
land, 1972–99); Lecturer in European Law (King’s Inns, Dublin); Senior 
Counsel (1994–99); Representative of the Government of Ireland on 
many occasions before the Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties; Judge at the High Court (from 1999); Bencher of the Honourable 
Society of King’s Inns (since 1999); Vice-President of the Irish Society 
of European Law; member of the International Law Association (Irish 
Branch); son of Judge Andreas O’Keeffe (Aindrias Ó Caoimh), mem-
ber of the Court of Justice 1974–85; Judge at the Court of Justice since 
13 October 2004.Annual Report 2012  69
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Lars Bay Larsen
Born 1953; awarded degrees in political science (1976) and law (1983) 
at the University of Copenhagen; official at the Ministry of Justice 
(1983–85); Lecturer (1984–91), then Associate Professor (1991–96), in 
Family Law at the University of Copenhagen; Head of Section at the 
Advokatsamfund (Danish Bar Association) (1985–86); Head of Section 
(1986–91) at the Ministry of Justice; called to the Bar (1991); Head of Div-
ision (1991–95), Head of the Police Department (1995–99) and Head of 
the Law Department (2000–03) at the Ministry of Justice; Representa-
tive of the Kingdom of Denmark on the K-4 Committee (1995–2000), 
the Schengen Central Group (1996–98) and the Europol Management 
Board (1998–2000); Judge at the Højesteret (Supreme Court) (2003–06); 
Judge at the Court of Justice since 11 January 2006.
Eleanor Sharpston
Born 1955; studied economics, languages and law at King’s College, 
Cambridge (1973–77); university teaching and research at Corpus Chris-
ti College, Oxford (1977–80); called to the Bar (Middle Temple, 1980); 
Barrister (1980–87 and 1990–2005); Legal Secretary in the Chambers 
of Advocate General, subsequently Judge, Sir Gordon Slynn (1987–90); 
Lecturer in EC and comparative law (Director of European Legal Stud-
ies) at University College London (1990–92); Lecturer in the Faculty 
of Law (1992–98), and subsequently Affiliated Lecturer (1998–2005), 
at the University of Cambridge; Fellow of King’s College, Cambridge 
(1992–2010); Emeritus Fellow (since 2011); Senior Research Fellow at 
the Centre for European Legal Studies of the University of Cambridge 
(1998–2005); Queen’s Counsel (1999); Bencher of Middle Temple (2005); 
Honorary Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford (2010); LL.D (h.c.) 
Glasgow (2010) and Nottingham Trent (2011); Advocate General at the 
Court of Justice since 11 January 2006.
Paolo Mengozzi
Born 1938; Professor of International Law and holder of the Jean Mon-
net Chair of European Community law at the University of Bologna; 
Doctor honoris causa of the Carlos III University, Madrid; Visiting Pro-
fessor at the Johns Hopkins University (Bologna Center), the Universi-
ties of St. Johns (New York), Georgetown, Paris II and Georgia (Athens) 
and the Institut universitaire international (Luxembourg); coordinator 
of the European Business Law Pallas Programme of the University of 
Nijmegen; member of the Consultative Committee of the Commission 
of the European Communities on Public Procurement; Under-Secretary 
of State for Trade and Industry during the Italian tenure of the Presi-
dency of the Council; member of the Working Group of the European 
Community on the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and Director of the 
1997 session of the research centre of The Hague Academy of Interna-
tional Law, devoted to the WTO; Judge at the Court of First Instance 
from 4 March 1998 to 3 May 2006; Advocate General at the Court of 
Justice since 4 May 2006.70  Annual Report 2012
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Yves Bot
Born 1947; graduate of the Faculty of Law, Rouen; Doctor of Laws (Uni-
versity of Paris II, Panthéon-Assas); Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, Le 
Mans; Deputy Public Prosecutor, then Senior Deputy Public Prosecutor, 
at the Public Prosecutor’s Office, Le Mans (1974–82); Public Prosecutor 
at the Regional Court, Dieppe (1982–84); Deputy Public Prosecutor at 
the Regional Court, Strasbourg (1984–86); Public Prosecutor at the Re-
gional Court, Bastia (1986–88); Advocate General at the Court of Ap-
peal, Caen (1988–91); Public Prosecutor at the Regional Court, Le Mans 
(1991–93); Special Adviser to the Minister for Justice (1993–95); Public 
Prosecutor at the Regional Court, Nanterre (1995–2002); Public Prosecu-
tor at the Regional Court, Paris (2002–04); Principal State Prosecutor at 
the Court of Appeal, Paris (2004–06); Advocate General at the Court of 
Justice since 7 October 2006.
Ján Mazák
Born 1954; Doctor of Laws, Pavol Jozef Šafárik University, Košice (1978); 
Professor of Civil Law (1994) and of Community Law (2004); Head of the 
Community Law Institute at the Faculty of Law, Košice (2004); Judge 
at the Krajský súd (Regional Court), Košice (1980); Vice-President (1982) 
and President (1990) of the Mestský súd (City Court), Košice; mem-
ber of the Slovak Bar (1991); Legal Adviser at the Constitutional Court 
(1993–98); Deputy Minister for Justice (1998–2000); President of the 
Constitutional Court (2000–06); member of the Venice Commission 
(2004); Advocate General at the Court of Justice from 7 October 2006 
to 8 October 2012.
Jean-Claude Bonichot
Born 1955; graduated in law at the University of Metz, degree from the 
Institut d’études politiques, Paris, former student at the École nationale 
d’administration; rapporteur (1982–85), commissaire du gouvernement 
(1985–87 and 1992–99), Judge (1999–2000), President of the Sixth Sub-
Division of the Judicial Division (2000–06), at the Council of State; Legal 
Secretary at the Court of Justice (1987–91); Director of the Private 
Office  of the Minister for Labour, Employment and Vocational Training, 
then Director of the Private Office of the Minister of State for the Civil 
Service and Modernisation of Administration (1991–92); Head of the 
Legal Mission of the Council of State at the National Health Insurance 
Fund for Employed Persons (2001–06); Lecturer at the University of 
Metz (1988–2000), then at the University of Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne 
(from 2000); author of numerous publications on administrative law, 
Community law and European human rights law; Founder and chair-
man of the editorial committee of the Bulletin de jurisprudence de droit 
de l’urbanisme, co-founder and member of the editorial committee of 
the Bulletin juridique des collectivités locales; President of the Scientific 
Council of the Research Group on Institutions and Law governing Re-
gional and Urban Planning and Habitats; Judge at the Court of Justice 
since 7 October 2006.Annual Report 2012  71
Members  Court of Justice
Thomas von Danwitz
Born 1962; studied at Bonn, Geneva and Paris; State examination in law 
(1986 and 1992); Doctor of Laws (University of Bonn, 1988); Internation-
al diploma in public administration (École nationale d’administration, 
1990); teaching authorisation (University of Bonn, 1996); Professor of 
German public law and European law (1996–2003), Dean of the Faculty 
of Law of the Ruhr University, Bochum (2000–01); Professor of German 
public law and European law (University of Cologne, 2003–06); Direc-
tor of the Institute of Public Law and Administrative Science (2006); 
Visiting professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (2000), 
François Rabelais University, Tours (2001–06), and the University of 
Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne (2005–06); Doctor honoris causa of Fran-
çois Rabelais University, Tours (2010); Judge at the Court of Justice since 
7 October 2006.
Verica Trstenjak
Born 1962; judicial service examination (1987); Doctor of Laws of the 
University of Ljubljana (1995); Professor (since 1996) of Theory of Law 
and State (jurisprudence) and of Private Law; researcher; postgradu-
ate study at the University of Zurich, the Institute of Comparative Law 
of the University of Vienna, the Max Planck Institute for Private Inter-
national Law in Hamburg, the Free University of Amsterdam; Visiting 
Professor at the Universities of Vienna and of Freiburg (Germany) and 
at the Bucerius School of Law in Hamburg; Head of the Legal Service 
(1994–96) and State Secretary in the Ministry of Science and Technolo-
gy (1996–2000); Secretary-General of the Government (2000); member 
of the Study Group on a European Civil Code since 2003; responsible 
for a Humboldt research project (Humboldt Foundation); publication 
of more than 100 legal articles and several books on European and 
private law; ‘Lawyer of the Year 2003’ prize of the Association of Slo-
vene Lawyers; member of the editorial board of a number of legal peri-
odicals; Secretary-General of the Association of Slovene Lawyers and 
member of a number of lawyers’ associations, including the Gesell-
schaft für Rechtsvergleichung; Judge at the Court of First Instance from 
7 July 2004 to 6 October 2006; Advocate General at the Court of Justice 
from 7 October 2006 to 28 November 2012.
Alexander Arabadjiev
Born 1949; legal studies (St Kliment Ohridski University, Sofia); Judge at 
the District Court, Blagoevgrad (1975–83); Judge at the Regional Court, 
Blagoevgrad (1983–86); Judge at the Supreme Court (1986–91); Judge 
at the Constitutional Court (1991–2000); member of the European Com-
mission of Human Rights (1997–99); member of the European Conven-
tion on the Future of Europe (2002–03); member of the National 
Assembly (2001–06); Observer at the European Parliament; Judge at 
the Court of Justice since 12 January 2007.72  Annual Report 2012
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Camelia Toader
Born 1963; Degree in law (1986), doctorate in law (1997), University of 
Bucharest; Trainee judge at the Court of First Instance, Buftea (1986–
88); Judge at the Court of First Instance, Sector 5, Bucharest (1988–92); 
called to the Bucharest Bar (1992); Lecturer (1992–2005), then, from 
2005, professor in civil law and European contract law at the University 
of Bucharest; Doctoral studies and research at the Max Planck Institute 
for Private International Law, Hamburg (between 1992 and 2004); Head 
of the European Integration Unit at the Ministry of Justice (1997–99); 
Judge at the High Court of Cassation and Justice (1999–2007); Visiting 
professor at the University of Vienna (2000 and 2011); taught Commu-
nity law at the National Institute for Magistrates (2003 and 2005–06); 
Member of the editorial board of several legal journals; from 2010 as-
sociate member of the International Academy of Comparative Law and 
honorary researcher at the Centre for European Legal Studies of the 
Legal Research Institute of the Romanian Academy; Judge at the Court 
of Justice since 12 January 2007.
Jean-Jacques Kasel
Born 1946; Doctor of Laws; special degree in Administrative Law (Uni-
versité libre de Bruxelles, 1970); graduated from the Institut d’études 
politiques, Paris (Ecofin, 1972); trainee lawyer; Legal Adviser of the 
Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas (1972–73); Attaché, then Legation Secre-
tary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1973–76); Chairman of work-
ing groups of the Council of Ministers (1976); First Embassy Secretary 
(Paris), Deputy Permanent Representative to the OECD (liaison officer 
to UNESCO, 1976–79); Head of the Office of the Vice-President of the 
Government (1979–80); Chairman of the EPC working groups (Asia, 
Africa, Latin America); Adviser, then Deputy Head of Cabinet, of the Presi-
dent of the Commission of the European Communities (1981); Director, 
Budget and Staff Matters, at the General Secretariat of the Council 
of Ministers (1981–84); Special Adviser at the Permanent Representation 
to the European Communities (1984–85); Chairman of the Budgetary 
Committee; Minister Plenipotentiary, Director of Political and Cultural 
Affairs (1986–91); Diplomatic Adviser of the Prime Minister (1986–91); 
Ambassador to Greece (1989–91, non-resident); Chairman of the Policy 
Committee (1991); Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the Euro-
pean Communities (1991–98); Chairman of Coreper (1997); Ambassador 
(Brussels, 1998–2002); Permanent Representative to NATO (1998–2002); 
Marshal of the Court and Head of the Office of HRH the Grand Duke 
(2002–07); Judge at the Court of Justice since 15 January 2008.Annual Report 2012  73
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Marek Safjan
Born 1949; Doctor of Law (University of Warsaw, 1980); habilitated 
Doctor in Legal Science (University of Warsaw, 1990); Professor of Law 
(1998); Director of the Civil Law Institute of the University of Warsaw 
(1992–96); Vice-Rector of the University of Warsaw (1994–97); Secre-
tary-General of the Polish Section of the Henri Capitant Association 
of Friends of French Legal Culture (1994–98); representative of Poland 
on the Bioethics Committee of the Council of Europe (1991–97); Judge 
(1997–98), then President (1998–2006), of the Constitutional Court; 
member (since 1994) and Vice-President (since 2010) of the Interna-
tional Academy of Comparative Law, member of the International As-
sociation of Law, Ethics and Science (since 1995), member of the Hel-
sinki Committee in Poland; member of the Polish Academy of Arts and 
Sciences; Pro Merito Medal conferred by the Secretary-General of the 
Council of Europe (2007); author of a very large number of publications 
in the fields of civil law, medical law and European law; Doctor honoris 
causa of the European University Institute (2012); Judge at the Court of 
Justice since 7 October 2009.
Daniel Šváby
Born 1951; Doctor of Laws (University of Bratislava); Judge at the District 
Court, Bratislava; Judge, Appeal Court, responsible for civil law cases, 
and Vice-President, Appeal Court, Bratislava; member of the Civil and 
Family Law Section at the Ministry of Justice Law Institute; acting Judge 
responsible for commercial law cases at the Supreme Court; member 
of the European Commission of Human Rights (Strasbourg); Judge at 
the Constitutional Court (2000–04); Judge at the Court of First Instance 
from 12 May 2004 to 6 October 2009; Judge at the Court of Justice 
since 7 October 2009.
Maria Berger
Born 1956; studied law and economics (1975–79), Doctor of Law; As-
sistant Lecturer and Lecturer at the Institute of Public Law and Politi-
cal Sciences of the University of Innsbruck (1979–84); Administrator at 
the Federal Ministry of Science and Research, ultimately Deputy Head 
of Unit (1984–88); official responsible for questions relating to the Eu-
ropean Union at the Federal Chancellery (1988–89); Head of the Euro-
pean Integration Section of the Federal Chancellery (preparation for 
the Republic of Austria’s accession to the European Union) (1989–92); 
Director at the EFTA Surveillance Authority, in Geneva and Brussels 
(1993–94); Vice-President of Danube University, Krems (1995–96); mem-
ber of the European Parliament (November 1996 to January 2007 and 
December 2008 to July 2009) and member of the Committee on Legal 
Affairs; substitute member of the European Convention on the Future 
of Europe (February 2002 to July 2003); Councillor of the Municipality of 
Perg (September 1997 to September 2009); Federal Minister for Justice 
(January 2007 to December 2008); Judge at the Court of Justice since 
7 October 2009.74  Annual Report 2012
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Niilo Jääskinen
Born 1958; law degree (1980), postgraduate law degree (1982), doctor-
ate (2008) at the University of Helsinki; Lecturer at the University of Hel-
sinki (1980–86); Legal Secretary and acting Judge at the District Court, 
Rovaniemi (1983–84); Legal Adviser (1987–89), and subsequently Head 
of the European Law Section (1990–95), at the Ministry of Justice; Legal 
Adviser at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1989–90); Adviser, and Clerk 
for European Affairs, of the Grand Committee of the Finnish Parliament 
(1995–2000); acting Judge (July 2000 to December 2002), then Judge 
(January 2003 to September 2009), at the Supreme Administrative 
Court; responsible for legal and institutional questions during the ne-
gotiations for the accession of the Republic of Finland to the European 
Union; Advocate General at the Court of Justice since 7 October 2009.
Pedro Cruz Villalón
Born 1946; law degree (1963–68) and awarded doctorate (1975) at the 
University of Seville; postgraduate studies at the University of Freiburg 
im Breisgau (1969–71); Assistant Professor of Political Law at the Uni-
versity of Seville (1978–86); Professor of Constitutional Law at the Uni-
versity of Seville (1986–92); Legal Secretary at the Constitutional Court 
(1986–87); Judge at the Constitutional Court (1992–98); President of the 
Constitutional Court (1998–2001); Fellow of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu 
Berlin (2001–02); Professor of Constitutional Law at the Autonomous 
University of Madrid (2002–09); elected member of the Council of State 
(2004–09); author of numerous publications; Advocate General at the 
Court of Justice since 14 December 2009.
Alexandra (Sacha) Prechal
Born 1959; studied law (University of Groningen, 1977–83); Doctor of 
Laws (University of Amsterdam, 1995); Law Lecturer in the Law Faculty 
of the University of Maastricht (1983–87); Legal Secretary at the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities (1987–91); Lecturer at the Europa 
Institute of the Law Faculty of the University of Amsterdam (1991–95); 
Professor of European Law in the Law Faculty of the University of Tilburg 
(1995–2003); Professor of European Law in the Law Faculty of the Univer-
sity of Utrecht and board member of the Europa Institute of the Univer-
sity of Utrecht (from 2003); member of the editorial board of several na-
tional and international legal journals; author of numerous publications; 
member of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences; Judge 
at the Court of Justice since 10 June 2010.Annual Report 2012  75
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Egidijus Jarašiūnas
Born 1952; law degree at the University of Vilnius (1974–79); Doctor of 
Legal Science of the Law University of Lithuania (1999); member of the 
Lithuanian Bar (1979–90); member of the Supreme Council (Parliament) 
of the Republic of Lithuania (1990–92), then member of the Seimas 
(Parliament) of the Republic of Lithuania and member of the Seimas’ 
State and Law Committee (1992–96); Judge at the Constitutional Court 
of the Republic of Lithuania (1996–2005), then Adviser to the President 
of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court (from 2006); Lecturer in the 
Constitutional Law Department of the Law Faculty of Mykolas Rom-
eris University (1997–2000), then Associate Professor (2000–04) and 
Professor (from 2004) in that department, and finally Head of Depart-
ment (2005–07); Dean of the Law Faculty of Mykolas Romeris University 
(2007–10); member of the Venice Commission (2006–10); signatory of 
the act of 11 March 1990 re-establishing Lithuania’s independence; au-
thor of numerous legal publications; Judge at the Court of Justice since 
6 October 2010.
Carl Gustav Fernlund
Born 1950; graduated in law from the University of Lund (1975); Clerk at 
the Landskrona District Court (1976–78); Assistant Judge at an admin-
istrative court of appeal (1978–82); Deputy Judge at an administrative 
court of appeal (1982); Legal Adviser to the Swedish Parliament’s Stand-
ing Committee on the Constitution (1983–85); Legal Adviser at the Min-
istry of Finance (1985–90); Director of the Division for Personal Income 
Taxes at the Ministry of Finance (1990–96); Director of the Excise Duty 
Division at the Ministry of Finance (1996–98); Fiscal Counsellor at the 
Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union (1998–
2000); Director-General for Legal Affairs in the Tax and Customs De-
partment of the Ministry of Finance (2000–05); Judge at the Supreme 
Administrative Court (2005–09); President of the Administrative Court 
of Appeal, Gothenburg (2009–11); Judge at the Court of Justice since 
6 October 2011.76  Annual Report 2012
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José Luis da Cruz Vilaça
Born 1944; degree in law and master’s degree in political economy at 
the University of Coimbra; Doctor in International Economics (Univer-
sity of Paris I – Panthéon Sorbonne); compulsory military service per-
formed in the Ministry for the Navy (Justice Department, 1969–72); 
Professor at the Catholic University and the New University of Lisbon; 
formerly Professor at the University of Coimbra and at Lusíada Univer-
sity, Lisbon (Director of the Institute for European Studies); Member 
of the Portuguese Government (1980–83): State Secretary for Home 
Affairs, State Secretary in the Prime Minister’s Office and State Secre-
tary for European Affairs; Deputy in the Portuguese Parliament, Vice-
President of the Christian-Democrat Group; Advocate General at the 
Court of Justice (1986–88); President of the Court of First Instance of 
the European Communities (1989–95); lawyer at the Lisbon bar, spe-
cialising in European and competition law (1996–2012); member of the 
Working Party on the Future of the European Communities’ Court Sys-
tem — ‘Due Group’ (2000); Chairman of the Disciplinary Board of the 
European Commission (2003–07); President of the Portuguese Associa-
tion of European Law (since 1999); Judge at the Court of Justice since 
8 October 2012.
Melchior Wathelet
Born 1949; degrees in law and in economics (University of Liège); Mas-
ter of Laws (Harvard University, United States); Doctor honoris causa 
(Université Paris-Dauphine); Professor of European Law at the Catho-
lic University of Louvain and the University of Liège; Deputy (1977–95); 
State Secretary, Minister and Minister-President of the Walloon Region 
(1980–88); Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Justice and for Small 
and Medium-Sized Businesses, the Liberal Professions and the Self-
Employed (1988–92); Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Justice and Eco-
nomic Affairs (1992–95); Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for National 
Defence (1995); Mayor of Verviers (1995); Judge at the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities (1995–2003); legal adviser, then counsel 
(2004–12); Minister of State (2009–12); Advocate General at the Court of 
Justice since 8 October 2012.
Christopher Vajda
Born 1955; law degree from Cambridge University; licence spéciale en 
droit européen at the Université libre de Bruxelles (grande distinction); 
called to the Bar of England and Wales by Gray’s Inn (1979); Barrister 
(1979–2012); called to the Bar of Northern Ireland (1996); Queen’s Coun-
sel (1997); Bencher of Gray’s Inn (2003); Recorder of the Crown Court 
(2003–12); Treasurer of the United Kingdom Association for European 
Law (2001–12); contributor to 3rd to 6th eds of European Community 
Law of Competition (Bellamy and Child); Judge at the Court of Justice 
since 8 October 2012.Annual Report 2012  77
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Nils Wahl
Born 1961; Master of Laws, University of Stockholm (1987); Doctor of 
Laws, University of Stockholm (1995); Associate Professor (docent) and 
holder of the Jean Monnet Chair of European Law (1995); Professor of 
European Law, University of Stockholm (2001); assistant lawyer in pri-
vate practice (1987–89); Managing Director of an educational founda-
tion (1993–2004); Chairman of the Nätverket för europarättslig forskn-
ing (Swedish Network for European Legal Research) (2001–06); member 
of the Rådet för konkurrensfrågor (Council for Competition Law Mat-
ters) (2001–06); Assigned Judge at the Hovrätten över Skåne och Ble-
kinge (Court of Appeal for Skåne and Blekinge) (2005); Judge at the 
General Court from 7 October 2006 to 28 November 2012; Advocate 
General at the Court of Justice since 28 November 2012.
Alfredo Calot Escobar
Born 1961; law degree at the University of Valencia (1979–84); Business 
Analyst at the Council of the Chambers of Commerce of the Autono-
mous Community of Valencia (1986); Lawyer-linguist at the Court of 
Justice (1986–90); Lawyer-reviser at the Court of Justice (1990–93); Ad-
ministrator in the Press and Information Service of the Court of Justice 
(1993–95); Administrator in the Secretariat of the Institutional Affairs 
Committee of the European Parliament (1995–96); Aide to the Registrar 
of the Court of Justice (1996–99); Legal Secretary at the Court of Jus-
tice (1999–2000); Head of the Spanish Translation Division at the Court 
of Justice (2000–01); Director, then Director-General, of Translation at 
the Court of Justice (2001–10); Registrar of the Court of Justice since 
7 October 2010.Annual Report 2012  79
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2.  Change in the composition of the Court of Justice in 2012
Formal sitting on 8 October 2012
By decisions of 25 April 2012 and 20 June 2012, Mr José Luís da Cruz Vilaça and Mr Christopher 
Vajda were appointed as Judges at the Court of Justice for the period from 7 October 2012 to 6 Oc-
tober 2018, replacing Mr José Narciso da Cunha Rodrigues and Mr Konrad Schiemann respectively.
By decisions of 25 April 2012 and 20 June 2012, the representatives of the governments of the 
Member States renewed, for the period from 7 October 2012 to 6 October 2018, the terms of office 
as Advocates General at the Court of Justice of Mr Yves Bot and Mr Paolo Mengozzi. By decision of 
25 April 2012, Mr Melchior Wathelet was appointed as Advocate General at the Court of Justice for 
the period from 7 October 2012 to 6 October 2018, replacing Mr Ján Mazák.
Formal sitting on 28 November 2012
A formal sitting of the Court of Justice took place on this day on the occasion of the departure from 
office of Ms Verica Trstenjak and the entry into office of Mr Nils Wahl.Annual Report 2012  81
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3.  Order of precedence
From 1 January 2012 to 10 October 2012 
V. SKOURIS, President of the Court
A. TIZZANO, President of the First Chamber
J.N. CUNHA RODRIGUES, President of the 
Second Chamber
K. LENAERTS, President of the Third Chamber
J.-C. BONICHOT, President of the Fourth 
Chamber
J. MAZÁK, First Advocate General
J. MALENOVSKÝ, President of the Seventh 
Chamber
U. LÕHMUS, President of the Sixth Chamber
M. SAFJAN, President of the Fifth Chamber
A. PRECHAL, President of the Eighth Chamber
A. ROSAS, Judge
R. SILVA de LAPUERTA, Judge
J. KOKOTT, Advocate General
K. SCHIEMANN, Judge
E. JUHÁSZ, Judge
G. ARESTIS, Judge
A. BORG BARTHET, Judge
M. ILEŠIČ, Judge
E. LEVITS, Judge
A. Ó CAOIMH, Judge
L. BAY LARSEN, Judge
E. SHARPSTON, Advocate General
P. MENGOZZI, Advocate General
Y. BOT, Advocate General
T. von DANWITZ, Judge
V. TRSTENJAK, Advocate General
A. ARABADJIEV, Judge
C. TOADER, Judge
J.-J. KASEL, Judge
D. ŠVÁBY, Judge
M. BERGER, Judge
N. JÄÄSKINEN, Advocate General
P. CRUZ VILLALÓN, Advocate General
E. JARAŠIŪNAS, Judge
C.G. FERNLUND, Judge
A. CALOT ESCOBAR, Registrar
From 11 October 2012 to 28 November 2012 
V. SKOURIS, President of the Court
K. LENAERTS, Vice-President of the Court
A. TIZZANO, President of the First Chamber
R. SILVA DE LAPUERTA, President of the Second 
Chamber
M. ILEŠIČ, President of the Third Chamber
L. BAY LARSEN, President of the Fourth 
Chamber
T. von DANWITZ, President of the Fifth 
Chamber
N. JÄÄSKINEN, First Advocate General
A. ROSAS, President of the Tenth Chamber
G. ARESTIS, President of the Seventh Chamber
J. MALENOVSKÝ, President of the Ninth 
Chamber
M. BERGER, President of the Sixth Chamber
E. JARAŠIŪNAS, President of the Eighth 
Chamber
J. KOKOTT, Advocate General
E. JUHÁSZ, Judge
A. BORG BARTHET, Judge
U. LÕHMUS, Judge
E. LEVITS, Judge
A. Ó CAOIMH, Judge
E. SHARPSTON, Advocate General
P. MENGOZZI, Advocate General
Y. BOT, Advocate General
J.-C. BONICHOT, Judge
A. ARABADJIEV, Judge
C. TOADER, Judge
J.-J. KASEL, Judge
M. SAFJAN, Judge
D. ŠVÁBY, Judge
P. CRUZ VILLALÓN, Advocate General
A. PRECHAL, Judge
C.G. FERNLUND, Judge
J.L. DA CRUZ VILAÇA, Judge
M. WATHELET, Advocate General
C. VAJDA, Judge
A. CALOT ESCOBAR, Registrar82  Annual Report 2012
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From 29 November 2012 to 
31 December 2012 
V. SKOURIS, President of the Court
K. LENAERTS, Vice-President of the Court
A. TIZZANO, President of the First Chamber
R. SILVA DE LAPUERTA, President of the Second 
Chamber
M. ILEŠIČ, President of the Third Chamber
L. BAY LARSEN, President of the Fourth 
Chamber
T. von DANWITZ, President of the Fifth 
Chamber
N. JÄÄSKINEN, First Advocate General
A. ROSAS, President of the Tenth Chamber
G. ARESTIS, President of the Seventh Chamber
J. MALENOVSKÝ, President of the Ninth 
Chamber
M. BERGER, President of the Sixth Chamber
E. JARAŠIŪNAS, President of the Eighth 
Chamber
J. KOKOTT, Advocate General
E. JUHÁSZ, Judge
A. BORG BARTHET, Judge
U. LÕHMUS, Judge
E. LEVITS, Judge
A. Ó CAOIMH, Judge
E. SHARPSTON, Advocate General
P. MENGOZZI, Advocate General
Y. BOT, Advocate General
J.-C. BONICHOT, Judge
A. ARABADJIEV, Judge
C. TOADER, Judge
J.-J. KASEL, Judge
M. SAFJAN, Judge
D. ŠVÁBY, Judge
P. CRUZ VILLALÓN, Advocate General
A. PRECHAL, Judge
C.G. FERNLUND, Judge
J.L. DA CRUZ VILAÇA, Judge
M. WATHELET, Advocate General
C. VAJDA, Judge
N. Wahl, Advocate General
A. CALOT ESCOBAR, RegistrarAnnual Report 2012  83
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4.  Former members of the Court of Justice
Massimo Pilotti, Judge (1952–58), President from 1952 to 1958
Petrus Serrarens, Judge (1952–58)
Adrianus Van Kleffens, Judge (1952–58)
Jacques Rueff, Judge (1952–59 and 1960–62)
Otto Riese, Judge (1952–63)
Maurice Lagrange, Advocate General (1952–64) 
Louis Delvaux, Judge (1952–67)
Charles Léon Hammes, Judge (1952–67), President from 1964 to 1967
Karl Roemer, Advocate General (1953–73)
Nicola Catalano, Judge (1958–62) 
Rino Rossi, Judge (1958–64)
Andreas Matthias Donner, Judge (1958–79), President from 1958 to 1964
Alberto Trabucchi, Judge (1962–72), then Advocate General (1973–76)
Robert Lecourt, Judge (1962–76), President from 1967 to 1976
Walter Strauss, Judge (1963–70)
Joseph Gand, Advocate General (1964–70)
Riccardo Monaco, Judge (1964–76)
Josse J. Mertens de Wilmars, Judge (1967–84), President from 1980 to 1984
Pierre Pescatore, Judge (1967–85)
Alain Louis Dutheillet de Lamothe, Advocate General (1970–72)
Hans Kutscher, Judge (1970–80), President from 1976 to 1980
Henri Mayras, Advocate General (1972–81)
Cearbhall O’Dalaigh, Judge (1973–74)
Max Sørensen, Judge (1973–79)
Gerhard Reischl, Advocate General (1973–81)
Jean-Pierre Warner, Advocate General (1973–81)
Alexander J. Mackenzie Stuart, Judge (1973–88), President from 1984 to 1988
Aindrias O’Keeffe, Judge (1974–85)
Adolphe Touffait, Judge (1976–82)
Francesco Capotorti, Judge (1976), then Advocate General (1976–82)
Giacinto Bosco, Judge (1976–88)
Thymen Koopmans, Judge (1979–90)
Ole Due, Judge (1979–94), President from 1988 to 1994
Ulrich Everling, Judge (1980–88) 
Alexandros Chloros, Judge (1981–82)
Simone Rozès, Advocate General (1981–84)
Pieter Verloren van Themaat, Advocate General (1981–86) 
Sir Gordon Slynn, Advocate General (1981–88), then Judge (1988–92)
Fernand Grévisse, Judge (1981–82 and 1988–94)
Kai Bahlmann, Judge (1982–88)
Yves Galmot, Judge (1982–88)
G. Federico Mancini, Advocate General (1982–88), then Judge (1988–99) 
Constantinos Kakouris, Judge (1983–97)84  Annual Report 2012
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Marco Darmon, Advocate General (1984–94)
René Joliet, Judge (1984–95)
Carl Otto Lenz, Advocate General (1984–97)
Thomas Francis O’Higgins, Judge (1985–91)
Fernand Schockweiler, Judge (1985–96)
José Luís Da Cruz Vilaça, Advocate General (1986–88)
José Carlos De Carvalho Moithinho de Almeida, Judge (1986–2000)
Jean Mischo, Advocate General (1986–91 and 1997–2003)
Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglesias, Judge (1986–2003), President from 1994 to 2003
Manuel Diez de Velasco, Judge (1988–94)
Manfred Zuleeg, Judge (1988–94)
Walter Van Gerven, Advocate General (1988–94)
Giuseppe Tesauro, Advocate General (1988–98) 
Francis Geoffrey Jacobs, Advocate General (1988–2006) 
Paul Joan George Kapteyn, Judge (1990–2000)
John L. Murray, Judge (1991–99)
Claus Christian Gulmann, Advocate General (1991–94), then Judge (1994–2006)
David Alexander Ogilvy Edward, Judge (1992–2004) 
Michael Bendik Elmer, Advocate General (1994–97)
Günter Hirsch, Judge (1994–2000)
Georges Cosmas, Advocate General (1994–2000)
Antonio Mario La Pergola, Judge (1994 and 1999–2006), Advocate General (1995–99)
Jean-Pierre Puissochet, Judge (1994–2006)
Philippe Léger, Advocate General (1994–2006)
Hans Ragnemalm, Judge (1995–2000)
Nial Fennelly, Advocate General (1995–2000) 
Leif Sevón, Judge (1995–2002)
Melchior Wathelet, Judge (1995–2003) 
Peter Jann, Judge (1995–2009)
Dámaso Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Advocate General (1995–2009)
Romain Schintgen, Judge (1996–2008)
Krateros Ioannou, Judge (1997–99)
Siegbert Alber, Advocate General (1997–2003)
Antonio Saggio, Advocate General (1998–2000)
Fidelma O’Kelly Macken, Judge (1999–2004) 
Stig Von Bahr, Judge (2000–06)
Ninon Colneric, Judge (2000–06)
Leendert A. Geelhoed, Advocate General (2000–06) 
Christine Stix-Hackl, Advocate General (2000–06)
Christiaan Willem Anton Timmermans, Judge (2000–10) 
José Narciso Da Cunha Rodrigues, Judge (2000–12)
Luís Miguel Poiares Pessoa Maduro, Advocate General (2003–09) 
Jerzy Makarczyk, Judge (2004–09)
Ján Klučka, Judge (2004–09)
Pranas Kūris, Judge (2004–10)
Konrad Hermann Theodor Schiemann, Judge (2004–12)Annual Report 2012  85
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Pernilla Lindh, Judge (2006–11)
Ján Mazák, Advocate General (2006–12)
Verica Trstenjak, Advocate General (2006–12)
Presidents
Massimo Pilotti (1952–58)
Andreas Matthias Donner (1958–64)
Charles Léon Hammes (1964–67)
Robert Lecourt (1967–76)
Hans Kutscher (1976–80)
Josse J. Mertens de Wilmars (1980–84)
Alexander John Mackenzie Stuart (1984–88)
Ole Due (1988–94)
Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglésias (1994–2003)
Registrars
Albert Van Houtte (1953–82)
Paul Heim (1982–88)
Jean-Guy Giraud (1988–94)
Roger Grass (1994–2010)Annual Report 2012  87
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D — Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the Court of Justice 
General activity of the Court of Justice
  1.  New cases, completed cases, cases pending (2008–12)
New cases
  2.  Nature of proceedings (2008–12)
  3.  Subject-matter of the action (2012)
  4.  Actions for failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations (2008–12)
Completed cases
  5.  Nature of proceedings (2008–12)
  6.  Judgments, orders, opinions (2012)
  7.  Bench hearing action (2008–12)
  8.    Cases completed by judgments, by opinions or by orders involving a judicial 
determination (2008–12) 
  9.  Subject-matter of the action (2008–12)
  10.  Subject-matter of the action (2012)
  11.    Judgments concerning failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations: outcome 
(2008–12)
   12.    Duration of proceedings (judgments and orders involving a judicial determination) 
(2008–12)
 Cases pending as at 31 December
  13.  Nature of proceedings (2008–12)
  14.  Bench hearing action (2008–12) 
Miscellaneous
  15.  Expedited and accelerated procedures (2008–12)
  16.   Urgent preliminary ruling procedure (2008–12)
  17.  Proceedings for interim measures (2012)
General trend in the work of the Court (1952–2012)
  18.  New cases and judgments
  19.  New references for a preliminary ruling (by Member State per year)
  20.  New references for a preliminary ruling (by Member State and by court or tribunal)
  21.  New actions for failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligationsAnnual Report 2012  89
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1.  General activity of the Court of Justice — 
New cases, completed cases, cases pending (2008–12) (1)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
 New cases  Completed cases   Cases pending
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
New cases 593 562 631 688 632
Completed cases  567 588 574 638 595
Cases pending 768 742 799 849 886
(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the 
joinder of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).90  Annual Report 2012
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2.  New cases — Nature of proceedings (2008–12) (1)
Direct actions
Appeals
Appeals concerning 
interim measures or 
interventions
Opinions of the Court
Special forms of procedure
References for 
a preliminary ruling
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
References for a preliminary ruling 302 385 423 404
Direct actions 143 136 81 73
Appeals 105 97 162 136
Appeals concerning interim measures 
or interventions 2 6 13 3
Opinions of the Court 1 1
Special forms of procedure (2) 9 7 9 15
Total 562 631 688 632
Applications for interim measures 2 2 3
(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the 
joinder of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).
(2)  The following are considered to be ‘special forms of procedure’: legal aid; taxation of costs; rectification; applica-
tion to set aside a judgment delivered by default; third-party proceedings; interpretation; revision; examination 
of a proposal by the First Advocate General to review a decision of the General Court; attachment procedure; 
cases concerning immunity.
2012Annual Report 2012  91
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3.  New cases — Subject-matter of the action (2012) (1)
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Access to documents 3 3
Agriculture 1 15 5 21
Approximation of laws 6 30 36
Area of freedom, security and justice 1 56 57
Citizenship of the Union 11 11
Commercial policy 1 1 5 7
Common fisheries policy 2 1 3
Common foreign and security policy 4 2 6
Company law 4 4
Competition 6 23 1 30
Consumer protection 1 22 1 24
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff 11 2 13
Economic and monetary policy  1 1 1 3
Economic, social and territorial cohesion 2 3 5
Energy 3 3
Environment  14 19 5 38
External action by the European Union 2 1 3 1
Financial provisions (budget, financial framework, 
own resources, combatting fraud and so forth) 1 1 2
Free movement of capital 2 9 11
Free movement of goods 2 1 3
Freedom of establishment 10 10
Freedom of movement for persons 1 21 22
Freedom to provide services 2 8 10
Industrial policy 4 12 16
Intellectual and industrial property 16 43 59
Law governing the institutions 3 3 15 21 4
Principles of European Union law 21 21
Public procurement 3 8 1 12
Research, technological development and space 2 2
Social policy 2 34 2 38
Social security for migrant workers 8 8
State aid 5 3 20 28
Taxation 2 57 1 60
Transport 10 11 21
TFEU 69 404 135 3 611 5
Procedure 11
Staff Regulations 4 1 5
Others 4 1 5 11
OVERALL TOTAL 73 404 136 3 616 16
(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the 
joinder of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).92  Annual Report 2012
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5.  Completed cases — Nature of proceedings (2008–12) (1)
Direct actions
Appeals
Appeals concerning interim 
measures or interventions
Special forms of procedure
References for 
a preliminary ruling
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
References for a preliminary ruling 301 259 339 388 386
Direct actions 181 215 139 117 70
Appeals 69 97 84 117 117
Appeals concerning interim 
measures or interventions 8 7 4 7 12
Opinions of the Court 1 1
Special forms of procedure 8 9 8 8 10
Total 567 588 574 638 595
(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the 
joinder of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).
2012
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6.  Completed cases — Judgments, orders, opinions (2012) (1)
Judgments
67.74%
Orders involving 
a judicial 
determination
17.65%
Interlocutory orders 
2.66%
Other orders 
11.95%
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References for a preliminary 
ruling 249 41 36 326
Direct actions 56 1 13 70
Appeals 52 44 1 14 111
Appeals concerning interim 
measures or interventions 12 12
Opinions of the Court
Special forms of procedure 8 8
Total 357 93 14 63 527
(1)  The figures given (net figures) represent the number of cases after joinder on the ground of similarity (a set of 
joined cases = one case).
(2)  Orders terminating proceedings other than those removing a case from the register, declaring that there is no 
need to give a decision or referring a case to the General Court.
(3)  Orders made following an application on the basis of Articles 278 TFEU and 279 TFEU (former Articles 242 EC 
and 243 EC), Article 280 TFEU (former Article 244 EC) or the corresponding provisions of the EAEC Treaty, or 
following an appeal against an order concerning interim measures or intervention.
(4)  Orders terminating the case by removal from the register, declaration that there is no need to give a decision or 
referral to the General Court.96  Annual Report 2012
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7.  Completed cases — Bench hearing action (2008–12) (1)
Chambers 
(3 judges)
34.42%
President
2.29%
Full Court
0.19%
Grand Chamber
8.99%
Chambers 
(5 judges)
54.11%
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Full Court 1 1 1 1
Grand Chamber 66 66 41 41 70 1 71 62 62 47 47
Chambers (5 judges) 259 13 272 275 8 283 280 8 288 290 10 300 275 8 283
Chambers (3 judges) 65 59 124 96 70 166 56 76 132 91 86 177 83 97 180
President 7 7 5 5 5 5 4 4 12 12
Total 390 79 469 412 83 495 406 90 496 444 100 544 406 117 523
(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the 
joinder of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).
(2)  Orders terminating proceedings other than those removing a case from the register, declaring that there is no 
need to give a decision or referring a case to the General Court.
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8.  Cases completed by judgments, by opinions or by orders 
involving a judicial determination (2008–12) (1) (2)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
   Judgments/Opinions  Orders
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Judgments/Opinions 390 412 406 444 406
Orders 79 83 90 100 117
Total 469 495 496 544 523
(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the 
joinder of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).
(2)  Orders terminating proceedings other than those removing a case from the register, declaring that there is no 
need to give a decision or referring a case to the General Court.98  Annual Report 2012
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9.  Cases completed by judgments, by opinions or by orders 
involving a judicial determination — Subject-matter of the 
action (2008–12) (1)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Access to documents 2 5
Accession of new States 1 1 2
Agriculture 54 18 15 23 22
Approximation of laws 21 32 15 15 12
Area of freedom, security and justice 4 26 24 23 37
Brussels Convention 1 2
Budget of the Communities (2) 1
Citizenship of the Union 7 3 6 7 8
Commercial policy 1 5 2 2 8
Common Customs Tariff (4) 5 13 7 2
Common fisheries policy 6 4 2 1
Common foreign and security policy 2 2 2 4 9
Community own resources (2) 10 5 2
Company law 17 17 17 8 1
Competition 23 28 13 19 30
Consumer protection (3) 3 4 9
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff 8 5 15 19 19
Economic and monetary policy  1 1 1 3
Economic, social and territorial cohesion 3
Education, vocational training, youth and sport 1
Energy 4 4 2 2
Environment (3) 9 35 27
Environment and consumers (3) 43 60 48 25 1
External action by the European Union 8 8 10 8 5
Financial provisions (budget, financial framework, own 
resources, combatting fraud and so forth) (2) 1 4 3
Free movement of capital 9 7 6 14 21
Free movement of goods 12 13 6 8 7
Freedom of establishment 29 13 17 21 6
Freedom of movement for persons 27 19 17 9 18
Freedom to provide services 8 17 30 27 29
Industrial policy 12 6 9 9 8
Intellectual and industrial property 22 31 38 47 46
Justice and home affairs 1
Law governing the institutions 15 29 26 20 27
Principles of European Union law 4 4 4 15 7
Privileges and immunities 2
Public health 3 1
Public procurement 7 12
Regional policy 1 3 2
Registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction 
of chemicals (REACH Regulation) 1
Research, information, education and statistics 1
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Research, technological development and space 1
Rome Convention 1
Social policy 25 33 36 36 28
Social security for migrant workers 5 3 6 8 8
State aid 26 10 16 48 10
Taxation 38 44 66 49 64
Tourism 1
Transport (4) 4 9 4 7 14
EC Treaty/TFEU 445 481 482 535 513
EU Treaty 6 1 4 1
CS Treaty 2 1
Privileges and immunities 2 3
Procedure 5 5 6 5 7
Staff Regulations 11 8 4
Others 16 13 10 7 10
OVERALL TOTAL 469 495 496 544 523
(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the 
joinder of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).
(2)  The headings ‘Budget of the Communities’ and ‘Community own resources’ have been combined under the 
heading ‘Financial provisions’ for cases brought after 1 December 2009.
(3)  The heading ‘Environment and consumers’ has been divided into two separate headings for cases brought after 
1 December 2009.
(4)  The headings ‘Common Customs Tariff’ and ‘Customs union’ have been combined under a single heading for 
cases brought after 1 December 2009.100  Annual Report 2012
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10.  Cases completed by judgments, by opinions or by orders 
involving a judicial determination — Subject-matter of the 
action (2012) (1)
Judgments/Opinions Orders (2) Total
Access to documents 3 2 5
Accession of new States 2 2
Agriculture 20 2 22
Approximation of laws 9 3 12
Area of freedom, security and justice 33 4 37
Citizenship of the Union 8 8
Commercial policy 7 1 8
Common foreign and security policy 6 3 9
Company law 1 1
Competition 20 10 30
Consumer protection (4) 7 2 9
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff (5) 17 2 19
Economic and monetary policy  1 2 3
Economic, social and territorial cohesion 1 2 3
Education, vocational training, youth and sport 1 1
Environment (4) 26 1 27
Environment and consumers (4) 1 1
External action by the European Union 4 1 5
Financial provisions (budget, financial 
framework, own resources, combatting fraud 
and so forth) (3) 3 3
Free movement of capital 18 3 21
Free movement of goods 7 7
Freedom of establishment 6 6
Freedom of movement for persons 12 6 18
Freedom to provide services 14 15 29
Industrial policy 8 8
Intellectual and industrial property 29 17 46
Law governing the institutions 13 14 27
Principles of European Union law 2 5 7
Public health 1 1
Public procurement 9 3 12
Research, technological development and 
space 1 1
Social policy 26 2 28
Social security for migrant workers 8 8
State aid 7 3 10
Taxation 59 5 64
Tourism 1 1
Transport 14 14
EC Treaty/TFEU 405 108 513
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Judgments/Opinions Orders (2) Total
Privileges and immunities 1 2 3
Procedure 7 7
Others 1 9 10
OVERALL TOTAL 406 117 523
(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the 
joinder of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).
(2)  Orders terminating proceedings other than those removing a case from the register, declaring that there is no 
need to give a decision or referring a case to the General Court. 
(3)  The headings ‘Budget of the Communities’ and ‘Community own resources’ have been combined under the 
heading ‘Financial provisions’ for cases brought after 1 December 2009.
(4)  The heading ‘Environment and consumers’ has been divided into two separate headings for cases brought after 
1 December 2009.
(5)  The headings ‘Common Customs Tariff’ and ‘Customs union’ have been combined under a single heading for 
cases brought after 1 December 2009.102  Annual Report 2012
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12.  Completed cases — Duration of proceedings (2008–12) (1) 
(judgments and orders involving a judicial determination)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
25
20
15
10
5
0
   References for 
a preliminary ruling
 Direct actions  Appeals
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
References for a preliminary ruling 16.8 17.1 16.1 16.4 15.7
  Urgent preliminary ruling procedure  2.1 2.5 2.1 2.5 1.9
Direct actions 16.9 17.1 16.7 20.2 19.7
Appeals 18.4 15.4 14.3 15.4 15.3
(1)  The following types of cases are excluded from the calculation of the duration of proceedings: cases involving 
an interlocutory judgment or a measure of inquiry; opinions; special forms of procedure (namely legal aid, taxa-
tion of costs, rectification, application to set aside a judgment delivered by default, third-party proceedings, 
interpretation, revision, examination of a proposal by the First Advocate General to review a decision of the 
General Court, attachment procedure and cases concerning immunity); cases terminated by an order removing 
the case from the register, declaring that there is no need to give a decision or referring the case to the General 
Court; proceedings for interim measures and appeals concerning interim measures and interventions.Annual Report 2012  105
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
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13.  Cases pending as at 31 December — Nature of proceedings 
(2008–12) (1)
(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the 
joinder of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).
   References for 
a preliminary ruling
 Opinions of the Court
 Direct actions  Appeals
   Special forms of 
procedure
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
References for a preliminary ruling 395 438 484 519 537
Direct actions 242 170 167 131 134
Appeals 126 129 144 195 205
Special forms of procedure 4 4 3 4 9
Opinions of the Court 1 1 1 1
Total 768 742 799 849 886106  Annual Report 2012
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14.  Cases pending as at 31 December — Bench hearing action 
(2008–12) (1)
Grand Chamber
4.97%
Chambers 
(5 judges)
26.86%
Chambers 
(3 judges)
4.74%
Vice-President 
0.11%
Not assigned
63.32%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Not assigned 524 490 519 617 561
Full Court 1
Grand Chamber 40 65 49 42 44
Chambers (5 judges) 177 169 193 157 238
Chambers (3 judges) 19 15 33 23 42
President 8 3 4 10
Vice-President 1
Total 768 742 799 849 886
(1)  The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the 
joinder of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case).
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15.  Miscellaneous — Expedited and accelerated procedures 
(2008–12)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
G
r
a
n
t
e
d
N
o
t
 
g
r
a
n
t
e
d
G
r
a
n
t
e
d
N
o
t
 
g
r
a
n
t
e
d
G
r
a
n
t
e
d
N
o
t
 
g
r
a
n
t
e
d
G
r
a
n
t
e
d
N
o
t
 
g
r
a
n
t
e
d
G
r
a
n
t
e
d
N
o
t
 
g
r
a
n
t
e
d
Direct actions 1 1
References for a preliminary 
ruling 6 1 3 4 7 2 6 1 3
Appeals 1 5
Special forms of procedure 1
Total 2 6 1 5 4 8 2 11 2 3
16.  Miscellaneous – Urgent preliminary ruling procedure (2008–12)
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Agriculture 1
Police and judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters 2 1 1
Area of freedom, security and 
justice 1 1 2 5 1 2 3 4 1
Total 3 3 2 1 5 1 2 3 4 1108  Annual Report 2012
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17.  Miscellaneous — Proceedings for interim measures (2012) (1)
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External action by the European Union 1
Competition 1 1
Law governing the institutions 8
Common foreign and security policy 2 3
Intellectual property 1
OVERALL TOTAL 3 14
(1)  The figures given (net figures) represent the number of cases after joinder on the ground of similarity (a set of 
joined cases = one case).Annual Report 2012  109
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18.  General trend in the work of the Court (1952–2012) — 
New cases and judgments
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1953 4 4
1954 10 10 2
1955 9 9 2 4
1956 11 11 2 6
1957 19 19 2 4
1958 43 43 10
1959 46 1 47 5 13
1960 22 1 23 2 18
1961 24 1 1 26 1 11
1962 30 5 35 2 20
1963 99 6 105 7 17
1964 49 6 55 4 31
1965 55 7 62 4 52
1966 30 1 31 2 24
1967 14 23 37 24
1968 24 9 33 1 27
1969 60 17 77 2 30
1970 47 32 79 64
1971 59 37 96 1 60
1972 42 40 82 2 61
1973 131 61 192 6 80
1974 63 39 102 8 63
1975 61 69 1 131 5 78
1976 51 75 1 127 6 88
1977 74 84 158 6 100
1978 146 123 1 270 7 97
1979 1 218 106 1 324 6 138
1980 180 99 279 14 132
1981 214 108 322 17 128
1982 217 129 346 16 185
1983 199 98 297 11 151
1984 183 129 312 17 165
1985 294 139 433 23 211
1986 238 91 329 23 174
1987 251 144 395 21 208
1988 193 179 372 17 238
1989 244 139 383 19 188
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1990 221 141 15 1 378 12 193
1991 140 186 13 1 2 342 9 204
1992 251 162 24 1 2 440 5 210
1993 265 204 17 486 13 203
1994 125 203 12 1 3 344 4 188
1995 109 251 46 2 408 3 172
1996 132 256 25 3 416 4 193
1997 169 239 30 5 443 1 242
1998 147 264 66 4 481 2 254
1999 214 255 68 4 541 4 235
2000 197 224 66 13 2 502 4 273
2001 187 237 72 7 503 6 244
2002 204 216 46 4 470 1 269
2003 277 210 63 5 1 556 7 308
2004 219 249 52 6 1 527 3 375
2005 179 221 66 1 467 2 362
2006 201 251 80 3 535 1 351
2007 221 265 79 8 573 3 379
2008 210 288 77 8 1 584 3 333
2009 143 302 104 2 1 552 2 377
2010 136 385 97 6 624 2 370
2011 81 423 162 13 679 3 371
2012 73 404 136 3 1 617 357
Total 8 755 7 832 1 416 101 20 18 124 355 9 365
(1)  Gross figures; special forms of procedure are not included.
(2)  Net figures.Annual Report 2012  111
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20.   General trend in the work of the Court (1952–2012) — 
New references for a preliminary ruling  
(by Member State and by court or tribunal)
Total
Belgium Cour constitutionnelle 25
Cour de cassation 88
Conseil d'État 66
Other courts or tribunals 534 713
Bulgaria Върховен административен съд 10
Върховен касационен съд 1
Other courts or tribunals 44 55
Czech Republic Nejvyššího soudu 
Nejvyšší správní soud  14
Ústavní soud 
Other courts or tribunals 13 27
Denmark Højesteret 32
Other courts or tribunals 117 149
Germany Bundesgerichtshof 163
Bundesverwaltungsgericht 105
Bundesfinanzhof 285
Bundesarbeitsgericht 25
Bundessozialgericht 74
Staatsgerichtshof des Landes Hessen 1
Other courts or tribunals 1 300 1 953
Estonia Riigikohus  4
Other courts or tribunals 8 12
Ireland Supreme Court 22
High Court 20
Other courts or tribunals 26 68
Greece Άρειος Πάγος 10
Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας 50
Other courts or tribunals 101 161
Spain Tribunal Supremo 47
Audiencia Nacional 1
Juzgado Central de lo Penal 7
Other courts or tribunals 232 287
France Cour de cassation 100
Conseil d'État 80
Other courts or tribunals 682 862
Italy Corte suprema di Cassazione 111
Corte Costituzionale 1
Consiglio di Stato 86
Other courts or tribunals 967 1 165
Cyprus Ανώτατο Δικαστήριο 2
Other courts or tribunals 2
>>>114  Annual Report 2012
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Total
Latvia Augstākā tiesa  18
Satversmes tiesa 
Other courts or tribunals 7 25
Lithuania Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucinis Teismas  1
Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas 3
Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis Teismas 5
Other courts or tribunals 4 13
Luxembourg Cour supérieure de justice 10
Cour de cassation 12
Conseil d'État 13
Cour administrative 10
Other courts or tribunals 38 83
Hungary Legfelsőbb Bíróság  3
Fővárosi ĺtélőtábla 2
Szegedi Ítélötáblá 1
Other courts or tribunals 58 64
Malta Constitutional Court
Qorti ta' l- Appel
Other courts or tribunals 2 2
Netherlands Raad van State 88
Hoge Raad der Nederlanden 221
Centrale Raad van Beroep 50
College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven 142
Tariefcommissie 34
Other courts or tribunals 298 833
Austria Verfassungsgerichtshof 5
Oberster Gerichtshof 92
Oberster Patent- und Markensenat 4
Bundesvergabeamt 24
Verwaltungsgerichtshof 69
Vergabekontrollsenat 4
Other courts or tribunals 212 410
Poland Sąd Najwyższy 5
Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny  19
Trybunał Konstytucyjny
Other courts or tribunals 25 49
Portugal Supremo Tribunal de Justiça 3
Supremo Tribunal Administrativo 47
Other courts or tribunals 52 102
Romania  Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție 6
Curtea de Apel 21
Other courts or tribunals 19 46
>>>Annual Report 2012  115
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Total
Slovenia Vrhovno sodišče  1
Ustavno sodišče 
Other courts or tribunals 3 4
Slovakia Ústavný Súd 
Najvyšší súd  8
Other courts or tribunals 12 20
Finland Korkein hallinto-oikeus 40
Korkein oikeus 13
Other courts or tribunals 26 79
Sweden Högsta Domstolen 16
Marknadsdomstolen 5
Regeringsrätten 24
Other courts or tribunals 54 99
United Kingdom House of Lords 40
Supreme Court 3
Court of Appeal 70
Other courts or tribunals 434 547
Others Cour de justice Benelux/Benelux Gerechtshof (1) 1
Complaints Board of the European Schools (2) 1 2
Total 7 832
(1)  Case C-265/00 Campina Melkunie. 
(2)  Case C-196/09 Miles and Others.116  Annual Report 2012
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A — Proceedings of the General Court in 2012
By Mr Marc Jaeger, President of the General Court
The year 2012 has demonstrated, in the light of the two previous years, that periods in which the 
General Court can enjoy a stable and full complement of members have become rare. This is a phe-
nomenon which the Court is now compelled to take into account in its operation and working 
methods. Although Mr E. Moavero Milanesi and Ms E. Cremona departed from office on 15 No-
vember 2011 and 22 March 2012 respectively, they were replaced from, respectively, 17 September 
2012, when Mr G. Berardis entered into office, and 8 October 2012, when Mr E. Buttigieg entered 
into office. Similarly, Mr N. Wahl, who entered into office at the Court of Justice as Advocate General 
on 28 November 2012, has not yet been replaced. Whilst departures of members are inevitable in 
a Court soon to be enlarged to 28 judges (taking account of the future accession of the Republic 
of Croatia), they quite evidently are not conducive to optimal management of judicial activity. It 
is therefore essential that the timetable for appointing members following such departures — in 
particular, on the partial renewal of the Court’s membership every three years — allows continuity 
in dealing with cases, in a context where the pursuit of efficiency is permanently at the centre of 
the Court’s efforts.
From a statistical point of view, despite those unfavourable circumstances, the Court can never-
theless be pleased to have succeeded in consolidating the real quantitative leap of 2011. Some 
688 cases were completed in 2012 (which constitutes, apart from 2011, the highest figure since the 
Court’s creation) and hearings were held in some 322 cases. The new level of judicial productivity 
that has been established — which stems from the many internal reforms that have been imple-
mented in recent years and are producing cumulative efficiency gains — has made a historic re-
duction (1) in the number of pending cases possible (a reduction of 71 cases, that is to say, of more 
than 5%), thanks to a one-off fall in the number of new cases, of which there were 617 in 2012 (that 
is to say, a fall of nearly 15%). However, in the light of the overall increase in the caseload that has 
been observed for a decade, this decline cannot be regarded as lasting, and the Court must there-
fore intensify its commitment to eliminate the backlog of cases, with the objective of improving 
upon the reduction in the duration of proceedings that has already been achieved (the duration of 
cases averaged 24.8 months in 2012, that is to say, 1.9 months shorter than in 2011).
It is in particular to this end that the Court has embarked upon a radical reform of its Rules of 
Procedure, which — in accordance with the fifth paragraph of Article 254 TFEU — will be submit-
ted to the Council for approval in the course of 2013. However, necessary though it may be, this 
modernisation of the Rules of Procedure will produce effects that are not quantifiable in advance 
and will be perceptible only in the medium term, after the new provisions have been applied for 
a sufficiently long period. It follows that the intended reform will not, in itself, make possible the 
major increase in productivity that is essential in order to achieve a sufficiently appreciable and 
lasting reduction in the duration of proceedings, in particular as regards voluminous and complex 
cases. The reform should thus as a matter of urgency be accompanied by the addition of new staff 
resources, pending a possible change in the Court’s structure.
As is indicated by the overview presented in the following pages, 2012 saw a variety of develop-
ments in the case-law, a significant part of which concerned disputes relating to competition law, 
(1)  Over the last 10 years, the number of pending cases has consistently increased, with the exception of 
2005 and 2006 (owing to the transfer of jurisdiction to the Civil Service Tribunal).120  Annual Report 2012
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State aid and intellectual property. The various areas of the Court’s activities will be dealt with 
according to the different roles of the Court: proceedings concerning the legality of measures (I), 
appeals (II) and interim measures (III).
I.  Proceedings concerning the legality of measures
Admissibility of actions brought under Article 263 TFEU
1.  Measure against which an action may be brought
In Case T-237/09 Région wallonne v Commission (judgment of 1 February 2012, not yet published), 
the Court, called upon to determine whether it is possible to bring an action for annulment of an 
implied decision of rejection resulting from the reasoning on which a measure is based, recalled 
first of all that, in principle, only the operative part of a decision is capable of producing legal ef-
fects and thus of adversely affecting the interests of those concerned, irrespective of the grounds 
on which that decision is based. Conversely, the assessments contained in the reasoning on which 
the contested decision is based cannot, as such, be the subject of an action for annulment and 
may be subject to judicial review by the Courts of the European Union only if, as the reasoning of 
an act adversely affecting the interests of those concerned, they constitute the essential basis for 
its operative part. However, even though the operative part of a decision does not expressly reject 
a request formulated by the addressee, it may none the less be apparent from the decision read in 
the light of its fundamental grounds that the institution which adopted it expressly adopted a posi-
tion on that request and rejected it. In that case the decision entails binding legal effects adversely 
affecting the addressee on that point.
2.  Act not entailing implementing measures
The Court was led to rule on the concept of an act which does not entail implementing measures 
within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. First, in Case T-221/10 Iberdrola 
v Commission (judgment of 8 March 2012, not yet published), the applicant claimed, in its action 
against the Commission decision which declared that the scheme, implemented by Spanish legis-
lation, allowing the tax amortisation of financial goodwill for foreign share acquisitions was in-
compatible with the common market, that it was not required to show that the decision was of 
individual concern to it, since the decision was a regulatory act which was of direct concern to the 
applicant and did not entail implementing measures.
Observing that Article 6(2) of the contested decision referred to the existence of ‘national meas-
ures taken to implement [it] until recovery of the aid granted under the scheme [at issue]’, the 
Court stated that the very existence of those recovery measures, which constituted implement-
ing measures, justified the contested decision’s being regarded as an act entailing implementing 
measures, which were capable of being challenged before a national court by persons to whom 
they were addressed. The measures implementing the contested decision were not confined to 
those recovery measures, but also included the measures for implementing the incompatibility 
decision, including inter alia the measure rejecting an application for the tax advantage at issue, 
a rejection which the applicant could also challenge before the national court. The Court therefore 
rejected the applicant’s argument that the contested decision did not entail or require implement-
ing measures to give it effect because it automatically prevented the continued application of the 
scheme at issue by the beneficiaries and the Kingdom of Spain.Annual Report 2012  121
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Second, Case T-381/11 Eurofer v Commission (order of 4 June 2012, not yet published) concerned 
a Commission decision determining transitional Union-wide rules for harmonised free allocation of 
greenhouse gas emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC. (2)
Although the Court concluded that that decision constituted a regulatory act within the meaning 
of Article 263 TFEU, in that it was of general application and did not constitute a legislative act, it 
none the less held that the decision could not be regarded as not entailing implementing meas-
ures. Since the contested decision provided that the Commission and the Member States were to 
adopt several implementing measures, which culminated in the determination by the Member 
States of the final total annual amount of emission allowances allocated free of charge for each of 
the installations concerned, the Court considered that it entailed implementing measures within 
the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. That conclusion was not called into ques-
tion by the objective sought by that provision, which is to enable natural and legal persons to 
bring an action against acts of general application which are not legislative acts, which are of direct 
concern to them and which do not entail implementing measures, therefore avoiding a situation 
in which such a person would have to break the law in order to have access to justice. The Court 
observed in that regard that the situation of the undertakings belonging to an association repre-
senting the interests of the European steel industry in the context of an action brought by that as-
sociation against the contested decision was not that to which that objective is intended to apply. 
Those undertakings could, in principle, without being required to infringe the contested decision 
beforehand, challenge the national measures implementing the contested decision and, in that 
context, plead the unlawfulness of the contested decision before the national courts, which could, 
before giving judgment, have recourse to the provisions of Article 267 TFEU.
3.  Direct effect
In Case T-541/10 ADEDY and Others v Council (order of 27 November 2012, not yet published), an 
action was brought before the Court by, among others, a Greek trade union confederation against 
two Council decisions addressed to the Hellenic Republic concerning the situation of excessive 
deficit in that State. The applicants took issue with the contested measures on the ground that they 
contained a number of provisions affecting the financial interests and working conditions of Greek 
civil servants.
The Court observed that the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU limits actions for annulment 
brought by a natural or legal person to three categories of act: first, acts addressed to that person; 
second, acts which are of direct and individual concern to them; and, third, regulatory acts which 
are of direct concern to them and do not entail implementing measures. In that regard, the Court 
recalled that, according to the case-law on the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, the condition 
that the decision forming the subject-matter of the action must be of direct concern to the natural 
or legal person concerned requires in principle that two cumulative conditions be satisfied: the 
contested measure must directly affect the legal situation of the person concerned and it must 
not leave any discretion to its addressees, who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such 
implementation being purely automatic and resulting from European Union rules without the ap-
plication of other intermediate rules. That case-law remains applicable to the fourth paragraph 
of Article 263 TFEU, in the absence of any change to the ‘direct effect’ condition laid down in that 
provision.
(2)  Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme 
for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/
EC (OJ 2003 L 275, p. 32).122  Annual Report 2012
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The Court examined the various provisions of the contested decisions against the yardstick of those 
conditions and held that the provision imposing the reduction of the bonuses paid to civil servants 
was not capable of directly affecting the applicants’ legal situation since, while it placed an obliga-
tion on the Member State concerned to achieve a budgetary objective, namely to make savings 
each year by reducing the bonuses paid to officials, it did not determine either the procedures 
governing that reduction or the categories of civil servants affected by the reduction, factors in 
respect of which the national authorities had a wide discretion. The same applied, according to the 
Court, with respect to the provision placing an obligation on the State concerned to adopt with-
in a prescribed period a law reforming the retirement arrangements in order to ensure that they 
would be practicable in the medium and long term. Since it required the adoption of a national law 
in order to be implemented and left a very wide discretion to the State authorities to define the 
terms of that law, on condition that the law would ensure the medium-term and long-term practi-
cability of the retirement arrangements, that provision was not of direct concern to the applicants, 
within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU; only that law might possibly have 
a direct effect on their legal situation. As for the provision placing a ceiling on the replacement of 
persons retiring in the public sector, the Court considered that it constituted a general measure for 
the organisation and management of the public administration and that therefore it too did not 
directly affect the applicants’ legal situation. In so far as that provision led to a deterioration in the 
functioning of public services and worsened the applicants’ conditions of employment, that was 
a circumstance which did not affect their legal situation, but only their factual situation.
4.  Representation by a lawyer
Under the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, which, pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 53 of that Statute, is applicable to 
the procedure before the General Court, individuals must be represented by a lawyer authorised 
to practise before a court of a Member State or of another State which is a party to the Agreement 
on the European Economic Area. (3)
In Case T-508/09 Cañas v Commission (order of 26 March 2012, under appeal), the application had 
been signed jointly by two lawyers, the first of whom was a member of the Bar of Lausanne (Swit-
zerland), while the second was a member of that Bar and also of the Bar of Paris (France). Since the 
latter was a full member of both Bars, the Court considered that the application had been lodged 
by a lawyer authorised to practise before a court of a Member State. However, that lawyer was re-
placed in the course of the proceedings by a third lawyer, of Swiss nationality, who was a member 
of the Paris Bar included on the list of foreign lawyers, and the Commission requested the Court 
to confirm that that Swiss lawyer was authorised to represent the applicant before it in view of 
the potential risk of distortion of the rules on the authorisation of lawyers before the Courts of the 
European Union, in particular on the basis of bilateral agreements between a Member State and 
a non-member State. The Court observed in that regard that, although Directive 98/5/EC, (4) read in 
conjunction with Annex III to the EC-Switzerland agreement on the free movement of persons, (5) 
gives Member States the possibility of requiring that Swiss lawyers permanently established on 
their territory act with a local lawyer when representing a client in legal proceedings, French law 
(3)  Agreement on the European Economic Area of 2 May 1992 (OJ 1994 L 1, p. 3).
(4)  Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 to facilitate practice of the 
profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the qualification was 
obtained (OJ 1998 L 77, p. 36).
(5)  Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss Confed-
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does not impose such an obligation. As the lawyer in question had, moreover, produced a certifi-
cate authorising him to practise before a court of a Member State, the Court concluded that he was 
permitted to represent the applicant before it.
The Court ruled, last, on the possibility for the first lawyer, who was a member only of the Laus-
anne Bar, to rely on his right to freedom to provide services in order to represent the applicant in 
the main proceedings. Observing that Article 5 of Directive 77/249/EEC, (6) on which Swiss lawyers 
could rely, stated that, for the pursuit of activities relating to the representation of a client in legal 
proceedings, a Member State might require lawyers providing services to work in conjunction with 
a lawyer who practises before the judicial authority in question, or with an ‘avoué’ or ‘procuratore’ 
practising before it, the Court considered that that requirement was satisfied provided that the 
applicant was also represented by a lawyer who was a full member of the Paris Bar.
5.  Capacity to act as defendant
In Case T-395/11 Elti v Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro (order of 4 June 2012, not 
yet published), an action was brought before the Court against a decision of the Head of the Dele-
gation of the European Union to Montenegro rejecting the applicant’s tender for the supply of 
equipment for the digitisation of the public broadcasting service in that country. That case gave 
the Court the opportunity to make clear that a delegation of the European Union to a non-member 
State cannot be considered a body, office or agency of the European Union within the meaning of 
the first paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.
The Court observed that it follows from Article 221 TFEU, Decision 2010/427/EU (7) and the second 
paragraph of Article 51 and Articles 59, 60a and 85 of the Financial Regulation (8) that the legal 
status of the Union Delegations is characterised by a two-fold organic and functional depend-
ence with respect to the European External Action Service (EEAS). For that reason, they cannot be 
characterised as bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union within the meaning of Article 
263 TFEU.
Furthermore, measures adopted pursuant to delegated powers are normally attributed to the 
delegating institution, on which it falls to defend the measure in question before the courts, an 
outcome which holds all the more true for signature by delegation and in a scenario of sub-dele-
gation. Thus, the measures adopted by the Head of Delegation of the European Union to Montene-
gro, acting in his capacity as sub-delegated authorising officer of the Commission, in the procedure 
for a public supply contract, did not confer capacity on that delegation to act as a defendant in 
legal proceedings and in the present case were attributable to the Commission. It followed that 
the Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro could not be considered a body, office or 
agency of the European Union and that the action brought against that delegation in the present 
case was dismissed as inadmissible.
(6)  Council Directive 77/249/EEC of 22 March 1977 to facilitate the effective exercise by lawyers of freedom to 
provide services (OJ 1977 L 78, p. 17).
(7)  Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July establishing the organisation and functioning of the European 
External Action Service (OJ 2010 L 201, p. 30).
(8)  Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the 
general budget of the European Communities (OJ 2002 L 248, p. 1).124  Annual Report 2012
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Competition rules applicable to undertakings
1.  General issues
(a)  Requests for information
Joined Cases T-458/09 and T-171/10 Slovak Telekom v Commission (judgment of 22 March 2012, not 
yet published) provided the Court with the opportunity to rule on the extent of the Commission’s 
power to request information from undertakings under Article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. (9) 
Those cases concerned two Commission decisions ordering the applicant to provide information 
about its activity, not only during the period following the Slovak Republic’s accession to the Euro-
pean Union but also during the preceding period. The Court observed that the powers of investiga-
tion provided for in Article 18(1) of Regulation No 1/2003 are subject only to a single requirement, 
namely that the information requested be necessary, which it is for the Commission to evaluate, in 
order to assess the putative infringements justifying the undertaking of the investigation. It follows 
that the Commission is entitled to request an undertaking to provide information relating to a period 
during which the competition rules of the European Union did not apply to it if such information 
should be necessary for the detection of a possible infringement of those rules from the point at 
which they became applicable. In that context, the Court rejected the applicant’s argument that 
there was in this instance no nexus between the alleged infringement and the information re-
quested. The Court observed in that regard that the information would enable the Commission to 
define the markets at issue, to determine whether the applicant held a dominant position on those 
markets or to assess the gravity of the infringement, while certain data from before 1 May 2004 
might also be necessary in order to establish the economic context of the conduct at issue.
(b)  Commission’s investigatory powers 
—  Assistance of a lawyer
In Case T-357/06 Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission (judgment of 27 September 2012, not 
yet published), the Court observed that, while certain rights of the defence, including the right to 
legal assistance, must be observed even at the stage of the preliminary investigation, it is none the 
less necessary to ensure that observance of those rights does not undermine the effectiveness of 
investigations, in order that the Commission is able to carry out its role as guardian of the Treaty 
in competition matters. It is necessary, in that context, to weigh up the general principles of Euro-
pean Union law on the rights of the defence and the effectiveness of the Commission’s power of 
investigation, by preventing the possible destruction or concealment of documents. Thus, while 
the presence of an external lawyer or an in-house lawyer is possible, the legality of the inspection 
cannot be conditional on such presence. Where an undertaking so desires, and in particular where 
it has no lawyer on the premises, it may therefore seek the advice of a lawyer and request him to 
attend as soon as possible. In order that the exercise of that right to be assisted by a lawyer cannot 
undermine the proper conduct of the inspection, the persons responsible for the inspection must 
be able to enter immediately all the premises of the undertaking, to notify the undertaking of the 
inspection decision and to occupy the offices of their choice without having to wait. Those persons 
must also be put in a position to monitor the telephone and electronic communications of the un-
dertaking. Furthermore, the period which the Commission is required to allow an undertaking in 
(9)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
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order for it to be able to contact its lawyer before the Commission begins the inspection can only 
be very brief and must be kept to a strict minimum.
In this connection, the Court considered that, by refusing to grant an undertaking’s request that 
the agents responsible for the inspection should wait in a waiting room until its external lawyers 
arrive and only then be allowed to enter its premises, the Commission does not breach any of the 
rights of defence of that undertaking. The undertaking’s refusal to grant the Commission’s inspec-
tors access to its premises before its lawyers arrived must therefore be characterised as a refusal to 
submit to the investigation decision.
— Scope
In Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission, the Court also had the opportunity to rule on the 
scope of the Commission’s powers of inspection. Observing in that regard that undertakings are 
under an obligation to cooperate actively in the measures of investigation in the course of the 
preliminary investigation procedure, the Court placed particular emphasis on the importance as-
sumed in that context by the right to have access to all their premises, land and means of transport. 
That right plays a crucial role inasmuch as it is intended to permit the Commission to obtain evi-
dence of infringements of the competition rules in places in which such evidence is normally to be 
found, that is to say, on the business premises of undertakings.
Thus, the Court held that the mere fact that an undertaking’s lawyers refuse to grant the Commis-
sion access to the office of one of the directors of that undertaking is sufficient for that undertaking 
to be considered to have refused to submit in full to the investigation decision, without its being 
necessary for the Commission to establish that the delay caused by that refusal led to the destruc-
tion or concealment of documents.
In Case T-135/09 Nexans France and Nexans v Commission and Case T-140/09 Prysmian and Prysmian 
Cavi e Sistemi Energia v Commission (judgments of 14 November 2012, not yet published), relating 
again to the same issue, the Court none the less made clear that, when the Commission carries out 
an inspection at the premises of an undertaking, it is required to restrict its searches to the activi-
ties of that undertaking relating to the sectors indicated in the decision ordering the inspection. 
Conversely, when it finds, after examination, that a document or other item of information does 
not relate to those sectors, it must refrain from using that document or item of information for the 
purposes of the investigation. The Court made clear in that regard that, if the Commission were 
not subject to such a restriction, it would in practice be able, every time it has indicia suggesting 
that an undertaking has infringed the competition rules in a specific field of its activities, to carry 
out an inspection covering all those activities. That would be incompatible with the protection of 
the sphere of private activity of legal persons, guaranteed as a fundamental right in a democratic 
society. In this instance, the Commission was thus under an obligation, in order to adopt the in-
spection decisions, to have reasonable grounds to justify an inspection at the applicants’ premises 
covering all the applicants’ activities in relation to electric cables and the material associated with 
those cables.
(c)  Reasonable period of time
In Case T-214/06 Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission (judgment of 5 June 2012, not yet pub-
lished), the Court, before which it was pleaded that the duration of the administrative procedure 
and judicial proceedings had been excessive, held that its unlimited jurisdiction in relation to fines 
for infringements of the competition rules enabled it to adjudicate on the applicant’s request for 
a reduction on that ground of the amount of the fine imposed on it by the Commission. The Court 126  Annual Report 2012
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observed, in particular, that such a possibility was justified in this instance by reasons of procedural 
economy and in order to ensure an immediate and effective remedy regarding such a breach of 
the ‘reasonable time’ principle.
Recalling that the reasonableness of a period must be appraised in the light of the circumstances 
specific to each case and, in particular, the importance of the case for the person concerned, its 
complexity and the conduct of the person concerned and of the competent authorities, the Court 
considered that, while the duration of the judicial proceedings of which the applicant complained 
— five years and nine months in all — was indeed considerable, that duration was explained by the 
circumstances and the complexity of the case. Thus, given that the applicant had not put forward 
any argument as regards the importance for it of the case, and in view of the fact that the case did 
not, by its nature or its importance for the applicant, require that it be dealt with particularly exped-
itiously, the Court considered that that duration was not capable of justifying a reduction of the 
amount of the fine imposed.
(d) Sanctions
—  Calculation of fines
Case T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission (judgment of 29 March 2012, not 
yet published, under appeal) also provided the Court with the opportunity to explain the criteria 
to be taken into consideration in the calculation of fines. The Court recalled that, in accordance 
with the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regula-
tion No 17 and Article 65(5) [CS], (10) the Commission must, in assessing the gravity of the infringe-
ment, examine its actual impact on the market only where that impact can be measured. In that 
context, the size of the geographic market is only one of the three criteria that are relevant for the 
purpose of the overall assessment of the gravity of the infringement. In addition, the size of the 
geographic market is not an autonomous criterion in the sense that only infringements affecting 
several Member States could be qualified as ‘very serious’. The Commission may therefore qualify 
an infringement as ‘very serious’ even though the size of the relevant geographic market is limited 
to the territory of a single Member State.
The Court also emphasised that, in assessing the gravity of an infringement for the purpose of set-
ting the amount of the fine, the Commission must ensure that its action has the necessary deter-
rent effect, especially as regards those types of infringement that are particularly harmful to the 
attainment of the objectives of the European Union. Deterrence must be both specific and general, 
in the sense that, as well as constituting punishment for an individual infringement, a fine also 
forms part of the general policy of compliance by undertakings with the competition rules.
Furthermore, since the increase for duration involves the application of a certain percentage to 
the starting amount of the fine, which is determined according to the gravity of the infringement 
as a whole and which already reflects the varying levels of intensity of the infringement, there is 
no reason to take into account, for the increase of that amount on the basis of the duration of the 
infringement, a variation in the intensity of the infringement during the period concerned. Last, 
while it is not excluded that, in certain circumstances, a national legal framework or conduct on 
the part of national authorities may constitute attenuating circumstances, the approval or toler-
ance of the infringement by the national authorities cannot be taken into account as attenuating 
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circumstances where the undertakings concerned have the necessary means to obtain precise and 
accurate information.
—  Fines and periodic penalty payments
In Case T-167/08 Microsoft v Commission (judgment of 27 June 2012, not yet published), the Court 
stated that, although a fine is the consequence of an infringement of Article 101 TFEU or Article 
102 TFEU and a periodic penalty payment is the consequence of a decision ordering that the in-
fringement in question be brought to an end and, where appropriate, prescribing behavioural rem-
edies, they both none the less relate to the conduct of the undertaking as revealed in the past and 
both require a deterrent effect in order to prevent repetition or continuation of the infringement. 
In view of those shared characteristics and objectives, there is no reason to state with different de-
grees of precision what an undertaking must do or not do in order to comply with the competition 
rules before either a decision imposing a fine or a decision imposing a definitive periodic penalty 
payment is adopted in its regard.
—  Orders addressed to undertakings — Limits
In Microsoft v Commission, the Court recalled that, although the Commission has the power to find 
that an infringement exists and to order the parties concerned to bring it to an end, it is not for the 
Commission to impose upon the parties its own choice from among the various potential courses 
of action which are in conformity with the Treaty or with a decision imposing behavioural rem-
edies. Thus, where the undertaking has chosen one of those potential courses of action, the Com-
mission will not be in a position to make a finding of infringement or to impose a periodic penalty 
payment on the ground that it would prefer another of them.
2.  Points raised in the field of Article 101 TFEU
(a)  Concept of a decision by an association of undertakings
In Case T-111/08 MasterCard and Others v Commission (judgment of 24 May, not yet published, 
under appeal), an action was brought before the Court for annulment of a Commission decision 
declaring the multilateral fallback interchange fees (‘MIF’) applied within the MasterCard payment 
system to be contrary to competition law. The cost of MIF is charged to merchants in the general 
context of the costs charged for the use of payment cards by the financial institution which man-
ages their transactions.
The judgment delivered in that case provided the Court with the opportunity to clarify the concept 
of decision of an association of undertakings, within the meaning of Article [101 TFEU]. The Court 
observed that that concept seeks to prevent undertakings from being able to evade the rules on 
competition on account simply of the form in which they coordinate their conduct on the market. It 
is in order to ensure that that principle is effective that Article [101](1) [TFEU] covers not only direct 
methods of coordinating conduct between undertakings (agreements and concerted practices) 
but also institutionalised forms of cooperation in which they act through a collective structure or 
a common body. In that context, the existence of a commonality of interests or a common interest 
is relevant evidence for assessment.
Emphasising, in particular, the existence of a commonality of interests between the MasterCard 
payment organisation and the financial institutions in relation to the setting of the MIF at a high 
level, the Court concluded that, in spite of changes following the initial public offering of Mas-
terCard Inc. on the stock exchange, the MasterCard payment organisation still constituted an 128  Annual Report 2012
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institutional form of coordination of the conduct of the participating financial institutions. The 
Commission had therefore been fully entitled to characterise as decisions by an association of un-
dertakings the decisions taken by the bodies of the MasterCard payment organisation in determin-
ing the MIF.
(b)  Restrictions of competition
—  Ancillary nature
In MasterCard and Others v Commission, the Court rejected the argument that the MIF were object-
ively necessary to the functioning of the MasterCard payment system. According to that argument, 
if those fees had not been charged, the financial institutions would have been prompted to of-
fer other types of payment cards to their customers or to reduce the advantages conferred on 
cardholders, which would have adversely affected the viability of the MasterCard system. Referring 
to the significant revenues and commercial benefits other than MIF which those institutions de-
rived from their payment card issuing business, the Court rejected that reasoning, taking the view 
that while, in a system operating without a MIF, a reduction in the benefits conferred on cardhold-
ers or the profitability of the card issuing business might be expected, it was reasonable to con-
clude that such a reduction would not have been sufficient to affect the viability of the MasterCard 
system.
— Effects
In MasterCard and Others v Commission, the applicants claimed, in particular, that the fact that the 
MIF had an impact on the merchant service charge did not affect competition between acquirers, 
on the ground that they applied in the same way to all acquirers. The Court held in that regard 
that, since it was acknowledged that the MIF set a floor for the merchant service charge, and inas-
much as the Commission had been legitimately entitled to find that a MasterCard system operat-
ing without a MIF would have remained economically viable, it necessarily followed that the MIF 
had effects restrictive of competition. By comparison with an acquiring market operating without 
them, the MIF limited the pressure which merchants could exert on acquiring banks when nego-
tiating the merchant service charge by reducing the possibility of prices dropping below a certain 
threshold.
—  Potential competition
In Case T-360/09 E�ON Ruhrgas and E�ON v Commission and Case T-370/09 GDF Suez v Commission 
(judgments of 29 June 2012, not yet published), the Court was required to adjudicate on actions for 
annulment of the Commission decision imposing a fine of EUR 553 million on each of the applicant 
energy companies for having infringed European Union competition law by entering into an agree-
ment to share the French and German natural gas markets. That agreement had been concluded 
in 1975, when Ruhrgas AG (which became E.ON Ruhrgas AG, part of the E.ON group), and Gaz de 
France (GDF) (now part of the GDF Suez group) decided to construct jointly a gas pipeline across 
Germany in order to import Russian gas into Germany and France. The Commission decided that, 
by the agreement at issue, the undertakings had each agreed not to sell the gas conveyed through 
that gas pipeline on the other party’s national market. Those cases provided the Court with the 
opportunity to adjudicate on the conditions in which an undertaking may be characterised as 
a potential competitor in the context of the application of Article [101](1) [TFEU].
In that regard, the Court pointed out that the examination of conditions of competition on a given 
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the relevant market but also on potential competition. While the intention of an undertaking to 
enter a market may be of relevance for the purpose of determining whether it can be considered to 
be a potential competitor in that market, none the less the essential factor on which such a descrip-
tion must be based is whether it has the ability to enter that market. As regards a national market 
characterised by the existence of de facto territorial monopolies, the fact that there is no legal 
monopoly in that market is irrelevant. In order to ascertain whether there is potential competition 
in a market, the Commission must examine the real concrete possibilities for the undertakings con-
cerned to compete among themselves or for a new competitor to enter that market and compete 
with established undertakings. That examination on the part of the Commission must be made on 
an objective basis, with the result that the fact that such possibilities are precluded on account of 
a monopoly which derives directly from national legislation or, indirectly, from the factual situation 
arising from the implementation of that legislation is irrelevant. Furthermore, the purely theoreti-
cal possibility that a company may enter such a market is not sufficient to establish the existence 
of such competition.
In this instance, the Court found that the situation on the German market until 24 April 1998, in that 
it was characterised by the lawful existence of de facto territorial monopolies, was likely to result 
in the absence of any competition, not only actual, but also potential, on that market. The fact that 
there was no legal monopoly in Germany was irrelevant in that respect. The Court concluded that 
the Commission had not demonstrated the existence of potential competition between E.ON and 
GDF Suez on the German gas market between 1 January 1980 and 24 April 1998 that could have 
been harmed by the agreement concluded between them.
(c)  Calculation of the fine
— Cooperation
(i) Scope
In Case T-347/06 Nynäs Petroleum and Nynas Belgium v Commission (judgment of 27 September 
2012, not yet published), the Court stated that, according to the sixth indent of Section 3 of the 
Guidelines on the method of setting fines, the Commission may reduce the basic amount of the 
fine for effective cooperation by the undertaking in the proceedings outside the scope of the 2002 
Leniency Notice. However, the Commission can grant an undertaking which has cooperated during 
the proceedings for infringement of the competition rules a reduction of the fine under those pro-
visions of the Guidelines only where the 2002 Leniency Notice is not applicable. That notice does 
not apply to vertical cartels or cartels falling within the scope of Article [102 TFEU]. Accordingly, and 
since, in this instance, the infringement in question did fall within the scope of the 2002 Leniency 
Notice, the Court considered that the provisions of the sixth indent of Section 3 of the Guidelines 
on the method of setting fines could not apply to the applicants.
(ii) Consequences
In Case T-370/06 Kuwait Petroleum and Others v Commission (judgment of 27 September 2012, not 
yet published, under appeal), the Court observed that, under point 27 of the 2002 Leniency No-
tice, in cartel cases, in any decision which it adopts at the close of the administrative procedure, 
the Commission will evaluate the final position of each undertaking which has filed an application 
for a reduction of the fine. It follows, according to the Court, that the Commission must assess the 
value of the information provided by an undertaking at the end of the administrative procedure 
and it cannot be criticised for taking the view that it could not reward an undertaking for state-
ments which had appeared to be decisive at one point in the procedure but which turned out to 130  Annual Report 2012
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be unusable at a later stage in the administrative procedure, since the undertaking had revised its 
statements.
—  Aggravating circumstances 
(i)  Role as leader or instigator of the infringement 
In Case T-343/06 Shell Petroleum and Others v Commission (judgment of 27 September 2012, not 
yet published, under appeal), the Court stated that in principle there is nothing to prevent the 
Commission from relying on a single event in order to establish that an undertaking played a role 
of instigator in a cartel, on condition that it is possible to establish with certainty from that single 
event that the undertaking persuaded or encouraged other undertakings to establish the cartel or 
to join it.
Furthermore, in Koninklijke Wegenbouw Stevin v Commission, the Court recalled that, while the 
Courts of the European Union draw a distinction between the roles of instigator and leader, they 
none the less consider that, even if the evidence adduced by the Commission is insufficient with 
respect to either of those roles, they may, in the exercise of their unlimited jurisdiction, maintain 
the increase of the amount of the fine applied by the Commission. In view of the importance of the 
applicant’s role as leader, the Court thus considered in this instance that the increase of the fine 
should not be reduced.
(ii)  Repeat infringement
The judgment in Shell Petroleum and Others v Commission gave the Court the opportunity to pro-
vide explanations on this subject in the case of similar infringements committed successively by 
two subsidiaries of the same parent company. The Court held that, since European Union compe-
tition law recognises that different companies belonging to the same group constitute the same 
economic entity if the companies concerned do not decide independently upon their own con-
duct on the market, the Commission is entitled to find that there has been a repeated infringement 
where one of the subsidiaries of the parent company commits an infringement of the same type as 
that for which another subsidiary was previously punished. Since, however, the Commission is able, 
but under no obligation, to do so, the mere fact that it did not impute liability in an earlier decision 
does not mean that it is required to make the same assessment in a subsequent decision.
In this case, the Court considered that, as the subsidiary which had been the subject of the ear-
lier decision and the subsidiary concerned by the Commission’s new decision were both indirectly 
wholly owned by the same parent companies, the fact that in the previous decision the Commis-
sion had chosen to impute the infringement to the first subsidiary rather than to its parent com-
panies did not affect the possibility of applying the case-law on repeated infringement in the new 
decision. Nor did the fact that one of the parent companies no longer existed affect the possibility 
of applying repeated infringement to the company that had continued to exist. Last, the Commis-
sion was not required to provide evidence establishing that that parent company had in fact exer-
cised decisive influence over the unlawful conduct of the subsidiary to which the earlier decision 
was addressed, since when the infringements were committed that subsidiary was wholly owned 
jointly by the abovementioned parent companies.
(d)  Imputation of the unlawful conduct — Finding of joint and several liability
In Case T-361/06 Ballast Nedam v Commission (judgment of 27 September 2012, not yet pub-
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subsidiary cannot maintain that the reduction by the Courts of the European Union of the amount 
of the fine imposed on its subsidiary means that the fine imposed jointly and severally on it as the 
parent company of the group should also be reduced, when the decision to reduce the amount of 
the fine was the consequence of the fact that the Commission infringed the subsidiary’s rights of 
defence.
(e)  Unlimited jurisdiction
—  Earlier matter 
In Shell Petroleum and Others v Commission, the Court recalled that the unlimited jurisdiction of the 
Courts of the European Union empowers them, in addition to carrying out a mere review of the 
lawfulness of the penalty, to substitute their own appraisal for the Commission’s and, consequently, 
to cancel, reduce or increase the fine or penalty payment imposed. That entails, in accordance 
with the requirements of the principle of effective judicial protection in Article 47 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, (11) review by the Courts of the European Union of 
both the law and the facts, and means that they have the power to assess the evidence, to annul 
the contested decision and to alter the amount of a fine. Thus, it is for the Court, in the exercise 
of its unlimited jurisdiction, to assess, on the date on which it adopts its decision, whether the 
undertakings concerned received a fine the amount of which properly reflects the gravity of the 
infringement in question. In the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, the Court may, in principle, 
take account of an undertaking’s lack of cooperation and consequently increase the fine imposed 
on it for infringement of Articles [101 TFEU] or [102 TFEU]. According to the Court, that could be 
the case where, in reply to a request to that effect from the Commission, an undertaking has failed 
to submit, intentionally or negligently, during the administrative procedure, decisive evidence for 
the setting of the amount of the fine which was or might have been in its possession at the time of 
adoption of the contested decision. In that case, although the Court is not prevented from taking 
such evidence into consideration, the fact remains that an undertaking which relies on such evi-
dence only at the judicial stage of the proceedings, thus prejudicing the purpose and the proper 
conduct of the administrative procedure, exposes itself to the risk that that factor will be taken into 
consideration when the Court determines the appropriate amount of the fine.
—  Subsequent matter
The Court observed in Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission that, even though it was put for-
ward only at the hearing, a plea relating to the overall duration of the proceedings against the 
applicant could not be regarded as inadmissible on the ground that it was out of time. The Court 
considered that the overall duration of the proceedings constituted a new matter of fact which, 
pursuant to Article 48(2) of its Rules of Procedure, justified the introduction of that plea in the 
course of proceedings.
—  Method — Non-binding nature of the Guidelines with respect to the Court
In E�ON Ruhrgas and E�ON v Commission and GDF Suez v Commission the Court observed that it is not 
bound by the Commission’s calculations or by the Commission’s Guidelines when it adjudicates in 
the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, but must make its own appraisal, taking account of all the 
circumstances of the specific case. In the Court’s view, the application of the method followed by 
the Commission would in this instance have led to a reduction of the amount of the fine imposed 
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that would have been disproportionate to the importance of the error which had been found to 
exist. Although the Commission’s error related solely to the French market and to only around one 
fifth of the duration of the infringement, the application of the Commission’s method would have 
led to a reduction of the amount of the fine of more than 50%. Observing that it was not bound by 
that method, the Court thus concluded that, in the light of the duration and gravity of the infringe-
ment, the final amount of the fine imposed on each company should be set at EUR 320 million.
3.  Points raised in the field of Article 102 TFEU
(a)  Dominant position
In Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission an action was brought before the Court for an-
nulment of the decision whereby the Commission had imposed on the applicants — companies 
in the Telefónica group, the historical Spanish telecommunications operator — a fine of around 
EUR 151 million for abuse of a dominant position on the broadband Internet access market in 
Spain. The Commission maintained that the applicants had abused their dominant position on the 
Spanish market for wholesale broadband Internet access services at regional and national levels 
between September 2001 and December 2006.
The Court recalled that the possible existence of competition on the market is a relevant factor for 
the purposes of determining the existence of a dominant position. However, even the existence of 
lively competition on a particular market does not rule out the possibility that there is a dominant 
position on that market, since the predominant feature of such a position is the ability of the under-
taking concerned to act without having to take account of that competition in its market strategy 
and without thereby suffering detrimental effects from such behaviour. The Court also recalled 
that although the ability to impose regular price increases unquestionably constitutes a factor cap-
able of pointing to the existence of a dominant position, it is by no means an indispensable factor, 
as the independence which a dominant undertaking enjoys in pricing matters has more to do with 
the ability to set prices without having to take account of the reaction of competitors, customers 
and suppliers than with the ability to increase prices.
(b)  Abusive practices
—  Margin squeeze
In the same case, the Commission had made a finding of infringement against the applicants 
on the ground that they had imposed unfair prices on their competitors in the form of a margin 
squeeze between the prices for retail broadband access and the prices on the regional and national 
wholesale broadband access markets.
The Court recalled that a margin squeeze is, in the absence of any objective justification, in itself 
capable of constituting abuse within the meaning of Article [102 TFEU]. A margin squeeze is the 
result of the spread between the prices for wholesale services and those for retail services and not 
of the level of those prices as such. Such a squeeze may be the result not only of an abnormally low 
price on the retail market, but also of an abnormally high price on the wholesale market. In order 
to assess the lawfulness of the pricing policy applied by a dominant undertaking, reference should 
be made, in principle, to pricing criteria based on the costs incurred by the dominant undertaking 
itself and on its strategy. In particular, as regards a pricing practice which causes a margin squeeze, 
the use of such analytical criteria can establish whether that undertaking would have been suf-
ficiently efficient to offer its retail services to end-users otherwise than at a loss if it had first been 
obliged to pay its own wholesale prices for the intermediary services.Annual Report 2012  133
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—  Potential effect on competition
In that case, the Court also pointed out that, for the purposes of establishing an infringement of 
Arti  cle [102 TFEU], it is sufficient to show that the abusive conduct of the undertaking in a dom-
inant position tends to restrict competition or, in other words, that the conduct is capable of having, 
or likely to have, that effect. Thus, a pricing practice must have an anti-competitive effect on the 
market, but the effect does not necessarily have to be concrete, and it is sufficient in that regard to 
demonstrate that there is a potential anti-competitive effect that may exclude competitors who are 
at least as efficient as the dominant undertaking.
—  Concept of infringement committed intentionally or negligently
In Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission the Court made clear, regarding the question 
whether an infringement has been committed intentionally or negligently, that that condition is 
satisfied where the undertaking concerned could not have been unaware that its conduct was 
anti-competitive, whether or not it was aware that it was infringing the competition rules of the 
Treaty. An undertaking is aware of the anti-competitive nature of its conduct where it was aware 
of the essential facts justifying both the finding of a dominant position on the relevant market and 
the finding by the Commission of an abuse of that position.
In that regard, there can be no doubt, for a prudent economic operator, that the possession of 
large market shares has a considerable significance which must of necessity be taken into consid-
eration by him in relation to his possible conduct on the market. A historical operator and owner of 
the only significant infrastructure for the supply of wholesale products in the telecommunications 
sector cannot be unaware that it holds a dominant position on the relevant markets. It follows that 
the significance of the market shares held by such an operator on the relevant markets means that 
its belief that it did not occupy a dominant position on those markets can only be the outcome of 
an inadequate study of the structure of the markets on which it operates or a refusal to take those 
structures into consideration.
— Interoperability
In Microsoft v Commission an action had been brought before the Court for annulment of the Com-
mission decision imposing a periodic penalty payment on Microsoft Corp. on the ground that the 
remuneration which it required in order to allow its competitors access to information on inter-
operability between its own products and competitors’ products was unreasonable.
In the Court’s view, the pricing principles applied by the Commission in the contested decision 
and, in particular, the criterion that the technologies concerned be innovative, gave an indication 
of whether Microsoft’s remuneration rates reflected the intrinsic value of a technology rather than 
its strategic value. It followed that the application of those principles objectively met the need to 
assess whether Microsoft’s remuneration rates were reasonable. In the context of grant of a right 
of access to and use of interoperability information on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms 
excluding any remuneration for strategic value, the Commission is entitled to assess the innova-
tive character of the technologies by reference to its constituent elements, namely novelty and 
non-obviousness, the latter belonging to the notion of ‘inventive step’. The effect of assessing the 
innovative character of technologies by reference to novelty and inventive step is not to extinguish 
generally the value of intellectual property rights, trade secrets or other confidential information 
or, a fortiori, to make innovative character a precondition for a product or information to be 
covered by such a right or to constitute a trade secret.134  Annual Report 2012
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4.  Points raised in the field of concentrations
In Case T-332/09 Electrabel v Commission (judgment of 12 December 2012, not yet published), an 
action was brought before the Court by the Belgian company Electrabel against the Commission 
decision imposing on it a fine of EUR 20 million for putting a concentration into effect before its 
notification, contrary to Article 7(1) of Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89. (12) The case concerned Electra-
bel’s acquisition of sole de facto control of Compagnie nationale du Rhône (CNR). Having acquired 
shares increasing its shareholding to 49.95% of the capital and 47.92% of the voting rights of CNR 
on 23 December 2003, Electrabel did not contact the Commission in order to seek its opinion on 
the acquisition of such control until 9 August 2007. As the Commission stated that control had in-
deed been acquired, Electrabel gave formal notice of the concentration. Although, by a first deci-
sion of 29 April 2008 the Commission did not object to the concentration and declared it to be 
compatible with the common market, it none the less left open the question of the precise date on 
which Electrabel had acquired sole de facto control of CNR. Taking the view that the date to be ap-
plied in that regard must be 23 December 2003, it then, however, adopted the contested decision.
In assessing the validity of the Commission’s analysis of the existence of a concentration, the Court 
recalled that the Commission’s examination of the circumstances in which a concentration was 
put into effect is amenable to a full review by the Courts of the European Union. In that regard, 
it observed that, according to point 14 of the Notice on the concept of a concentration, (13) even 
a minority shareholder may be regarded as having sole control of an undertaking where it is highly 
likely to achieve a majority at the general meeting because the remaining shareholders are widely 
dispersed. The determination of whether or not sole control exists in a particular case will be based 
on the evidence resulting from the presence of shareholders in previous years. Where, on the basis 
of the number of shareholders attending the shareholders’ meeting, a minority shareholder has 
a stable majority of the votes at this meeting, then the minority shareholder in question is taken to 
have sole control of the undertaking. The Court held that that was so in this instance, since the ap-
plicant had been unable to call into question the Commission’s finding that on 23 December 2003 
it had been highly likely to achieve a majority at general meetings even without holding a majority 
of voting rights.
In addition, the Court held that, in applying a limitation period of five years, the Commission had 
not erred, since the infringement which the applicant was found to have committed, namely the 
putting into effect of a concentration before notification, was an infringement capable of giving 
rise to substantial changes of the conditions of competition and could not be characterised as 
purely formal or procedural, within the meaning of Article 1(1)(a) of Regulation (EEC) No 2988/74. (14)
Last, as regards the determination of the amount of the fine, in the first place the Court observed 
that the Commission could not be criticised for not having followed the principles and methods 
set out in the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed for infringements of Articles 
[101 TFEU] and [102 TFEU] when setting the amount of the fine in this case. The framework of its 
analysis had to be that set out in Article 14(3) of Regulation No 4064/89, which provides that, in 
setting the amount of a fine, regard is to be had to the nature and gravity of the infringement.
(12) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between under-
takings (corrected version at OJ 1990 L 257, p. 13).
(13) Commission notice on the concept of concentration under Regulation No 4064/89 (OJ 1998 C 66, p. 5).
(14) Council Regulation (EEC) No 2988/74 of 26 November 1974 concerning limitation periods in proceedings and 
the enforcement of sanctions under the rules of the European Economic Community relating to transport and 
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State aid
1. Admissibility 
In Case T-154/10 France v Commission (judgment of 20 September 2012, not yet published, under 
appeal), the Court held that the fact that a Member State withdrew a measure categorised as exist-
ing aid by a contested decision several months before that decision was adopted does not render 
the action brought against that decision inadmissible. The Court was called upon to adjudicate in 
an action brought against a Commission decision declaring incompatible with the internal market 
aid allegedly implemented by the French Republic in the form of an implied unlimited guarantee 
in favour of La Poste resulting from its status as a publicly owned establishment.
The Court pointed out that a Commission decision finding that there was State aid in the form of 
an unlimited guarantee in favour of an undertaking, and declaring that aid incompatible with the 
internal market, is necessarily intended to produce binding legal effects and is therefore a chal-
lengeable act under Article 263 TFEU. Although it was true that in this instance the French Govern-
ment had decided, for its own reasons and without being obliged to do so by the Commission, to 
withdraw the measure categorised as existing aid by the Commission several months before the 
contested decision was adopted, the fact remained that the French Republic was legally bound to 
implement the contested decision. In the Court’s view, the fact that in the implementation of the 
decision there might have been a convergence between the interests defended by the Commis-
sion and those of the Member State did not preclude the latter from bringing an action for annul-
ment of the decision. If such an action were precluded, the Member States would be penalised 
depending on whether or not they had an interest in complying with a Commission decision and 
such an approach would be eminently subjective in nature.
In Case T-123/09 Ryanair v Commission (judgment of 28 March 2012, not yet published, under ap-
peal), the applicant claimed that the Court should annul two Commission decisions relating to the 
loan of EUR 300 million granted by the Italian State to Alitalia — Compagnia Aera Italiana SpA in 
2008. While the first of those decisions, declaring that measure to be incompatible with the com-
mon market and ordering recovery of the aid paid to Alitalia, closed a formal investigation proced-
ure, the second, refusing to categorise the sale of Alitalia’s assets as aid, so long as certain under-
takings given by the Italian authorities were fully complied with, had been adopted on the basis of 
Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, (15) without initiation of the formal investigation stage.
As regards the second decision, the Court, observing that the lawfulness of a decision not to raise 
objections depends on whether there are doubts as to the compatibility of the aid with the com-
mon market, stated that, since such doubts must trigger the initiation of a formal investigation 
procedure in which the interested parties referred to in Article 1(h) of Regulation No 659/1999 can 
participate, it must be held that any interested party within the meaning of the latter provision is 
directly and individually concerned by such a decision. If the beneficiaries of the procedural guar-
antees provided for in Article [108](2) [TFEU] and Article 6(1) of Regulation No 659/1999 are to be 
able to ensure that those guarantees are respected, it must be possible for them to challenge be-
fore the Courts of the European Union the decision not to raise objections. Thus, under Article 1(h) 
of Regulation No 659/1999, ‘interested party’ must mean, inter alia, any person, undertaking or 
association of undertakings whose interests might be affected by the granting of aid, that is to say, 
in particular competing undertakings of the beneficiary of the aid.
(15) Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22  March  1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of 
Article [88 EC] (OJ 1999 L 83, p. 1).136  Annual Report 2012
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Drawing the appropriate conclusions from Case C-83/09 P Commission v Kronoply and Kronotex 
[2011] ECR I-4441, the Court explained that, where an applicant seeks annulment of a decision not 
to raise objections, it essentially contests the fact that the Commission adopted the decision in 
relation to the aid at issue without initiating the formal investigation procedure, thereby infring-
ing the applicant’s procedural rights. In order to have its action for annulment upheld, the appli-
cant may invoke any plea to show that the assessment of the information and evidence which the 
Commission had at its disposal during the preliminary examination phase of the measure notified 
should have raised doubts as to the compatibility of that measure with the common market.
The outcome is different, however, with respect to the decision declaring the aid incompatible 
with the common market. A decision closing a proceeding pursuant to Article [108](2) [TFEU] is of 
individual concern to any undertaking which was at the origin of the complaint which led to the 
opening of the investigation procedure, and whose views were heard during that procedure and 
largely determined the conduct of that procedure, only if its position on the market was substan-
tially affected by the aid which is the subject of that decision or if it succeeds in demonstrating by 
other means, by reference to specific circumstances distinguishing it individually as in the case of 
the person addressed, that it is individually concerned. While acknowledging that in this instance 
the applicant had played an active role in the procedure, the Court found that such individual 
effect was lacking.
2.  Substantive issues
(a)  Concept of State aid
In Case T-154/10 France v Commission, the Court stated that aid in the form of an unlimited guar-
antee granted by the State without consideration is, as a rule, liable to confer an advantage on the 
beneficiary, in that that party thereby enjoys an improvement in its financial position through a re-
duction of the charges which would normally encumber its budget. In that regard, the Court point-
ed out that the definition of aid is more general than that of subsidy, because it includes not only 
positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also State measures which, in various forms, 
mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which thus, 
without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same 
effect. An unlimited State guarantee enables its recipient inter alia to obtain more favourable credit 
terms than those which it would have obtained on its own merits alone and, therefore, eases the 
pressure on its budget. In that context, the Court held that, in order to show that a publicly owned 
establishment enjoyed more favourable terms of credit and, therefore, a financial advantage, the 
Commission may refer to the findings of the ratings agencies and, more specifically, to the leading 
agencies. Since it is established that the market takes accounts of the leading agencies’ ratings 
in assessing the credit to be granted to a given undertaking, a rating by those agencies which is 
better than would have been given without a guarantee is liable to procure an advantage for the 
publicly owned establishment.
In Joined Cases T-50/06 RENV, T-56/06 RENV, T-60/06 RENV, T-62/06 RENV and T-69/06 RENV Ire-
land and Others v Commission (judgment of 21 March 2012, not yet published, under appeal), the 
Court provided clarification of the relationship between the rules on State aid and the rules flow-
ing from a harmonisation directive relating to exemption from excise duty. The Court observed in 
that regard that the rules on the harmonisation of national fiscal legislation, including the rules on 
excise duty, and the rules on State aid pursue the same objective, namely to promote the proper 
functioning of the internal market by combating, especially, distortion of competition. In the light 
of their common objective, in order for those different rules to be implemented consistently, the 
notion of distortion of competition must be regarded as having the same scope and the same Annual Report 2012  137
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meaning with regard to both the harmonisation of domestic fiscal legislation and State aid. More-
over, the rules governing the harmonisation of domestic fiscal legislation, including the rules on 
excise duties, laid down in Article [113 TFEU] and in Directive 92/81/EC, (16) expressly confer on the 
European Union institutions, namely the Commission, which submits a proposal, and the Council, 
which enacts legislation, the responsibility for assessing whether competition may be distorted, 
and on that basis to authorise, or not authorise, a Member State to apply, or to continue to apply, 
an exemption from the harmonised excise duty under Article 8(4) of Directive 92/81, or whether 
there may be unfair competition or distortion of the functioning of the internal market justifying 
a review of authorisation already granted under that provision, as provided for in Article 8(5) of 
Directive 92/81.
The Court observed, none the less, that in order for advantages to be capable of being catego-
rised as State aid within the meaning of Article [107](1) [TFEU], they must be imputable to an au-
tonomous and unilateral decision of the Member State concerned. That was not so in the case of 
the exemptions from excise duty at issue, which, having been granted in reliance on the Council’s 
authorisation decisions issued on a proposal from the Commission in accordance with Directive 
92/81, had to be imputed to the European Union. It followed that, as long as the Council’s authori-
sation decisions remained in force and had not been amended by the Council or annulled by the 
Courts of the European Union, the Commission was not entitled to classify the exemptions as State 
aid. Moreover, since the procedural requirements laid down in Article [108 TFEU] stem from the 
classification of the measures in question as State aid within the meaning of Article [107](1) [TFEU], 
there was no basis for the Commission’s complaint that the Member States concerned had failed to 
notify to it the exemptions at issue which they had granted on the basis of the Council’s authorisa-
tion decisions. The Court concluded that the contested decision breached the principle of legal 
certainty and the principle of the presumption of legality attaching to European Union measures.
Case T-139/09 France v Commission (judgment of 27 September 2012, not yet published) raised, in 
particular, the question whether measures intended to support the fruit and vegetable market in 
France could be categorised as State aid in view of the fact that they were financed in part by 
voluntary contributions from persons operating in that sector. In that regard, the Court observed 
that the relevant criterion for the purpose of assessing whether the resources are public, whatever 
their origin, is that of the degree of intervention of the public authority in the definition of the 
measures in question and their methods of financing. The mere fact that the contributions of the 
economic operators concerned in respect of the partial financing of the measures in question are 
only voluntary and not obligatory is not sufficient to call that principle into question. The degree of 
intervention of the public authority as regards those contributions may be great, even where those 
contributions are not obligatory. As regards the assessment of the role of the public authority in 
the definition of the measures financed by a public establishment and by voluntary contributions 
from producers’ organisations, it was for the Court to make an overall assessment, without its being 
possible to draw a distinction according to their method of financing, since the public and private 
contributions had been put together and mixed in an operational fund. In this instance, in view of 
the fact that the definition of the disputed measures and the way in which they were financed was 
carried out by a public industrial and commercial institution under the supervision of the State, 
while the beneficiaries of the measures, conversely, had the power only to participate or not to 
participate in the system thus defined, by agreeing or refusing to pay the sectoral contribution 
which that public establishment fixed, the Court concluded that those measures constituted State 
aid within the meaning of Article [107](1) [TFEU].
(16) Council Directive 92/81/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the harmonisation of the structures of excise duties on 
mineral oils (OJ 1992 L 316, p. 12).138  Annual Report 2012
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Last, Case T-210/02 RENV British Aggregates v Commission (judgment of 7 March 2012, not yet pub-
lished, under appeal) led the Court to examine the criteria that must serve to guide assessment of 
the selectivity of a State measure. The Court recalled in that regard that, in establishing whether 
a measure is selective in nature, it is necessary to determine whether, in a given legal system, that 
measure is such as to favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods within the 
meaning of Article [107](1) [TFEU] by comparison with other undertakings which are in a legal 
and factual situation that is comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the measure in 
question. The Court observed, however, that that condition is not satisfied by a measure which, al-
though conferring an advantage on its recipient, is justified by the nature or general scheme of the 
tax system of which it forms part. For the purposes of that assessment, a distinction must be made 
between, on the one hand, the objectives attributed to a particular tax system which are extrinsic 
to it and, on the other, the mechanisms inherent in the tax system itself which are necessary for the 
achievement of such objectives, since, as basic or guiding principles of the tax system in question, 
those objectives and mechanisms could support such justification, which it is for the Member State 
to demonstrate. Furthermore, for the purpose of assessing the selective nature of the advantage 
conferred by the measure in question, the determination of the reference framework assumes par-
ticular importance in the case of tax measures, since the very existence of an advantage can be 
established only when compared with ‘normal’ taxation. Thus, in order to classify a domestic tax 
measure as ‘selective’, it is necessary to begin by identifying and examining the common or ‘nor-
mal’ tax system applicable in the Member State concerned. It is by reference to that common or 
‘normal’ regime that it is then necessary to assess and determine whether any advantage granted 
by the tax measure at issue may be selective, by demonstrating that the measure derogates from 
that common regime in so far as it differentiates between economic operators who, in the light 
of the objective assigned to the tax system of the Member State concerned, are in a comparable 
factual and legal situation.
In this instance, the Court considered that the question whether the rules at issue, establishing an 
environmental tax on aggregates in the United Kingdom, accorded more favourable treatment to 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods in a comparable factual and legal situ-
ation had to be examined in the light of the environmental objective pursued by those rules. In 
that context, the Court found that those rules had resulted in tax differentiation between materi-
als exempted from tax and alternative aggregates derived from other materials that were subject 
to tax. Such a differentiation could not be justified by the nature and general structure of the tax 
regime at issue since it clearly derogated from the normal taxation rationale of the tax at issue and, 
furthermore, it was likely to undermine the environmental objective of that tax.
(b)  Services of general economic interest
In Case T-137/10 CBI v Commission (judgment of 7 November 2012, not yet published), the Court 
set out the circumstances in which measures intended to compensate for public service obliga-
tions may be categorised as State aid. That case originated in subsidies granted by the Belgian 
authorities to five public general hospitals in the Brussels-Capital Region (Belgium). On a complaint 
lodged by the applicant and another association concerning alleged State aid, the Commission had 
decided not to raise objections with respect to the measures at issue following the preliminary exam-
ination stage provided for in Article [108](3) [TFEU]. That decision was based on the judgment of 
the Court of Justice in Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, (17) where it was held that 
compensation granted in consideration for the discharge of public services obligations does not 
constitute State aid, provided that certain criteria are met. Maintaining that, in the light of those 
(17) Case C-280/00 [2003] ECR I-7747.Annual Report 2012  139
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criteria, the Commission ought to have had serious doubts as to the compatibility with the internal 
market of the aid measures examined, the applicant, an association governed by Belgian law con-
sisting of nine private hospitals, brought an action for annulment of that decision.
The Court observed first of all that, as regards, in particular, the public hospital service, it is neces-
sary, when applying Article [106](2) [TFEU], to take into consideration the absence of a trade di-
mension, as its characterisation as a service of general economic interest is to be explained rather 
more by its impact on the competitive and trade sector than by an alleged trade dimension. The 
application of that provision must therefore take into account respect for the responsibilities of the 
Member States as regards the definition of their health policy and the organisation and provision 
of health services and medical care. In accordance with those considerations, Member States or-
ganise their national health systems according to the principles which they choose. None the less, 
where the organisation of the provision of health services decided upon by a Member State im-
poses public service obligations on private operators, it is necessary to take that circumstance into 
account when assessing the State measures adopted in the sector. In particular, where different 
requirements are made of the public and private entities responsible for the same public service, 
those differences must be clear from their respective terms of reference, notably in order to permit 
an assessment of the compatibility of the subsidy with the principle of equal treatment.
The Court then observed that Member States have a wide discretion as to the definition of what 
they consider to be services of general economic interest; that definition can be called into ques-
tion by the Commission only in the event of manifest error. Review by the Courts of the European 
Union of the Commission’s assessment as to the existence of a public service task must focus on 
compliance with certain minimum criteria relating, in particular, to the presence of an act by a pub-
lic authority charging the operators in question with a task amounting to a service of general eco-
nomic interest and also to the universal and obligatory nature of that task. In that regard, the Court 
recalled that, in order for the decisions of an entity to be able to characterised as public acts, that 
entity’s organs must be composed of persons having a public interest task and the public author-
ities must have actual power to control those decisions. That wide discretion also extends to the 
determination of the parameters on the basis of which compensation for a task of service of gen-
eral economic interest is calculated; those parameters must, however, be defined in such a way as 
to preclude any improper use by the Member State of the concept of service of general economic 
interest. Should a Member State employ a number of compensation measures, the Commission 
carries out an incomplete examination of the aid measure concerned if it fails to carry out a separ-
ate assessment of the financing parameters relating to one of the measures.
(c)  Notion of serious difficulties
In Ryanair v Commission the Court recalled that the notion of serious difficulties, which determines 
whether the Commission is obliged to initiate the formal investigation procedure in respect of 
State aid, is an objective one. Although the Commission has no discretion in relation to the deci-
sion to initiate the formal investigation procedure where it finds that such difficulties exist, it none 
the less enjoys a certain margin of discretion in identifying and evaluating the circumstances of 
the case in order to determine whether or not they present serious difficulties. In accordance with 
the objective of Article [108](3) [TFEU] and its duty of good administration, the Commission may, 
amongst other things, engage in talks with the notifying State or with third parties in an en-
deavour to overcome, during the preliminary examination procedure, any difficulties encountered. 
That power presupposes that the Commission may bring its position into line with the results of 
the dialogue it engaged in, without that alignment having to be interpreted a priori as establishing 
the existence of serious difficulties. Furthermore, if the examination carried out by the Commission 140  Annual Report 2012
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during the preliminary examination procedure is insufficient or incomplete, that constitutes 
evidence of the existence of serious difficulties.
(d)  Private investor in a market economy test
In Case T-565/08 Corsica Ferries France v Commission (judgment of 11 September 2012, not yet pub-
lished, under appeal), an action was brought before the Court against the Commission decision 
declaring measures for the restructuring of Société nationale maritime Corse-Méditerranée (SNCM) 
put in place by the French Republic in 2002 to be compatible with the common market and refus-
ing to categorise as aid the measures for the plan, approved in 2006, for the privatisation of that 
undertaking. The applicant disputed, in particular, the Commission’s application of the private in-
vestor test to the privatisation of that company for a negative selling price of EUR 158 million. It 
claimed, in particular, that the Commission could not include in the calculation of the hypothetical 
cost of the liquidation of SNCM additional severance payments in excess of the strict obligations 
imposed by law and agreement, since such an approach could not characterise the conduct of 
a private investor guided by prospects of long-term profitability.
The Court observed that, in a market economy, a prudent private investor cannot ignore, on the 
one hand, his responsibility to all the undertaking’s stakeholders and, on the other, changes in the 
social, economic and environmental context in which he seeks to develop. On that basis, payment 
by a private investor of additional severance payments is, in principle, liable to constitute a legiti-
mate and appropriate practice with the aim of promoting calm dialogue between management 
and labour and maintaining the brand image of a company or group of companies. However, in 
the absence of any economic, rationality, even in the long term, the taking into account of costs 
going beyond the strict obligations imposed by law and by agreement must be regarded as State 
aid within the meaning of Article [107]((1) [TFEU]. In that context, the protection of the brand image 
of a Member State as a global investor in the market economy cannot, where there are no spe-
cial circumstances and without particularly convincing reasons, constitute sufficient justification to 
demonstrate the long-term economic rationality of assuming additional costs such as additional 
severance payments.
The private investor test was also central to the issue raised in Joined Cases T-29/10 and T-33/10 
Netherlands and ING Groep v Commission (judgment of 2 March 2012, not yet published, under ap-
peal), where the applicants challenged the Commission’s decision on the compatibility with the 
common market of the aid measures adopted by the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 2008 and 2009 
in favour of ING Groep NV, in the context of the financial crisis of autumn 2008. The applicants took 
issue with the Commission for having considered that an amendment to the conditions of repay-
ment of the capital contribution arising from the creation of one billion ING Groep securities wholly 
underwritten by the Kingdom of the Netherlands constituted additional aid of EUR 2 billion.
The Court held that the Commission could not merely find that the amendment to those repay-
ment conditions constituted, ipso facto, State aid without first examining whether that amend-
ment conferred on ING Groep an advantage to which a private investor in the same position as the 
Netherlands State would not have agreed. It is only on completion of such an examination, which 
presupposes in particular a comparison of the initial repayment terms with the amended terms, 
that the Commission is able to conclude that there was or was not a conferral of an additional bene-
fit within the meaning of Article [107](1) [TFEU]. The Court considered that, in this instance, it was 
not apparent from the contested decision that the Commission had undertaken such an analysis. 
Having merely found that the amendment to the repayment terms entailed a loss of profits for 
the Netherlands State, the Commission had not examined how the return of between 15% and 
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correspond to what could be reasonably expected by a private investor confronted by a similar 
situation. The Court observed that, in failing to evaluate whether, in agreeing to the amendment to 
the repayment terms, the Netherlands State had acted like a private investor, in particular because 
it could be repaid early and because it benefited when the amendment occurred from greater cer-
tainty of being repaid in a satisfactory manner in view of the market conditions, the Commission 
had misinterpreted the notion of aid, and it annulled the contested decision.
In Joined Cases T-268/08 and T-281/08 Land Burgenland and Austria v Commission (judgment of 
28 February 2012, not yet published, under appeal), the Court was required to adjudicate on the 
application of the private investor test in the context of the privatisation of a bank through a tender 
procedure. The point at issue was the choice of Land Burgenland (Province of Burgenland, Austria) 
to award the Austrian bank Hypo Bank Burgenland AG to two Austrian companies, although the 
purchase price offered by those companies had been significantly lower than the price offered 
by an Austro-Ukrainian consortium. On a complaint lodged by that consortium, the Commission 
characterised the difference between the two final offers submitted during the tender procedure 
as State aid incompatible with the common market, taking the view that the Austrian authority had 
not behaved as a market economy seller.
In cases brought against that decision by both Land Burgenland and the Republic of Austria, the 
Court confirmed that the appropriate test for determining whether the sale of property by a public 
authority to a private person constitutes State aid is the private operator in a market economy test, 
the specific application of which requires in principle a complex economic assessment. While it 
acknowledged that a market economy vendor can accept the lower bid if it is obvious that the sale 
to the highest bidder is not realisable, the Court none the less considered, in this instance, that the 
Commission had been entitled to conclude that neither the uncertain outcome nor the probably 
longer duration of the procedure before the financial markets supervisory authority if the bank had 
been sold to the consortium justified the consortium being excluded. The Court observed, in that 
regard, that Land Burgenland would have had to adduce hard evidence to demonstrate that the 
length of the procedure before the market supervisory authority if the bank had been sold to the 
consortium would have seriously compromised the chances of privatisation.
3.  Procedural rules
(a)  Cumulative effect of aid with previous aid
Joined Cases T-115/09 and T-116/09 Electrolux and Whirlpool Europe v Commission (judgment of 
14 February 2012, not yet published) concerned two actions for annulment of the Commission de-
cision declaring that restructuring aid of EUR 31 million granted by the French Republic to Fagor 
France SA (FagorBrandt), a competitor of the applicants, was compatible with the common mar-
ket, on certain conditions. The contested decision followed a previous decision declaring fiscal aid 
granted by the Italian Republic to a subsidiary of that company incompatible with the common 
market and ordering recovery of that aid. The applicants maintained, in particular, that the Com-
mission had failed to examine the cumulative effect of the aid at issue with the incompatible Italian 
aid. 
The Court observed that it follows from the judgment of the Court of Justice in TWD v Com-
mission, (18) and also from point 23 of the Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and 
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restructuring firms in difficulty, (19) that, in its examination of the compatibility of restructuring aid 
with the common market, the Commission must in principle examine the cumulative effect of that 
aid with any earlier aid which has not been recovered. Such an examination is justified on account 
of the fact that the advantages conferred by the grant of the earlier incompatible aid which has 
not yet been recovered continue to produce effects on competition. However, if the Commission 
makes the grant of the planned aid subject to the prior recovery of earlier aid, it is not obliged to 
examine the cumulative effect of the aid on competition. In such a case, the imposition of such 
a condition in itself prevents the advantage conferred by the planned aid from combining with 
that conferred by the earlier aid, the negative effects on competition resulting from the grant of 
the earlier aid having been eliminated by the recovery of the amount of that aid plus interest. 
Conversely, where the Commission does not make the grant of the aid at issue conditional on the 
recovery of the incompatible aid, it must necessarily examine the cumulative effect of the two 
forms of aid.
(b)  Effectiveness of the administrative procedure
In Case T-139/09 France v Commission, the Court had occasion to recall that a Member State which 
has granted or seeks to be allowed to grant aid under one of the exceptions provided for in the 
Treaty rules has a duty to cooperate with the Commission in the proceedings in which it takes 
part. It must provide all the information necessary to enable the Commission to verify that the 
conditions for the derogation sought are fulfilled. The legality of a decision concerning State aid 
falls to be assessed in the light of the information available to the Commission at the time when 
the decision was adopted. Since the concept of State aid must be applied to an objective situa-
tion appraised on the date on which the Commission takes its decision, it is the appraisals carried 
out on that date that must be taken into account when the Court undertakes its review. It follows 
that, where there is no information to the contrary from interested parties, the Commission is em-
powered to take as its basis the factual elements it has before it at the time when it adopts its 
final decision, even if they are incorrect, provided that the factual elements in question were the 
subject of an order issued by the Commission to the Member State to provide it with the necessary 
information.
In that context, the Court observed, moreover, that it is apparent from Article 13(1) of Regulation 
No 659/1999 that, at the end of the formal investigation procedure into unlawful aid, the decision is 
to be taken by the Commission on the basis of the information available, in particular that supplied 
by the Member State in response to the Commission’s requests for information. In this instance, 
the applicant State could not therefore, in the light of the principle of effectiveness of the admin-
istrative procedure, challenge for the first time during the legal proceedings the content of factual 
observations made by an interested third party during the administrative procedure which had 
been sent to that Member State.
(c)  Proof of the existence of an advantage constituting aid
In Case T-154/10 France v Commission, the Court also observed that the Commission cannot assume 
that an undertaking has benefited from an advantage constituting State aid solely on the basis of 
a negative presumption, based on a lack of information enabling the contrary to be found. The 
Commission is, at the very least, required to ensure that the information at its disposal, even if in-
complete and fragmented, constitutes a sufficient basis on which to conclude that an undertaking 
has benefited from an advantage amounting to State aid. In particular, proof of the existence of an 
(19) OJ 2004 C 244, p. 2. Annual Report 2012  143
Proceedings  General Court
implied State guarantee may be inferred from a bundle of converging facts having a certain degree 
of reliability and coherence, taken inter alia from an interpretation of the relevant provisions of 
national law, and, in particular, be inferred from the legal effects flowing from the legal status of 
the recipient undertaking. Memoranda and interpretation bulletins may be considered relevant for 
demonstrating that a State has granted an implied financial guarantee, which, by definition, is not 
explicitly provided for by national law.
Intellectual property
With 210 cases brought to a close and 238 new cases, intellectual property proceedings represent-
ed, in terms of numbers of cases, a significant source of the Court’s activity, of which the following 
is merely an overview.
1.  Community trade mark 
(a)  Absolute grounds for refusal
In Case T-33/11 Peeters Landbouwmachines v OHIM – Fors MW (BIGAB) (judgment of 14 February 
2012, not yet published), the Court held that the question whether an applicant for a trade mark 
was acting in bad faith within the meaning of Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 on the 
Community trade mark — which justifies refusal to register the trade mark applied for — must be 
decided by means of an overall assessment in which all the factors relevant to the particular case 
are taken into account. Those factors include the fact that the applicant knows or must know that 
a third party is using, in at least one Member State, an identical or similar sign for identical or similar 
goods, which could give rise to confusion with the sign for which registration is sought; the appli-
cant’s intention to prevent that third party from continuing to use such a sign; and the degree of 
legal protection enjoyed by the third party’s sign and the sign for which registration is sought. In the 
context of the overall analysis undertaken pursuant to Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, 
account may none the less also be taken of the origin of the contested sign and its use since its 
creation, and of the commercial logic underlying the filing of the application for registration of that 
sign as a Community trade mark. In addition, the Court made clear that the intention of preventing 
certain goods from being marketed may, in certain circumstances, be indicative of bad faith on the 
part of the applicant. That is the case, in particular, where it subsequently becomes apparent that 
the applicant had the sign registered as a Community trade mark with no intention of using it, his 
sole objective being to prevent a third party from entering the market.
Furthermore, the Court observed that the fact that the applicant knows or must know that a third 
party has long been using, in at least one Member State, an identical or similar sign for identical 
or similar goods, which could give rise to confusion with the sign for which registration is sought, 
is not sufficient in itself to permit the conclusion that the applicant was acting in bad faith. Ac-
cordingly, it cannot be excluded that, where a number of producers use, on the market, identical 
or similar signs for identical or similar goods, which could give rise to confusion with the sign for 
which registration is sought, the applicant’s registration of the sign may be in pursuit of a legiti-
mate objective. That may be the position, in particular, where the applicant knows, at the time 
of filing the application for registration, that a third-party undertaking is making use of the mark 
covered by that application by giving its customers the impression that it officially distributes the 
goods sold under that mark, even though it has not received authorisation to do so. Accordingly, 
the good faith of a trade mark applicant cannot be challenged solely because that applicant is 
the proprietor of other marks and it did not take the initiative of applying to have those marks 
registered as Community trade marks. Last, the Court stated that, for the purposes of determin-
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extent of the reputation enjoyed by a sign at the time when the application for its registration as 
a Community trade mark was filed, since the extent of that reputation might justify the applicant’s 
interest in ensuring a wider legal protection for his sign.
(b)  Relative grounds for refusal
In Case T-424/10 Dosenbach-Ochsner v OHIM – Sisma (Representation of elephants in a rectangle) 
(judgment of 7 February 2012, not yet published), an action was brought before the Court against 
the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market 
(Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) dismissing the application for a declaration of invalidity lodged 
by the proprietor of earlier international and national figurative marks representing an elephant 
and the earlier national word mark elefanten against the figurative Community trade mark re-
presenting elephants in a rectangle.
In response to the plea alleging phonetic similarity between the signs concerned, the Court held 
that a phonetic comparison is not relevant in the examination of the similarity to another mark 
of a figurative mark without word elements. A figurative mark without word elements cannot, as 
such, be pronounced. At the very most, its visual or conceptual content can be described orally. 
According to the Court, however, such a description necessarily coincides with either the visual 
perception or the conceptual perception of the mark in question. Accordingly, it is not necessary 
to examine separately the phonetic perception of a figurative mark lacking word elements and to 
compare it with the phonetic perception of other marks.
Also, in Case T-369/10 You-Q v OHIM – Apple Corps (BEATLE) (judgment of 29 March 2012, not pub-
lished, under appeal), the Court was requested to examine the legality of the decision relating to 
the opposition proceedings concerning the registration of the figurative Community trade mark 
BEATLE for apparatus for locomotion of persons of reduced mobility. Apple Corps Ltd, an undertak-
ing founded by the musical group The Beatles, had opposed the application for registration of that 
mark submitted by You-Q BV (formerly Handicare Holding BV), relying on various earlier Commu-
nity and national trade marks including the word mark BEATLES and a number of figurative marks 
composed of the words ‘beatles’ or ‘the beatles’. Taking the view that, owing to the similarity of the 
signs, the considerable and long-standing reputation of the earlier marks and the overlap of the 
relevant public, it was likely that, by using the mark applied for, You-Q would take unfair advantage 
of the repute and consistent selling power of the earlier marks, the Board of Appeal had concluded 
that there was a serious risk that detriment to those marks would occur. 
The Court’s judgment confirmed that analysis. The Court observed, first of all, that on the basis 
of the evidence adduced and, in particular, of sales of records of the Beatles, the Board of Appeal 
had been entitled to find that the earlier trade marks BEATLES and THE BEATLES had an enormous 
reputation for sound records, video records and films. It had also been entitled to find that the 
earlier marks had a reputation for merchandising products such as toys and games, although that 
reputation was lesser than the reputation for sound records, video records and films. In the Court’s 
view, the Board of Appeal had also been right to find that, visually, phonetically and conceptually, 
the signs at issue were very similar. Likewise, the Board of Appeal had been correct to observe that 
there was an overlap between the public affected by the signs at issue, in so far as persons with 
reduced mobility are also part of the public at large at whom the earlier marks are directed. Con-
sequently, the Board of Appeal had been entitled to infer from those factors that, notwithstanding 
the difference between the goods in question, there was a link between those signs. Owing to 
the existence of that link, the relevant public would, even if there was no likelihood of confusion, 
have been led to transfer the value of the earlier marks to the goods bearing the mark applied for, 
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without having to bear the costs of launching a newly created mark. Accordingly, the Court found 
that the Board of Appeal had not erred in finding that it was likely that, by using the mark at issue, 
the applicant would have taken unfair advantage of the repute and the consistent selling power of 
the earlier trade marks.
(c)  Procedural issues
In Case T-298/10 Arrieta D� Gross v OHIM – International Biocentric Foundation and Others (BIODANZA) 
(judgment of 8 March 2012, not published), the Court ruled on the question of the outcome of an 
application to register a Community trade mark in the event of the death of the applicant. The 
Court observed in that regard that it is apparent from Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (20) 
that the proprietors of Community trade marks are natural or legal persons. Consequently, a Com-
munity trade mark cannot be registered in the name of a deceased person. Nor is there any provi-
sion in that regulation that the death of the applicant for registration of a Community trade mark 
entails the expiry of that application; indeed, such a conclusion would be contrary to the nature 
of the application for registration as an object of property. It follows, according to the Court, that 
in the event of the death of the proprietor of an application to register a Community trade mark, 
that application is transferred to another person, to be determined according to the provisions of 
the law of succession of the relevant Member State. In order to ensure the efficient conduct of the 
proceedings before OHIM, it is for the new proprietor of such an application to register its transfer 
with OHIM. However, regardless of the moment when that registration takes place, the new pro-
prietor of the application for registration must be regarded as having acquired that status from the 
moment of death of the initial applicant.
Furthermore, in Case T-227/09 Feng Shen Technology v OHIM – Majtczak (FS) (judgment of 21 March 
2012, not yet published, under appeal), the Court explained that, although the Community trade 
mark system is based on the principle under Article 8(2) of Regulation No 40/94 (21) (now Article 8(2) 
of Regulation No 207/2009) that an exclusive right is granted to the first applicant, that principle 
is not absolute. It is qualified, in particular, by Article 51(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94, under which 
a Community trade mark is to be declared invalid, on application to OHIM or on the basis of a coun-
terclaim in infringement proceedings, where the applicant was acting in bad faith when he filed 
the application for the trade mark, which it is for the applicant for invalidity to establish.
In addition, in Case T-523/10 Interkobo v OHIM – XXXLutz Marken (my baby) (judgment of 27 June 
2012, not yet published), the Court held that, when the information and evidence referred to in 
Rule 19(1) and (2) of Regulation No 2868/95 (22) are in a language other than that of the proceed-
ings, the opposing party must file, at the stage of the opposition and within the period prescribed 
for the production of that information and evidence, a translation of those documents, which must 
meet specific requirements regarding both its form and content. Thus, first, the translation of any 
of the information and evidence referred to in Rule 19(1) and (2) of Regulation No 2868/95 must 
be submitted not in the form of mere annotations in the original document but of one or several 
separate written documents. In the event that that procedural requirement is not met, the above-
mentioned information and evidence submitted by the opposing party cannot be taken into ac-
count in the opposition proceedings. The purpose of that procedural requirement is, first, to ensure 
that the other party to the opposition proceedings, as well as the OHIM bodies, can readily distin-
(20) Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1).
(21) Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1).
(22)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 of 13 December 1995 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 
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guish the original document from its translation and, second, to ensure that the translation is suf-
ficiently clear. Second, it is apparent from Rule 98(1) of Regulation No 2868/95 that the translation, 
presented in the form of a separate written document, must faithfully reproduce the contents of 
the original document. In case of doubt as to the faithfulness of the translation, the OHIM bodies 
are entitled to require from the interested party the production of a certificate attesting that the 
translation corresponds to the original text.
Case T-279/09 Aiello v OHIM – Cantoni ITC (100% Capri) (judgment of 12 July 2012, not yet published) 
provided the Court with the opportunity to explain the conditions governing notification to the 
applicant for a trade mark of the opposing party’s pleading before the Board of Appeal. The Court 
pointed out that, under Rule 67(1) of Regulation No 2868/95, if a representative has been appointed 
or where the applicant first named in a common application is considered to be the common rep-
resentative, notifications are to be addressed to that appointed or common representative. There-
fore, OHIM cannot rely on the alleged notification of the opposing party’s pleading to the applicant 
himself in order to justify the failure to notify the applicant’s representative.
Nor, according to the Court, can it be inferred from Rule 77 of Regulation No 2868/95, under which 
any notification addressed to a representative is to have the same effect as if it had been addressed 
to the represented person, that notification to the represented person is the same as notification to 
the representative, since, if that were the case, Rule 67 of that regulation would serve no purpose.
Last, in Case T-278/10 Wesergold Getränkeindustrie v OHIM – Lidl Stiftung (WESTERN GOLD) (judgment 
of 21 September 2012, not yet published, under appeal), the Court, called upon to examine the 
scope of the examination by one of the Boards of Appeal of OHIM of an appeal against a decision 
of the Opposition Division, recalled that, under Article 64(1) of Regulation No 207/2009, following 
the examination as to the merits of the appeal the Board of Appeal is to decide on that appeal 
and, in doing so, it may ‘exercise any power within the competence of the department which was 
responsible for the contested decision’, that is to say, it may make a ruling itself on the opposition 
either by rejecting it or by declaring it to be well founded, thereby either upholding or revers-
ing the contested decision. Thus, the absence in the defence submitted to the Board of Appeal 
of any specific invocation of distinctive character enhanced by use does not affect the obligation 
incumbent on the Board of Appeal, where it decides on the opposition itself, to carry out a new, 
comprehensive examination of the merits of the opposition, in terms of both law and of fact. The 
extent of the examination which the Board of Appeal must undertake in relation to the decision 
under appeal is not, in principle, delimited by the pleas relied on by the party who has brought the 
appeal. A fortiori, the extent of the examination which the Board of Appeal must undertake is not 
limited by the lack of precision of certain pleas raised before it.
(d)  Proof of genuine use
In BIODANZA, first, the Court held that the assessment of the genuine use of a trade mark must, in 
particular, take account of the nature of the goods or services to which the mark applies and also 
of the uses considered to be justified in the economic sector concerned. In that regard, the require-
ment that genuine use of a trade mark cannot be proved by probabilities or presumptions, but 
must be demonstrated by solid and objective evidence, is also applicable in the case of trade marks 
for services. In that case, the evidence required must be compatible with the nature of the services 
covered by the trade mark. Second, the Court observed that neither Article 42 nor any other provi-
sion of Regulation No 207/2009 expressly provides that the application seeking proof of genuine 
use is to be refused in the event of bad faith on the part of the party making the application. Nor 
can such a rule be implied from the applicable provisions. To make absence of bad faith on the part 
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would needlessly complicate the procedure and would, ultimately, be contrary to the ratio legis of 
the provisions relating to it.
In Case T-170/11 Rivella International v OHIM – Baskaya di Baskaya Alim (BASKAYA) (judgment of 
12 July 2012, not yet published, under appeal), the Court held, with respect to the determination of 
the territory on which genuine use of the earlier mark must be established, that questions relating 
to the proof furnished in support of the grounds for opposition to an application for registration 
of a Community trade mark and questions relating to the territorial aspect of the use of marks are 
governed by the relevant provisions of Regulation No 207/2009 and that it is not necessary to refer 
to any provision of domestic law of the Member States. The fact that earlier national or interna-
tional marks may be cited in opposition against the registration of Community trade marks does 
not imply that the national law applicable to the earlier mark cited in opposition is the relevant law 
as regards Community opposition proceedings. It is true that, in the absence of relevant provisions 
in Regulation No 207/2009 or, where appropriate, in Directive 2008/95/EC, (23) national law serves 
as a point of reference. Whilst that is true as regards the date of registration of an earlier mark 
cited in Community opposition proceedings, the same does not apply, however, as regards the 
determination of the territory in which use of the earlier mark must be established. That question is 
exhaustively governed by Regulation No 207/2009 and it is not necessary to refer to national law. It 
follows that genuine use of an earlier mark, be it a Community, national or international mark, must 
be proved in the European Union or in the Member State concerned.
2. Designs
Joined Cases T-83/11 and T-84/11 Antrax It v OHIM – THC (Heating radiators) (judgment of 13 No-
vember 2012, not yet published) provided the Court with the opportunity to clarify the criteria for 
the determination of the degree of freedom of the designer in the context of the assessment of 
the individuality of the design. The Court observed that such a degree of freedom is established, 
inter alia, by the constraints of the features imposed by the technical function of the product or an 
element thereof, or by statutory requirements applicable to the product to which the design is ap-
plied. Those constraints result in a standardisation of certain features, which will thus be common 
to the designs applied to the product concerned. Accordingly, the greater the designer’s freedom 
in developing the design, the less likely it is that minor differences between the designs being 
compared will suffice to produce a different overall impression on an informed user. Conversely, 
the more the designer’s freedom in developing the design is restricted, the more likely it is that 
minor differences between the designs being compared will suffice to produce a different overall 
impression on an informed user. Thus, if a designer enjoys a high degree of freedom in developing 
a design, that reinforces the conclusion that the designs being compared which do not have sig-
nificant differences produce the same overall impression on an informed user. In that context, any 
saturation of the state of the art, deriving from the existence of other designs which have the same 
overall features as the designs concerned, is relevant, in that it may be liable to make the informed 
user more aware of the differences in the internal proportions of those different designs.
3.  Plant variety rights
In Joined Cases T-133/08, T-134/08, T-177/08 and T-242/09 Schräder v CPVO – Hansson (LEMON SYM-
PHONY and SUMOST 01) (judgment of 18 September 2012, not yet published, under appeal), the 
Court ruled on the consequences of the finding of a well-known fact by the Community Plant 
(23) Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the 
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Variety Office (CPVO). Recalling that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, in Commu-
nity trade mark proceedings OHIM bodies are not required to prove, in their decisions, the accuracy 
of well-known facts, the Court considered that that principle must apply to the bodies of the CPVO. 
Observing, moreover, that it also follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice in that area that 
the finding, by the General Court, as to whether the facts on which the Board of Appeal of OHIM 
has based its decision are well known or not is a factual assessment which, save where the facts 
or evidence are distorted, is not subject to review by the Court of Justice on appeal, the General 
Court took the view that it was appropriate to transpose that solution to the judicial review which 
it exercises over the decisions of the bodies of the CPVO.
Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures
The year 2012 confirmed the important place which disputes relating to restrictive measures occu-
py among the various fields of litigation in respect of which the Court has jurisdiction, with 42 cases 
brought to a close and 60 cases brought.
Particularly deserving of mention are Joined Cases T-439/10 and T-440/10 Fulmen and Mahmoudian 
v Council (judgment of 21 March 2012, not yet published, under appeal), in which the Court was 
called upon to examine the lawfulness of the restrictive measures imposed on an Iranian company, 
active in particular in the electrical equipment sector, and on the chairman of its board of directors. 
These measures, adopted in the context of the restrictive measures adopted against the Islamic 
Republic of Iran in order to prevent nuclear proliferation, were based on that company’s alleged 
participation in the installation of electrical equipment on the Qom/Fordoo site (Iran) at a time 
when the existence of that site had not yet been revealed. The applicants denied such participation 
and maintained that the Council had not adduced evidence of its claims on that point. The Council 
submitted that it could not be expected to adduce such evidence, as review by the Courts of the 
European Union must be limited to determining that the reasons relied on to justify the adoption 
of the restrictive measures were ‘probable’, which they were in this instance, given that Fulmen was 
a company which had long been active on the Iranian electrical equipment market.
The Court rejected that line of argument. It stated that judicial review of the lawfulness of a meas-
ure whereby restrictive measures have been imposed on an entity extends to the assessment of 
the facts and circumstances relied on as justifying it, and to the evidence and information on which 
that assessment is based. In the event of challenge, it is for the Council to present that evidence 
for review by the Courts of the European Union. Thus, the review of lawfulness which must be 
carried out is not limited to an appraisal of the abstract ‘probability’ of the grounds relied on, but 
must include the question whether those grounds are supported, to the requisite legal standard, 
by concrete evidence and information. The Court observed that, although the restrictive measures 
at issue had been adopted on the proposal of a Member State, in accordance with the procedure 
laid down in Article 23(2) of Decision 2010/413/CFSP, (24) that circumstance in no way detracted from 
the fact that the contested measures were measures taken by the Council, which therefore had to 
ensure that their adoption was justified, if necessary by requesting the Member State concerned to 
submit to it the evidence and information required for that purpose. Nor could the Council rely on 
a claim that the evidence concerned came from confidential sources. Taking into consideration the 
essential role of judicial review in the context of the adoption of restrictive measures, the Courts of 
the European Union must be able to review the lawfulness and merits of such measures without it 
being possible to raise objections that the evidence and information used by the Council are secret 
(24) Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP of 26 July 2010 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing 
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or confidential. Furthermore, the Council is not entitled to base an act adopting restrictive meas-
ures on information or evidence in the file communicated by a Member State if that Member State 
is not willing to authorise its communication to the Courts of the European Union whose task is to 
review the lawfulness of that decision.
Access to documents of the institutions
1.  Obligation for the institutions to undertake a concrete, individual examination of 
the documents covered by the request
Case T-344/08 EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg v Commission (judgment of 22 May 2012, not yet 
published, under appeal) concerned the Commission’s refusal to provide access to the admin-
istrative file in a cartel procedure, on the basis of various exceptions provided for in Regulation 
(EC) No 1049/2001, (25) without undertaking a concrete, individual examination of the documents 
concerned.
In the context of an action against that decision refusing access, the Court held that, although, 
where there has been a request for access to documents, it is open to the institution concerned 
to base its decision refusing access on general presumptions which apply to certain categories of 
document and which may be based on a document-access system specific to a particular proced-
ure, the fact remains that such systems, whether in the matter of State aid or cartels, are applica-
ble only for the duration of the procedure in question and not where the institution has already 
adopted a final decision closing the file to which access is sought. Furthermore, while account must 
be taken of any restrictions on access to the file that may obtain in particular procedures, such as 
cartel procedures, the fact that such matters are taken into account does not give grounds for as-
suming that, if the Commission’s ability to proceed against cartels is not to be undermined, all the 
documents held in its files in that domain are automatically covered by one of the exceptions laid 
down in Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001.
The Court also stated that a single justification for refusing such access may be applied to docu-
ments belonging to the same category, especially if they contain the same type of information. In 
such circumstances, justifying non-disclosure by groups of documents facilitates or simplifies the 
Commission’s task when it examines the request and provides reasons for its decision. It follows 
that an examination by categories is lawful only if it plays a useful role in processing a request for 
access, and the document categories must therefore be defined on the basis of criteria that enable 
the Commission to apply a single line of reasoning to all the documents within one category.
2.  Protection of international relations
In Case T-529/09 In ’t Veld v Council (judgment of 4 May 2012, not yet published, under appeal), the 
Court was required to interpret the exception relating to the protection of international relations 
provided for in the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001. In this case, the ap-
plicant, a Member of the European Parliament, had requested access to an opinion of the Council’s 
Legal Service concerning a recommendation from the Commission for the adoption by the Council 
of a decision authorising the opening of negotiations between the European Union and the United 
States of America for an international agreement to make financial messaging data available to the 
United States Treasury Department in the framework of the prevention of terrorism.
(25) Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43).150  Annual Report 2012
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The Court observed, first of all, that a document such as that at issue, relating to the legal basis of 
a decision to be adopted by the Council concerning the opening of negotiations for the signature 
of an international agreement, is capable of being covered, given its content and the context in 
which it has been drawn up, by the third indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001. Since 
such a document has been drawn up specifically for the opening of negotiations which are to lead 
to the conclusion of an international agreement, the analysis carried out by the Legal Service of the 
institution concerned is necessarily linked to the specific context of the envisaged international 
agreement, even though the document deals with the issue of the legal basis, which is an issue of 
internal European Union law. Thus, the disclosure of elements connected with the objectives pur-
sued by the European Union in the negotiations, in that they deal with the specific content of the 
envisaged agreement, would damage the climate of confidence in the negotiations.
Conversely, the Council’s reliance on a weakening of the European Union’s position in the on  going 
negotiations was not appropriate. The Court observed that, since the choice of the legal basis 
rested on objective factors and did not fall within the discretion of the institution, any divergence 
of opinions on that subject could not be equated with a difference of opinion between the institu-
tions as to matters which related to the substance of the agreement. Accordingly, the mere fear of 
disclosing a disagreement within the institutions regarding the legal basis of a decision authorising 
the opening of negotiations on behalf of the European Union is not a sufficient basis for conclud-
ing that the protected public interest in the field of international relations may be undermined.
Also, in Case T-465/09 Jurašinović v Council (judgment of 3 October 2012, not yet published), the 
Court held that the exception relating to the protection of the public interest in international rela-
tions justified the Council’s refusal to give access to the reports of the European Union’s observers 
in Croatia, in the Knin area, between 1 and 31 August 1995. Indeed, the disclosure of those reports 
would have been liable to undermine the objectives pursued by the European Union in the west-
ern Balkans region — namely, to contribute to peace, stability and a lasting regional reconciliation, 
with a view, in particular, to reinforcing, in relation to the European Union, the integration of the 
countries of that region — and, accordingly, liable to undermine international relations. The obser-
vations or evaluations made by the European Community’s surveillance mission on the political, 
military and security situation at a decisive stage of the conflict between the Croatian forces and 
the Yugoslavian federal forces would have been disclosed. The disclosure of those matters was 
liable to give rise to or to increase resentment or tensions between the different communities of 
the countries which had been parties to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia or between the 
countries which had emerged from Yugoslavia, thus weakening the confidence of the States of the 
western Balkans in that process of integration.
3.  Protection of court proceedings and legal advice
The Court explained the scope of the exception relating to the protection of court proceedings in 
Case T-63/10 Jurašinović v Council (judgment of 3 October 2012, not yet published). It stated that 
the interpretation according to which only proceedings before a court of the European Union or 
before a court of one of the Member States may be protected under the exception in the second 
indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 cannot be upheld. No argument derived from 
the wording of Article 4 can lead to the view that the court proceedings referred to in that in-
dent are only those taking place before the Courts of the European Union or those of its Member 
States; that finding is strengthened by an overall reading of Regulation No 1049/2001, which es-
tablishes a link with the European Union or its Member States only for certain aspects of the rules 
which it lays down. It follows, according to the Court, that there is nothing in that regulation to 
prevent court proceedings referred to by the exception provided for in the second indent of Article 
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European Union or the legal orders of its Member States, and that exception can protect, inter alia, 
court proceedings before the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia (‘the ICCY’).
As regards the documents capable of being covered by the exception, the Court pointed out that 
the protection of the public interest precludes the disclosure of the content of documents drawn 
up for the sole purpose of particular court proceedings. Thus, in principle, that protection from any 
disclosure may apply to documents exchanged between, on the one hand, the prosecutor of the 
ICCY or the First Chamber of First Instance of the ICCY and, on the other hand, the European Union 
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the context of proceedings be-
fore that court, where the documents relate to an aspect of the organisation of a criminal trial and 
reveal the way in which the judicial bodies of the ICCY decided to conduct the procedure as well 
as the reactions of the defence and a third party to the measures taken by those bodies in order to 
obtain the evidence necessary for the proper conduct of the trial. That is not the case, conversely, 
for reports of the European Union observers in Croatia between 1 and 31 August 1995, exchanged 
between the European Union institutions and the ICCY, which were drawn up more than 10 years 
before the beginning of the trial and cannot be regarded as having been drawn up for the sole 
purposes of court proceedings.
As regards the exception relating to the protection of legal advice, in In ’t Veld v Council the Court 
held that the Council could not rely, with respect to the exception provided for in the second in-
dent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, on the general consideration that a threat to a pro-
tected public interest might be presumed in a sensitive area, in particular in the case of legal advice 
given during the negotiation procedure for an international agreement. Nor could a specific and 
foreseeable threat to the interest in question be established by a mere fear of disclosure to citizens 
of differences of opinion between the European Union institutions regarding the legal basis for the 
international activity of the European Union and, thus, of creating doubts as to the lawfulness of 
that activity, with the result that the Council had been unable to show that the public interest relat-
ing to the protection of legal advice might be undermined.
The Court considered, moreover, that there was in any event an overriding public interest justifying 
disclosure of the document at issue, since disclosure would have helped to confer greater legitima-
cy on the institutions and would have increased European citizens’ confidence in those institutions 
by making it possible to have an open debate on the points where there was a divergence of opin-
ion. Those considerations would have been all the more relevant because the document examined 
the legal basis of an agreement which, once concluded, would have an impact on the fundamental 
right to the protection of personal data.
4.  Protection of the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits
In EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg v Commission, the Court recalled that the exception relating 
to the protection of the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits provided for in the third 
indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 is not intended to protect investigations as such, 
but rather their purpose, which, in the case of competition proceedings, is to determine whether 
an infringement of Article [101 TFEU] has taken place and to penalise the companies responsible if 
that be the case. While the documents relating to the various acts of investigation may remain cov-
ered by the exception in question so long as that goal has not been attained, even if the particular 
investigation or inspection which gave rise to the document to which access is sought has been 
completed, the investigation in a given case must be regarded as closed once the final decision has 
been adopted, regardless of whether that decision might subsequently be annulled by the courts, 
because it is at that moment that the institution in question itself considered the proceedings to 
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by the exception provided for in the third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 until all 
the possible consequences of the proceedings in question have been decided — even in the case 
where an action which may lead to a re-opening of the proceedings before the Commission has 
been brought before the Court — would make access to those documents dependent on uncer-
tain events, namely the outcome of that action and the conclusions which the Commission might 
draw from it. In any event, they are uncertain and future events which depend on decisions of the 
addressees of the decision censuring a cartel and of the various authorities concerned.
Environment
In Case T-396/09 Vereniging Milieudefensie and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht v Commis-
sion (judgment of 14 June 2012, not yet published, under appeal), the Court was led to rule on the 
effects of the Aarhus Convention (26) in the European Union legal order, and also on the relationship 
between that Convention and Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006. (27) The case arose from a Commission 
decision rejecting as inadmissible a request submitted by the applicants, two non-governmen-
tal organisations having as their object the protection of the environment, that the Commission 
should review an earlier decision granting the Kingdom of the Netherlands a temporary exemption 
from the obligations laid down in Directive 2008/50/EC. (28) That refusal was based on the fact that, 
as the earlier decision was not a measure of individual scope, the request for review did not relate 
to an administrative act within the meaning of Article 10(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006 and was 
therefore inadmissible. In their action, the applicants maintained, in particular, that that provision 
was contrary to the Aarhus Convention, in that it limited the concept of ‘acts’ in Article 9(3) of that 
Convention to ‘administrative acts’, which are defined in Article 2(1)(g) of Regulation No 1367/2006 
as ‘measure[s] of individual scope’.
Observing that the European Union institutions are bound by the Aarhus Convention, which 
prevails over secondary Community legislation, the Court held that the validity of Regulation 
No 1367/2006, concerning the application to the institutions and bodies of the Community of the 
provisions of that Convention, may be affected by the fact that it is incompatible with that Conven-
tion. Where the Community has intended to implement a particular obligation assumed under an 
international agreement, or where the measure makes an express renvoi to particular provisions 
of that agreement, it is for the Courts of the European Union to review the legality of the measure 
in question in the light of the rules laid down in that agreement. Thus, the Courts of the European 
Union must be able to review the legality of a regulation in the light of an international treaty with-
out first having to determine whether the nature and the broad logic of the international treaty 
preclude such review and whether the provisions of that treaty appear, as regards their content, 
to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, where the regulation is intended to implement an 
obligation imposed on the European Union institutions by the international treaty. Taking the view 
that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention cannot be interpreted as referring only to measures of 
individual scope, the Court held that, in so far as it limits the concept of acts amenable to challenge 
set out in that article to administrative acts defined as measures of individual scope, Article 10(1) of 
(26)  Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environ-
mental Matters, signed at Aarhus on 25 June 1998.
(27)  Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the applica-
tion of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (OJ 2006 L 264, p. 13).
(28)  Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and 
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Regulation No 1367/2006 must be considered to be incompatible with that provision of the Aarhus 
Convention.
II. Appeals
In 2012, 10 appeals were brought against decisions of the Civil Service Tribunal and 32 cases were 
brought to a close by the Appeal Chamber of the Court; of these, Case T-37/10 P De Nicola v EIB 
(judgment of 27 April 2012, not yet published) is particularly noteworthy.
In De Nicola v EIB the Court held that the possibility — conferred on the Appeals Committee of the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) by point 6 of the Decision of 27 June 2006 on the rules of proce-
dure before that committee — of invalidating ‘any statement in the assessment form’ implies that 
that committee is empowered to re-appraise the merits of each of those statements before finding 
fault with it. The scope of that power thus clearly exceeds the power solely to review legality and 
to annul the operative part of a measure, since it encompasses the possibility of invalidating even 
the grounds on which the operative part was adopted. The Court added that, even considering 
that, when examining a complaint under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations of the European 
Union (‘the Staff Regulations’), the appointing authority does not conduct an unlimited review of 
the decision of the assessor, the fact remains that that provision does not provide for review criteria 
comparable to and as precise as those laid down in point 6 of the decision of 27 June 2006, or the 
possibility of holding a hearing or hearing witnesses. The internal rules of the EIB are therefore not 
incomplete in that respect, which precludes the application by analogy of the rules governing the 
complaints procedure established by Article 90 of the Staff Regulations.
Thus, the renunciation by the Appeal Committee of such unlimited review is tantamount to de-
priving the person concerned of a review body provided for in the internal rules of the EIB and 
therefore adversely affects that person, so that that renunciation is amenable to review by the tri-
bunal of first instance. In the light of the power of unlimited review conferred on the Appeals Com-
mittee under point 6 of the Decision of 27 June 2006 with respect to the assessments contained 
and the marks awarded in the impugned report, it is essential for the tribunal of first instance to 
ascertain, admittedly within the framework of its limited power of review, whether and to what 
extent that committee discharged that duty of unlimited review in accordance with the applicable 
rules. Last, the Court held that the particular nature of Article 41 of the Staff Regulations of the EIB, 
which provides for an optional conciliation procedure, unlike the mandatory pre-litigation proce-
dure provided for in Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations, precludes a simple transposition of 
the pre-litigation system laid down in the Staff Regulations, as Article 41 constitutes, in principle, 
a complete internal system of rules for the EIB, the nature and rationale of which are very different 
from those of the Staff Regulations. The very existence of those internal rules prohibits, except in 
the case of a manifest lacuna contrary to higher rules of law which must necessarily be made good, 
the drawing of analogies with the Staff Regulations.
III.  Applications for interim measures
In the past year 21 applications for interim measures were made to the President of the Gen-
eral Court, a significant reduction by comparison with the number of applications (44) made in 
2011. In 2012, the judge hearing such applications disposed of 23 cases, as against 52 in 2011. The 
President of the Court granted four applications: in Case T-52/12 R Greece v Commission (order of 
19 September 2012, not yet published), concerning State aid; and in Case T-341/12 R Evonik Degussa 
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v Commission (order of 16 November 2012, not yet published), and Case T-164/12 R Alstom v Com-
mission (order of 29 November 2012, not yet published), all relating to the problem of disclosure by 
the Commission of allegedly confidential information.
Greece v Commission concerned a decision of 7 December 2011 whereby the Commission had clas-
sified as State aid incompatible with the internal market a total amount of EUR 425 million paid 
by the Greek authorities to the Greek agricultural sector to make good damage attributable to 
adverse weather conditions, and had ordered those authorities to recover the sums paid from the 
beneficiaries. The Hellenic Republic brought an action for annulment and submitted an application 
for suspension of operation of that decision.
In his order, the President of the Court considered that the case raised the question whether, in 
the particular circumstances that had marked the economic and financial situation in Greece since 
2008, the financial impact of the payments at issue was genuinely such as to affect trade between 
Member States and to threaten to distort competition for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU. In-
deed, the sum of EUR 425 million identified by the Commission had to be reduced considerably, 
since numerous beneficiaries of the payments at issue had received de minimis aid so that they 
were exempt from the obligation to repay aid, and those payments had been partly financed by 
contributions from the Greek farmers (that is to say, the beneficiaries) themselves. A further ques-
tion was whether the contested decision had to be considered excessive in that it required recov-
ery of aid on 7 December 2011, although the extremely difficult state of the Greek agricultural sec-
tor had deteriorated further since the aid was granted. The President of the Court considered that 
the answers to those questions were not immediately obvious and called for detailed examination 
in the context of the main proceedings, so that they appeared, at first sight, sufficiently serious to 
constitute a prima facie case.
As regards the condition relating to urgency, the President of the Court recalled that Member 
States may seek the grant of interim measures by asserting that the contested measure could 
seriously jeopardise performance of their State tasks and public order. The Hellenic Republic was 
therefore not prevented from submitting that forced immediate recovery of the sums at issue by 
the tax authorities’ staff from several hundreds of thousands of farmers would have entailed ad-
ministrative difficulties liable to cause it serious and irreparable harm. Indeed, the Hellenic Republic 
legitimately intended to concentrate its resources on the establishment of effective tax authorities 
that would be capable of identifying and pursuing the ‘big tax avoiders’ and combating tax fraud, 
the volume of which, in terms of loss of revenue, came to EUR 20 billion. As forced recovery would 
have required massive intervention on the part of the Greek tax authorities’ staff, such forcible 
large-scale collection of the sums in question would have prevented those authorities from de-
voting themselves to their priority, namely combating tax avoidance and collecting sums eluding 
tax that were nearly 50 times greater than the contested payments. Furthermore, a deterioration 
of confidence in the public authorities, generalised discontent and a feeling of injustice were fea-
tures of the social climate in Greece. In particular, violent demonstrations against the draconian 
austerity measures adopted by the Greek public authorities were constantly increasing. In those 
circumstances, the risk that immediate recovery of the payments at issue in the agricultural sector 
might trigger demonstrations liable to degenerate into violence appeared to be neither purely 
hypothetical nor theoretical or uncertain. The perturbation of public order that would be brought 
about by such demonstrations and by the excesses to which, as recent dramatic events had shown, 
they might give rise would have caused serious and irreparable harm which the Hellenic Republic 
could legitimately invoke.
Last, when weighing up the various interests involved, the President of the Court accorded priority 
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preventing social unrest and, second, being able to concentrate the capacities of its tax authorities 
on the tasks which it regarded as paramount for the country, whereas the grant of suspension of 
operation exposed the European Union’s interests solely to the risk of postponement of the nation-
al measures for recovery to a later date and there was no evidence that that postponement would 
in itself have prejudiced the chances of success of those measures. Consequently, the operation of 
the contested decision, in so far as it obliged the Hellenic Republic to recover the sums paid from 
the beneficiaries, was suspended pending the outcome of the main proceedings.
The applications in Evonik Degussa v Commission and Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission were 
lodged by undertakings which had participated in a cartel and whose anti-competitive conduct 
had in 2006 formed the subject-matter of a Commission decision pursuant to Article 81 EC. Having 
acknowledged the infringement and produced evidence relating to its existence, pursuant to the 
2002 Leniency Notice, one of the applicant undertakings had been granted total immunity and the 
others a reduction in the fines which would otherwise have been imposed on them. After taking 
into consideration requests for confidential treatment submitted by the applicants, the Commis-
sion had, in September 2007, published a full-text non-confidential version of the 2006 decision on 
its website. In November 2011 the Commission informed the applicants of its intention to publish 
a fuller version of the 2006 decision. Taking the view that that version contained information which 
they had provided on the basis of the 2002 Leniency Notice and which had not been published in 
September 2007 for reasons of confidentiality, the applicants objected to the Commission’s pro-
posal, on the ground that it would have caused considerable and irreversible harm to their interests 
and would have breached the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expec-
tations. By decision of 24 May 2012 the Commission rejected the applicants’ claim for confidential 
treatment. In their applications for interim measures against that decision, the applicants claimed 
that the President of the Court should suspend the operation of the contested decision and order 
the Commission to refrain from publishing a non-confidential version. In his orders, the President 
of the Court granted the interim measures sought.
As regards the weighing-up of the various interests involved, the President of the Court observed 
that the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is limited to guaranteeing the full effectiveness 
of the future decision on the main action and that that procedure is merely ancillary to the main ac-
tion to which it is an adjunct, so that the decision made by the judge hearing an application for in-
terim measures is by nature interim in the sense that it must not either prejudge the future decision 
on the substance of the case or render it illusory by depriving it of effectiveness. In this instance, 
the Court would be called upon to rule, in the main action, on whether the decision whereby the 
Commission had rejected the claim that it should refrain from publishing the disputed information 
had to be annulled because of an infringement of the obligation of professional secrecy protected 
in Article 339 TFEU and because of the disregard of the confidentiality of the information which the 
applicants had submitted to the Commission in order to have the benefit of the 2002 Leniency No-
tice. In order to protect the effectiveness of a judgment annulling that decision, the applicants had 
to be able to ensure that the Commission would not publish the disputed information. A judgment 
ordering annulment would have been rendered illusory and would have been deprived of effect-
iveness if the application for interim measures had been dismissed, since the consequence of that 
dismissal would have been that the Commission was free immediately to publish the information 
at issue and therefore de facto to prejudge the future decision in the main action, namely dismissal 
of the action for annulment. Consequently, the interest defended by the applicants had to prevail 
over the Commission’s interest in the dismissal of the application for interim measures, a fortiori as 
the grant of the interim measures would amount to no more than maintaining, for a limited period, 
the status quo which had existed for several years (since September 2007).156  Annual Report 2012
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As regards urgency, the President of the Court considered that the applicants were likely to suf-
fer serious and irreparable harm in the event of their application for interim measures being dis-
missed. If it should be established, in the main proceedings, that the publication envisaged by the 
Commission concerned confidential information the disclosure of which was incompatible with 
the protection of professional secrecy under Article 339 TFEU, the applicants could rely on that 
provision, which bestows on them a fundamental right, in order to object to that publication. If 
the application for interim measures had been dismissed, there would have been a risk that the 
applicants’ fundamental right to the protection of professional secrecy would irreversibly have lost 
any meaning in relation to that information. Likewise, it was likely that the applicants’ fundamental 
right to an effective remedy, enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, would 
have been jeopardised if the Commission had been allowed to publish the information at issue 
before the Court had ruled on the main action.
As for the condition relating to a prima facie case, the President of the Court observed that the 
case raised complex questions, requiring a thorough examination within the main proceedings, 
concerning problems connected with the confidentiality to be granted to leniency applications. It 
would be important to ascertain whether the applicants, in March 2003, when they voluntarily sent 
the information at issue to the Commission in connection with the Leniency Notice, could rely — in 
particular by reference to the position taken by the Commission at that time — on the fact that that 
information would, as information which was essentially confidential, enjoy an enduring protection 
against publication. The President of the Court thus held that there was a prima facie case. Since all 
the requisite conditions were satisfied, the application for interim measures prohibiting the Com-
mission from publishing the disputed information was granted. (29)
(29)  Similar reasoning was followed in the order in Alstom v Commission, although in that case the decision suspen-
sion of enforcement of which was ordered was the Commission’s decision to grant the request of the High Court 
of Justice of England and Wales to obtain, in the context of an action for damages against Alstom, the allegedly 
confidential data submitted by Alstom in response to the statement of objections when the Commission had 
initiated a competition procedure.Annual Report 2012  157
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B — Composition of the General Court
(order of precedence as at 8 October 2012)
First row, from left to right:
L. Truchot, President of Chamber; S. Papasavvas, President of Chamber; O. Czúcz, President of 
Chamber; J. Azizi, President of Chamber; M. Jaeger, President of the Court; N.J. Forwood, President 
of Chamber; I. Pelikánová, President of Chamber; A. Dittrich, President of Chamber; H. Kanninen, 
President of Chamber.
Second row, from left to right:
S. Frimodt Nielsen, Judge; M. Prek, Judge; I. Labucka, Judge; V. Vadapalas, Judge; F. Dehousse, 
Judge; M.E. Martins Ribeiro, Judge; I. Wiszniewska-Białecka, Judge; K. Jürimäe, Judge; N. Wahl, 
Judge; S. Soldevila Fragoso, Judge.
Third row, from left to right:
E. Buttigieg, Judge; M. Kancheva, Judge; D. Gratsias, Judge; J. Schwarcz, Judge; K. O’Higgins, Judge; 
M. Van der Woude, Judge; A. Popescu, Judge; G. Berardis, Judge; E. Coulon, Registrar.Annual Report 2012  159
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1.  Members of the General Court
(in order of their entry into office)
Marc Jaeger 
Born 1954; law degree from the Robert Schuman University of Stras-
bourg; studied at the College of Europe; admitted to the Luxembourg 
Bar (1981); attaché de justice delegated to the office of the Public At-
torney of Luxembourg (1983); Judge at the Luxembourg District Court 
(1984); Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities (1986–96); President of the Institut Universitaire International 
Luxembourg (IUIL); Judge at the General Court since 11 July 1996; Presi-
dent of the General Court since 17 September 2007.
Josef Azizi
Born 1948; Doctor of Laws and Master of Sociology and Economics of 
the University of Vienna; Lecturer and Senior Lecturer at the Vienna 
School of Economics, the Faculty of Law of the University of Vienna and 
various other universities; Honorary Professor at the Faculty of Law of 
the University of Vienna; Ministerialrat and Head of Department at the 
Federal Chancellery; member of the Steering Committee on Legal Co-
operation of the Council of Europe (CDCJ); representative ad litem be-
fore the Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court) in proceedings 
for review of the constitutionality of federal laws; Coordinator respon-
sible for the adaptation of Austrian federal law to Community law; 
Judge at the General Court since 18 January 1995.
Nicholas James Forwood 
Born 1948; Cambridge University BA 1969, MA 1973 (Mechanical Sci-
ences and Law); called to the English Bar in 1970, thereafter practising 
in London (1971–99) and also in Brussels (1979–99); called to the Irish 
Bar in 1981; appointed Queen’s Counsel 1987; Bencher of the Middle 
Temple 1998; representative of the Bar of England and Wales at the 
Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the EU (CCBE) and Chairman 
of the CCBE’s Permanent Delegation to the European Court of Justice 
(1995–99); governing board member of the World Trade Law Associa-
tion and European Maritime Law Organisation (1993–2002); Judge at 
the General Court since 15 December 1999.160  Annual Report 2012
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Maria Eugénia Martins de Nazaré Ribeiro
Born 1956; studied in Lisbon, Brussels and Strasbourg; member of the Bar 
in Portugal and Brussels; independent researcher at the Institut d’études 
européennes de l’Université libre de Bruxelles (Institute for European 
Studies, Free University of Brussels); Legal Secretary to the Portuguese 
Judge at the Court of Justice, Mr Moitinho de Almeida (1986–2000), then 
to the President of the Court of First Instance, Mr Vesterdorf (2000–03); 
Judge at the General Court since 31 March 2003.
Franklin Dehousse
Born 1959; law degree (University of Liège, 1981); Research Fellow 
(Fonds national de la recherche scientifique, 1985–89); Legal Adviser to 
the Chamber of Representatives (1981–90); Doctor of Laws (University 
of Strasbourg, 1990); Professor (Universities of Liège and Strasbourg; 
College of Europe; Institut royal supérieur de Défense; Université Mon-
tesquieu, Bordeaux; Collège Michel Servet of the Universities of Paris; 
Faculties of Notre-Dame de la Paix, Namur); Special Representative of 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs (1995–99); Director of European Studies 
of the Royal Institute of International Relations (1998–2003); assesseur at 
the Council of State (2001–03); consultant to the European Commission 
(1990–2003); member of the Internet Observatory (2001–03); Judge at 
the General Court since 7 October 2003.
Ena Cremona
Born 1936; Bachelor’s degree (BA) in languages, Royal University of Mal-
ta (1955); Doctor of Laws (LLD) of the Royal University of Malta (1958); 
practising at the Malta Bar from 1959; Legal Adviser to the National 
Council of Women (1964–79); member of the Public Service Commis-
sion (1987–89); board member at Lombard Bank (Malta) Ltd, represent-
ing the government shareholding (1987–93); member of the Electoral 
Commission since 1993; examiner for doctoral theses in the Faculty of 
Laws of the Royal University of Malta; Member of the European Com-
mission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) (2003–04); Judge at the 
General Court from 12 May 2004 to 22 March 2012.Annual Report 2012  161
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Ottó Czúcz
Born 1946; Doctor of Laws of the University of Szeged (1971); Adminis-
trator at the Ministry of Labour (1971–74); Lecturer (1974–89), Dean of 
the Faculty of Law (1989–90), Vice-Rector (1992–97) at the University of 
Szeged; lawyer; member of the Presidium of the National Retirement 
Insurance Scheme; Vice-President of the European Institute of Social 
Security (1998–2002); member of the Scientific Council of the Interna-
tional Social Security Association; Judge at the Constitutional Court 
(1998–2004); Judge at the General Court since 12 May 2004.
Irena Wiszniewska-Białecka
Born 1947; Magister Juris, University of Warsaw (1965–69); Researcher 
(Assistant Lecturer, Associate Professor, Professor) at the Institute of 
Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences (1969–2004); Assistant 
Researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International 
Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, Munich (award from the Alex-
ander von Humboldt Foundation, 1985–86); lawyer (1992–2000); Judge 
at the Supreme Administrative Court (2001–04); Judge at the General 
Court since 12 May 2004.
Irena Pelikánová
Born 1949; Doctor of Laws, assistant in economic law (before 1989), 
Dr Sc., Professor of Business Law (since 1993) at the Faculty of Law, 
Charles University, Prague; member of the Executive of the Securities 
Commission (1999–2002); lawyer; member of the Legislative Council 
of the Government of the Czech Republic (1998–2004); Judge at the 
General Court since 12 May 2004.162  Annual Report 2012
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Vilenas Vadapalas
Born 1954; Doctor of Laws (University of Moscow); Doctor habil. in Law 
(University of Warsaw); taught, at the University of Vilnius, internation-
al law (from 1981), human rights law (from 1991) and Community law 
(from 2000); Adviser to the Lithuanian Government on foreign relations 
(1991–93); member of the coordinating group of the delegation negoti-
ating accession to the European Union; Director-General of the Govern-
ment’s European Law Department (1997–2004); Professor of European 
Law at the University of Vilnius, holder of the Jean Monnet Chair; Presi-
dent of the Lithuanian European Union Studies Association; Rappor-
teur of the parliamentary working group on constitutional reform relat-
ing to Lithuanian accession; member of the International Commission 
of Jurists (April 2003); Judge at the General Court since 12 May 2004.
Küllike Jürimäe
Born 1962; law degree, University of Tartu (1981–86); Assistant to the 
Public Prosecutor, Tallinn (1986–91); Diploma, Estonian School of Dip-
lomacy (1991–92); Legal Adviser (1991–93) and General Counsel at the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1992–93); Judge, Tallinn Court of 
Appeal (1993–2004); European Masters in Human Rights and Democra-
tisation, Universities of Padua and Nottingham (2002–03); Judge at the 
General Court since 12 May 2004.
Ingrida Labucka
Born 1963; Diploma in Law, University of Latvia (1986); Investigator at 
the Interior Ministry for the Kirov Region and the City of Riga (1986–89); 
Judge, Riga District Court (1990–94); lawyer (1994–98 and July 1999 to 
May 2000); Minister for Justice (November 1998 to July 1999 and May 
2000 to October 2002); member of the International Court of Arbitra-
tion in The Hague (2001–04); Member of Parliament (2002–04); Judge 
at the General Court since 12 May 2004.Annual Report 2012  163
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Savvas S. Papasavvas
Born 1969; studies at the University of Athens (graduated in 1991); 
DEA (diploma of advanced studies) in public law, University of Paris II 
(1992), and PhD in law, University of Aix-Marseille III (1995); admitted 
to the Cyprus Bar, member of the Nicosia Bar since 1993; Lecturer, 
University of Cyprus (1997–2002), Lecturer in Constitutional Law 
since September 2002; Researcher, European Public Law Centre 
(2001–02); Judge at the General Court since 12 May 2004.
Nils Wahl
Born 1961; Master of Laws, University of Stockholm (1987); Doctor of 
Laws, University of Stockholm (1995); Associate Professor (docent) and 
holder of the Jean Monnet Chair of European Law (1995); Professor of 
European Law, University of Stockholm (2001); assistant lawyer in pri-
vate practice (1987–89); Managing Director of an educational founda-
tion (1993–2004); Chairman of the Nätverket för europarättslig forskn-
ing (Swedish Network for European Legal Research) (2001–06); member 
of the Rådet för konkurrensfrågor (Council for Competition Law Mat-
ters) (2001–06); Assigned Judge at the Hovrätten över Skåne och Ble-
kinge (Court of Appeal for Skåne and Blekinge) (2005); Judge at the 
General Court from 7 October 2006 to 28 November 2012.
Miro Prek
Born 1965; law degree (1989); called to the Bar (1994); performed vari-
ous tasks and functions in public authorities, principally in the Govern-
ment Office for Legislation (Under-Secretary of State and Deputy Dir-
ector, Head of Department for European and Comparative Law) and 
in the Office for European Affairs (Under-Secretary of State); member 
of the negotiating team for the association agreement (1994–96) and 
for accession to the European Union (1998–2003), responsible for 
legal affairs; lawyer; responsible for projects regarding adaptation to 
European legislation, and to achieve European integration, principally 
in the western Balkans; Head of Division at the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (2004–06); Judge at the General Court since 
7 October 2006.164  Annual Report 2012
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Alfred Dittrich
Born 1950; studied law at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg 
(1970–75); articled law clerk in the Nuremberg Higher Regional Court 
district (1975–78); Adviser at the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(1978–82); Counsellor at the Permanent Representation of the Federal 
Republic of Germany to the European Communities (1982); Adviser at 
the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs, responsible for Community 
law and competition issues (1983–92); Head of the EU Law Section at 
the Federal Ministry of Justice (1992–2007); Head of the German dele-
gation on the Council Working Party on the Court of Justice; Agent of 
the Federal Government in a large number of cases before the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities; Judge at the General Court since 
17 September 2007.
Santiago Soldevila Fragoso
Born 1960; graduated in law from the Autonomous University of Barce-
lona (1983); Judge (1985); from 1992 Judge specialising in contentious 
administrative proceedings, assigned to the High Court of Justice of 
the Canary Islands at Santa Cruz de Tenerife (1992 and 1993), and to the 
National High Court (Madrid, from May 1998 to August 2007), where he 
decided judicial proceedings in the field of tax (VAT), actions brought 
against general legislative provisions of the Ministry of the Economy 
and against its decisions on State aid or the government’s financial 
liability, and actions brought against all agreements of the central eco-
nomic regulators in the spheres of banking, the stock market, energy, 
insurance and competition; Legal Adviser at the Constitutional Court 
(1993–98); Judge at the General Court since 17 September 2007.
Laurent Truchot
Born 1962; graduate of the Institut d’études politiques, Paris (1984); for-
mer student of the École nationale de la magistrature (National School 
for the Judiciary) (1986–88); Judge at the Regional Court, Marseilles 
(January 1988 to January 1990); Law Officer in the Directorate for Civil 
Affairs and the Legal Professions at the Ministry of Justice (January 
1990 to June 1992); Deputy Section Head, then Section Head, in the 
Directorate-General for Competition, Consumption and the Combating 
of Fraud at the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Finance and Industry (June 
1992 to September 1994); Technical Adviser to the Minister for Justice 
(September 1994 to May 1995); Judge at the Regional Court, Nîmes 
(May 1995 to May 1996); Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice in the 
Chambers of Advocate General Léger (May 1996 to December 2001); 
Auxiliary Judge at the Court of Cassation (December 2001 to August 
2007); Judge at the General Court since 17 September 2007.Annual Report 2012  165
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Sten Frimodt Nielsen
Born 1963; graduated in law from Copenhagen University (1988); civil 
servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1988–91); tutor in interna-
tional and European law at Copenhagen University (1988–91); Embassy 
Secretary at the Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations 
in New York (1991–94); civil servant in the Legal Service of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (1994–95); external lecturer at Copenhagen Univer-
sity (1995); Adviser, then Senior Adviser, in the Prime Minister’s Office 
(1995–98); Minister Counsellor at the Permanent Representation of 
Denmark to the European Union (1998–2001); Special Adviser for legal 
issues in the Prime Minister’s Office (2001–02); Head of Department and 
Legal Counsel in the Prime Minister’s Office (March 2002 to July 2004); 
Assistant Secretary of State and Legal Counsel in the Prime Minister’s 
Office (August 2004 to August 2007); Judge at the General Court since 
17 September 2007.
Kevin O’Higgins
Born 1946; educated at Crescent College Limerick, Clongowes 
Wood College, University College Dublin (BA degree and Diploma 
in European Law) and the King’s Inns; called to the Bar of Ireland in 
1968; Barrister (1968–82); Senior Counsel (Inner Bar of Ireland, 1982–
86); Judge of the Circuit Court (1986–97); Judge of the High Court 
of Ireland (1997–2008); Bencher of King’s Inns; Irish Representative 
on the Consultative Council of European Judges (2000–08); Judge 
at the General Court since 15 September 2008.
Heikki Kanninen
Born 1952; graduate of the Helsinki School of Economics and of the 
Faculty of Law of the University of Helsinki; Legal Secretary at the 
Supreme Administrative Court of Finland; General Secretary to the 
Committee for Reform of Legal Protection in Public Administration; 
Principal Administrator at the Supreme Administrative Court; 
General Secretary to the Committee for Reform of Administrative 
Litigation, Counsellor in the Legislative Drafting Department of 
the Ministry of Justice; Assistant Registrar at the EFTA Court; Legal 
Secretary at the Court of Justice of the European Communities; 
Judge at the Supreme Administrative Court (1998–2005); member 
of the Asylum Appeal Board; Vice-Chairman of the Committee on 
the Development of the Finnish Courts; Judge at the Civil Service 
Tribunal from 6  October  2005 to 6 October 2009; Judge at the 
General Court since 7 October 2009.166  Annual Report 2012
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Juraj Schwarcz
Born 1952; Doctor of Law (Comenius University, Bratislava, 1979); com-
pany lawyer (1975–90); Registrar responsible for the commercial reg-
ister at the City Court, Košice (1991); Judge at the City Court, Košice 
(January to October 1992); Judge and President of Chamber at the 
Regional Court, Košice (November 1992 to 2009); temporary Judge at 
the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, Commercial Law Division 
(October 2004 to September 2005); Head of the Commercial Law Div-
ision at the Regional Court, Košice (October 2005 to September 2009); 
external member of the Commercial and Business Law Department at 
Pavol Josef Šafárik University, Košice (1997–2009); external member of 
the teaching staff of the Judicial Academy (2005–09); Judge at the Gen-
eral Court since 7 October 2009.-
Marc van der Woude
Born 1960; law degree (University of Groningen, 1983); studies at the 
College of Europe (1983–84); Assistant Lecturer at the College of Eur-
ope (1984–86); Lecturer at Leiden University (1986–87); Rapporteur in 
the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities (1987–89); Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities (1989–92); Policy Coordinator in the Di-
rectorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European 
Communities (1992–93); Member of the Legal Service of the Commis-
sion of the European Communities (1993–95); Member of the Brussels 
Bar from 1995; Professor at Erasmus University Rotterdam from 2000; 
author of numerous publications; Judge at the General Court since 
13 September 2010.
Dimitrios Gratsias
Born 1957; graduated in law from the University of Athens (1980); 
awarded DEA (diploma of advanced studies) in public law by the Uni-
versity of Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne (1981); awarded diploma by the 
University Centre for Community and European Studies (University of 
Paris I) (1982); Junior Officer of the Council of State (1985–92); Junior 
Member of the Council of State (1992–2005); Legal Secretary at the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities (1994–96); Supplemen-
tary Member of the Superior Special Court of Greece (1998 and 1999); 
Member of the Council of State (2005); Member of the Special Court 
for Actions against Judges (2006); Member of the Supreme Council for 
Administrative Justice (2008); Inspector of Administrative Courts (2009–
10); Judge at the General Court since 25 October 2010.Annual Report 2012  167
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Andrei Popescu
Born 1948; graduated in law from the University of Bucharest (1971); 
postgraduate studies in international labour law and European social 
law, University of Geneva (1973–74); Doctor of Laws of the University 
of Bucharest (1980); trainee Assistant Lecturer (1971–73), Assistant Lec-
turer with tenure (1974–85) and then Lecturer in Labour Law at the 
University of Bucharest (1985–90); Principal Researcher at the National 
Research Institute for Labour and Social Protection (1990–91); Deputy 
Director-General (1991–92), then Director (1992–96) at the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Protection; senior lecturer (1997), then Professor at 
the National School of Political Science and Public Administration, Bu-
charest (2000); State Secretary at the Ministry for European Integration 
(2001–05); Head of Department at the Legislative Council of Romania 
(1996–2001 and 2005–09); founding editor of the Romanian Review of 
European Law; President of the Romanian Society for European Law 
(2009–10); Agent of the Romanian Government before the Courts 
of the European Union (2009–10); Judge at the General Court since 
26 November 2010.
Mariyana Kancheva
Born 1958; degree in law at the University of Sofia (1979–84); post-
master’s degree in European law at the Institute for European Studies, 
Free University of Brussels (2008–09); specialisation in economic law 
and intellectual property law; Trainee judge at the Regional Court, Sofia 
(1985–86); Legal adviser (1986–88); Lawyer at the Sofia Bar (1988–92); 
Director-General of the Services Office for the Diplomatic Corps at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1992–94); pursuit of the profession of lawyer 
in Sofia (1994–2011) and Brussels (2007–11); Arbitrator in Sofia for the 
resolution of commercial disputes; participation in the drafting of vari-
ous legislative texts as legal adviser to the Bulgarian Parliament; Judge 
at the General Court since 19 September 2011.168  Annual Report 2012
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Guido Berardis
Born 1950; degree in law (Sapienza University of Rome, 1973), Diplo-
ma of Advanced European Studies at the College of Europe (Bruges, 
1974–75); official of the Commission of the European Communities 
(‘International Affairs’ Directorate of the Directorate-General for Agri-
culture, 1975–76); member of the Legal Service of the Commission of 
the European Communities (1976–91 and 1994–95); Representative of 
the Legal Service of the Commission of the European Communities in 
Luxembourg (1990–91); Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities in the chambers of the judge Mr G.F. Man-
cini (1991–94); Legal Adviser to members of the Commission of the 
European Communities, Mr M. Monti (1995–97) and Mr F. Bolkestein 
(2000–02); Director of the ‘Procurement Policy’ Directorate (2002–03), 
the ‘Services, Intellectual and Industrial Property, Media and Data Pro-
tection’ Directorate (2003–05) and the ‘Services’ Directorate (2005–11) 
at the Directorate-General for the Internal Market of the Commission of 
the European Communities; Principal Legal Adviser and Director of the 
‘Justice, Freedom and Security, Private Law and Criminal Law’ Team at 
the Legal Service of the European Commission (2011–12); Judge at the 
General Court since 17 September 2012.
Eugène Buttigieg
Born 1961; Doctor of Laws, University of Malta; Master of Laws in Euro-
pean Legal Studies, University of Exeter; Ph.D. in Competition Law, 
University of London; Legal Officer at the Ministry of Justice (1987–90); 
Senior Legal Officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1990–94); Mem-
ber of the Copyright Board (1994–2005); Legal Reviser at the Ministry of 
Justice and Local Government (2001–02); Board Member of the Malta 
Resources Authority (2001–09); Legal Consultant in the field of Euro-
pean Union law from 1994, Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Finance, the 
Economy and Investment on consumer and competition law (2000–10), 
Legal Adviser to the Office of the Prime Minister on consumer affairs 
and competition (2010–11), Legal Consultant with the Malta Competi-
tion and Consumer Affairs Authority (2012); Lecturer (1994–2001), Se-
nior Lecturer (2001–06), subsequently Associate Professor (from 2007) 
and holder of the Jean Monnet Chair in European Union Law (from 
2009) at the University of Malta; Co-founder and Vice-President of the 
Maltese Association for European Law; Judge at the General Court 
since 8 October 2012.Annual Report 2012  169
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Emmanuel Coulon
Born 1968; law studies (Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris); manage-
ment studies (Université Paris Dauphine); College of Europe (1992); en-
trance examination for the Centre régional de formation à la profession 
d’avocat (regional training centre for the bar), Paris; certificate of ad-
mission to the Brussels Bar; practice as a lawyer in Brussels; successful 
candidate in an open competition for the Commission of the European 
Communities; Legal Secretary at the Court of First Instance (Chambers 
of the Presidents Mr Saggio (1996–98) and Mr Vesterdorf (1998–2002)); 
Head of Chambers of the President of the Court of First Instance 
(2003–05); Registrar of the General Court since 6 October 2005.Annual Report 2012  171
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2.  Change in the composition of the General Court in 2012
Formal sitting on 17 September 2012 
Following the resignation of Mr Enzo Moavero Milanesi, by decision of 5 September 2012 the rep-
resentatives of the governments of the Member States of the European Union appointed Mr Guido 
Berardis as Judge at the General Court of the European Union for the remainder of Mr Moavero 
Milanesi’s term of office, that is to say, until 31 August 2013.
Formal sitting on 8 October 2012
By decision of 20 September 2012 Mr Eugène Buttigieg was appointed as Judge at the General 
Court for the period from 22 September 2012 to 31 August 2013, replacing Ms Ena Cremona.Annual Report 2012  173
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3.  Order of precedence
 From 1 January 2012 to 22 March 2012
M. JAEGER, President of the Court
J. AZIZI, President of Chamber
N.J. FORWOOD, President of Chamber
O. CZÚCZ, President of Chamber
I. PELIKÁNOVÁ, President of Chamber
S. PAPASAVVAS, President of Chamber
A. DITTRICH, President of Chamber
L. TRUCHOT, President of Chamber
H. KANNINEN, President of Chamber
M.E. MARTINS RIBEIRO, Judge
F. DEHOUSSE, Judge
E. CREMONA, Judge
I. WISZNIEWSKA-BIAŁECKA, Judge
V. VADAPALAS, Judge
K. JüRIMÄE, Judge
I. LABUCKA, Judge
N. WAHL, Judge
M. PREK, Judge
S. SOLDEVILA FRAGOSO, Judge
S. FRIMODT NIELSEN, Judge
K. O’HIGGINS, Judge
J. SCHWARCZ, Judge
M. VAN DER WOUDE, Judge
D. GRATSIAS, Judge
A. POPESCU, Judge
M. KANCHEVA, Judge
E. COULON, Registrar
 From 23 March 2012 to 16 September 2012
M. JAEGER, President of the Court
J. AZIZI, President of Chamber
N.J. FORWOOD, President of Chamber
O. CZÚCZ, President of Chamber
I. PELIKÁNOVÁ, President of Chamber
S. PAPASAVVAS, President of Chamber
A. DITTRICH, President of Chamber 
L. TRUCHOT, President of Chamber
H. KANNINEN, President of Chamber
M.E. MARTINS RIBEIRO, Judge
F. DEHOUSSE, Judge
I. WISZNIEWSKA-BIAŁECKA, Judge
V. VADAPALAS, Judge
K. JüRIMÄE, Judge
I. LABUCKA, Judge
N. WAHL, Judge
M. PREK, Judge
S. SOLDEVILA FRAGOSO, Judge
S. FRIMODT NIELSEN, Judge
K. O’HIGGINS, Judge
J. SCHWARCZ, Judge
M. VAN DER WOUDE, Judge
D. GRATSIAS, Judge
A. POPESCU, Judge
M. KANCHEVA, Judge
E. COULON, Registrar174  Annual Report 2012
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 From 17 September 2012 to 7 October 2012
M. JAEGER, President of the Court
J. AZIZI, President of Chamber
N.J. FORWOOD, President of Chamber
O. CZÚCZ, President of Chamber
I. PELIKÁNOVÁ, President of Chamber
S. PAPASAVVAS, President of Chamber
A. DITTRICH, President of Chamber
L. TRUCHOT, President of Chamber
H. KANNINEN, President of Chamber
M.E. MARTINS RIBEIRO, Judge
F. DEHOUSSE, Judge
I. WISZNIEWSKA-BIAŁECKA, Judge
V. VADAPALAS, Judge 
K. JüRIMÄE, Judge
I. LABUCKA, Judge
N. WAHL, Judge
M. PREK, Judge
S. SOLDEVILA FRAGOSO, Judge
S. FRIMODT NIELSEN, Judge
K. O’HIGGINS, Judge
J. SCHWARCZ, Judge
M. VAN DER WOUDE, Judge
D. GRATSIAS, Judge
A. POPESCU, Judge
M. KANCHEVA, Judge 
G. BERARDIS, Judge
E. COULON, Registrar
From 8 October 2012 to 28 November 2012
M. JAEGER, President of the Court
J. AZIZI, President of Chamber
N.J. FORWOOD, President of Chamber
O. CZÚCZ, President of Chamber
I. PELIKÁNOVÁ, President of Chamber
S. PAPASAVVAS, President of Chamber
A. DITTRICH, President of Chamber
L. TRUCHOT, President of Chamber 
H. KANNINEN, President of Chamber
M.E. MARTINS RIBEIRO, Judge
F. DEHOUSSE, Judge
I. WISZNIEWSKA-BIAŁECKA, Judge
V. VADAPALAS, Judge
K. JüRIMÄE, Judge
I. LABUCKA, Judge
N. WAHL, Judge
M. PREK, Judge
S. SOLDEVILA FRAGOSO, Judge
S. FRIMODT NIELSEN, Judge
K. O’HIGGINS, Judge
J. SCHWARCZ, Judge
M. VAN DER WOUDE, Judge
D. GRATSIAS, Judge
A. POPESCU, Judge
M. KANCHEVA, Judge
G. BERARDIS, Judge
E. BUTTIGIEG, Judge
E. COULON, RegistrarAnnual Report 2012  175
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From 29 November 2012 to 
31 December 2012
M. JAEGER, President of the Court
J. AZIZI, President of Chamber
N.J. FORWOOD, President of Chamber
O. CZÚCZ, President of Chamber
I. PELIKÁNOVÁ, President of Chamber
S. PAPASAVVAS, President of Chamber
A. DITTRICH, President of Chamber
L. TRUCHOT, President of Chamber
H. KANNINEN, President of Chamber
M.E. MARTINS RIBEIRO, Judge
F. DEHOUSSE, Judge
I. WISZNIEWSKA-BIAŁECKA, Judge
V. VADAPALAS, Judge
K. JüRIMÄE, Judge
I. LABUCKA, Judge
M. PREK, Judge
S. SOLDEVILA FRAGOSO, Judge
S. FRIMODT NIELSEN, Judge
K. O’HIGGINS, Judge
J. SCHWARCZ, Judge
M. VAN DER WOUDE, Judge
D. GRATSIAS, Judge
A. POPESCU, Judge
M. KANCHEVA, Judge
G. BERARDIS, Judge
E. BUTTIGIEG, Judge
E. COULON, RegistrarAnnual Report 2012  177
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4.  Former members of the General Court
David Alexander Ogilvy Edward (1989–92)
Christos Yeraris (1989–92)
José Luis Da Cruz Vilaça (1989–95), President (1989–95)
Jacques Biancarelli (1989–95)
Donal Patrick Michael Barrington (1989–96)
Romain Alphonse Schintgen (1989–96)
Heinrich Kirschner (1989–97)
Antonio Saggio (1989–98), President (1995–98)
Cornelis Paulus Briët (1989–98)
Koen Lenaerts (1989–2003)
Bo Vesterdorf (1989–2007), President (1998–2007)
Rafael García-Valdecasas y Fernández (1989–2007)
Andreas Kalogeropoulos (1992–98)
Christopher William Bellamy (1992–99)
André Potocki (1995–2001)
Rui Manuel Gens de Moura Ramos (1995–2003)
Pernilla Lindh (1995–2006)
Virpi Tiili (1995–2009)
John D. Cooke (1996–2008)
Jörg Pirrung (1997–2007)
Paolo Mengozzi (1998–2006)
Arjen W.H. Meij (1998–2010)
Mihalis Vilaras (1998–2010)
Hubert Legal (2001–07)
Verica Trstenjak (2004–06) 
Daniel Šváby (2004–09)
Ena Cremona (2004–12)
Enzo Moavero Milanesi (2006–11)
Nils Wahl (2006–12)
Teodor Tchipev (2007–10)
Valeriu M Ciucă (2007–10)
Presidents
José Luis Da Cruz Vilaça (1989–95)
Antonio Saggio (1995–98)
Bo Vesterdorf (1998–2007)
Registrar
Hans Jung (1989–2005)Annual Report 2012  179
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C — Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the General Court
General activity of the General Court
  1.  New cases, completed cases, cases pending (2008–12)
New cases
  2.  Nature of proceedings (2008–12)
  3.  Type of action (2008–12)
  4.  Subject-matter of the action (2008–12)
Completed cases
  5.  Nature of proceedings (2008–12)
  6.  Subject-matter of the action (2012)
  7.  Subject-matter of the action (2008–12) (judgments and orders)
  8.  Bench hearing action (2008–12)
  9.  Duration of proceedings in months (2008–12) (judgments and orders)
Cases pending as at 31 December
  10.  Nature of proceedings (2008–12)
  11.  Subject-matter of the action (2008–12)
  12.  Bench hearing action (2008–12)
Miscellaneous
  13.  Proceedings for interim measures (2008–12)
  14.  Expedited procedures (2008–12)
  15.  Appeals against decisions of the General Court to the Court of Justice (1990–2012)
  16.    Distribution of appeals before the Court of Justice according to the nature of the 
proceedings (2008–12)
  17.  Results of appeals before the Court of Justice (2012) (judgments and orders)
  18.  Results of appeals before the Court of Justice (2008–12) (judgments and orders)
  19.  General trend (1989–2012) (new cases, completed cases, cases pending)Annual Report 2012  181
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1.  General activity of the General Court — 
New cases, completed cases, cases pending (2008–12) (1) (2)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
New cases 629 568 636 722 617
Completed cases 605 555 527 714 688
Cases pending 1 178 1 191 1 300 1 308 1 237
 New cases  Completed cases  Cases pending
1 400
1 200
1 000
800
600
400
200
0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
(1)  Unless otherwise indicated, this table and the following tables take account of special forms of procedure. 
 The following are considered to be ‘special forms of procedure’: application to set a judgment aside (Article 41 
of the Statute of the Court of Justice; Article 122 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court); third-party 
proceedings (Article 42 of the Statute of the Court of Justice; Article 123 of the Rules of Procedure); revision of 
a judgment (Article 44 of the Statute of the Court of Justice; Article 125 of the Rules of Procedure); interpretation 
of a judgment (Article 43 of the Statute of the Court of Justice; Article 129 of the Rules of Procedure); taxation of 
costs (Article 92 of the Rules of Procedure); legal aid (Article 96 of the Rules of Procedure); and rectification of 
a judgment (Article 84 of the Rules of Procedure).
(2)  Unless otherwise indicated, this table and the following tables do not take account of proceedings concerning 
interim measures.182  Annual Report 2012
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2.  New cases — Nature of proceedings (2008–12)
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 State aid
 Other direct actions
 Competition
   Appeals    Appeals  concerning 
interim measures 
or interventions
 Staff cases
   Special forms of 
procedure
 Intellectual property
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
State aid 56 46 42 67 36
Competition 71 42 79 39 34
Staff cases 2
Intellectual property 198 207 207 219 238
Other direct actions 178 158 207 264 220
Appeals 37 31 23 44 10
Appeals concerning interim measures 
or interventions 1 1 1
Special forms of procedure 87 84 77 88 78
Total 629 568 636 722 617Annual Report 2012  183
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3.  New cases — Type of action (2008–12)
Distribution in 2012
Actions for annulment 
41,65%
Actions for failure 
to act 
1.30%
Actions 
for damages 
2.76%
Arbitration 
clauses 
1.30%
Intellectual property 
38.57%
Appeals 
1.62%
Appeals concerning 
interim measures or 
interventions 
0.16%
Special forms 
of procedure 
12.64%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Actions for annulment 269 214 304 341 257
Actions for failure to act 9 7 7 8 8
Actions for damages 15 13 8 16 17
Arbitration clauses 12 12 9 5 8
Intellectual property 198 207 207 219 238
Staff cases 2
Appeals 37 31 23 44 10
Appeals concerning interim measures 
or interventions 1 1 1
Special forms of procedure 87 84 77 88 78
Total 629 568 636 722 617184  Annual Report 2012
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4.  New cases — Subject-matter of the action (2008–12) (1)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Access to documents 22 15 19 21 18
Accession of new States 1
Agriculture 14 19 24 22 11
Arbitration clause 12 12 9 5 8
Area of freedom, security and justice 3 2 1
Commercial policy 10 8 9 11 20
Common fisheries policy 23 1 19 3
Common foreign and security policy 1
Company law 1
Competition 71 42 79 39 34
Consumer protection 2
Culture 1
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff 1 5 4 10 6
Economic and monetary policy 4 4 3
Economic, social and territorial cohesion 6 6 24 3 4
Education, vocational training, youth and sport 2 1
Energy 2 1
Environment 7 4 15 6 3
External action by the European Union 2 5 1 2 1
Financial provisions (budget, financial framework, own 
resources, combatting fraud) 1 1
Free movement of goods 1 1
Freedom of establishment 1
Freedom of movement for persons 1 1 1
Freedom to provide services 3 4 1 1
Intellectual and industrial property 198 207 207 219 238
Law governing the institutions 23 32 17 44 40
Public health 2 2 4 2 12
Public procurement 31 19 15 18 23
Registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of 
chemicals (REACH Regulation) 8 3 2
Research, technological development and space 6 3 4 3
Restrictive measures (external action) 7 7 21 93 60
Social policy 6 2 4 5 1
State aid 55 46 42 67 36
Taxation 1 1 1
Transport 1 1 1
Total EC Treaty/TFEU 502 452 533 587 527
Total CS Treaty 1
Total EA Treaty 1
Staff Regulations 39 32 25 47 12
Special forms of procedure 87 84 77 88 78
OVERALL TOTAL 629 568 636 722 617
(1)  As a result of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on 1 Decem-
ber 2009, it has been necessary to change the presentation of the subject-matter of actions. The data for the 
period 2008–09 have been revised accordingly.Annual Report 2012  185
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5.  Completed cases — Nature of proceedings (2008–12)
250
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 State aid
 Other direct actions
   Competition
   Appeals    Appeals  concerning 
interim measures 
or interventions
 Staff cases
   Special forms of 
procedure
 Intellectual property
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
State aid 37 70 50 41 63
Competition 31 31 38 100 61
Staff cases 33 1 1
Intellectual property 171 168 180 240 210
Other direct actions 229 171 149 222 240
Appeals 21 31 37 29 32
Appeals concerning interim measures 
or interventions 1 1 1
Special forms of procedure 83 83 72 80 81
Total 605 555 527 714 688186  Annual Report 2012
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6.  Completed cases — Subject-matter of the action (2012)
Judgments Orders Total
Access to documents 9 12 21
Agriculture 23 9 32
Arbitration clause 9 2 11
Area of freedom, security and justice 1 1 2
Commercial policy 11 3 14
Common fisheries policy 3 6 9
Competition 49 12 61
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff 2 4 6
Economic and monetary policy 2 2
Economic, social and territorial cohesion 10 2 12
Education, vocational training, youth and sport 1 1
Environment 3 5 8
Financial provisions (budget, financial framework, 
own resources, combatting fraud) 2 2
Freedom of movement for persons 1 1
Freedom to provide services 2 2
Intellectual and industrial property 160 50 210
Law governing the institutions 4 37 41
Public health 1 1 2
Public procurement 13 11 24
Registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction 
of chemicals (REACH Regulation) 1 1
Research, technological development and space 1 2 3
Restrictive measures (external action) 7 35 42
Social policy 1 1
State aid 30 33 63
Taxation 2 2
Transport 1 1
Total EC Treaty/TFEU 337 237 574
Special forms of procedure 81 81
Staff Regulations 17 16 33
OVERALL TOTAL 354 334 688Annual Report 2012  187
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7.  Completed cases — Subject-matter of the action (2008–12) (1) 
(judgments and orders)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Access to documents 15 6 21 23 21
Accession of new States 1
Agriculture 48 46 16 26 32
Approximation of laws 1
Arbitration clause 9 10 12 6 11
Area of freedom, security and justice 1 3 2
Commercial policy 12 6 8 10 14
Common fisheries policy 4 17 5 9
Company law 1
Competition 31 31 38 100 61
Consumer protection 2 1
Culture 1 2
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff 6 10 4 1 6
Economic and monetary policy 1 2 3 2
Economic, social and territorial cohesion 42 3 2 9 12
Education, vocational training, youth and sport 1 1 1
Energy 2
Environment 17 9 6 22 8
External action by the European Union 2 4 5
Financial provisions (budget, financial framework, 
own resources, combatting fraud) 2 2 2
Free movement of goods 2 3
Freedom of establishment 1
Freedom of movement for persons 2 1 2 1
Freedom to provide services 2 2 3 2
Intellectual and industrial property 171 169 180 240 210
Law governing the institutions 22 20 26 36 41
Public health 1 1 2 3 2
Public procurement 26 12 16 15 24
Registration, evaluation, authorisation and 
restriction of chemicals (REACH Regulation) 4 1
Research, technological development and space 1 1 3 5 3
Restrictive measures (external action) 6 8 10 32 42
Social policy 2 6 6 5 1
State aid 37 70 50 41 63
Taxation 2 1 2
Transport 3 2 1 1
Total EC Treaty/TFEU 468 439 417 599 574
Total EA Treaty 1 1
Special forms of procedure 83 83 72 80 81
Staff Regulations 54 32 38 34 33
OVERALL TOTAL 605 555 527 714 688
(1)  As a result of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on 1 Decem-
ber 2009, it has been necessary to change the presentation of the subject-matter of actions. The data for the 
period 2008–09 have been revised accordingly.188  Annual Report 2012
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8.  Completed cases — Bench hearing action (2008–12)
Distribution in 2012
Chambers 
(3 judges) 
86.05%
Appeal 
Chamber 
5.38%
President of the 
General Court 
7.27%
Chambers 
(5 judges) 
1.31%
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Grand Chamber 2 2
Appeal Chamber 16 10 26 20 11 31 22 15 37 15 14 29 17 20 37
President of the General 
Court 52 52 50 50 54 54 56 56 50 50
Chambers (5 judges) 15 2 17 27 2 29 8 8 19 6 25 9 9
Chambers (3 judges) 228 282 510 245 200 445 255 168 423 359 245 604 328 264 592
Single judge 3 3
Total 259 346 605 292 263 555 288 239 527 393 321 714 354 334 688Annual Report 2012  189
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9.  Completed cases — Duration of proceedings in months 
(2008-12) (1) (judgments and orders)
 State aid
 Other direct actions
   Competition
   Appeals
 Staff cases
 Intellectual property
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
State aid 48.1 50.3 32.4 32.8 31.5
Competition 40.2 46.2 45.7 50.5 48.4
Staff cases 38.6 52.8 45.3
Intellectual property 20.4 20.1 20.6 20.3 20.3
Other direct actions 20.6 23.9 23.7 22.8 22.2
Appeals 16.1 16.1 16.6 18.3 16.8
(1)  The calculation of the average duration of proceedings does not take account of: cases ruled upon by interlocu-
tory judgment; special forms of procedure; appeals concerning interim measures or interventions; cases re-
ferred by the Court of Justice following the amendment of the division of jurisdiction between it and the Court 
of First Instance (now the General Court); cases referred by the Court of First Instance after the Civil Service 
Tribunal began operating.
  The duration of proceedings is expressed in months and tenths of months.190  Annual Report 2012
General Court  Statistics
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
10.  Cases pending as at 31 December — Nature of proceedings 
(2008–12)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
State aid 185 161 153 179 152
Competition 236 247 288 227 200
Staff cases 2 1 1
Intellectual property 316 355 382 361 389
Other direct actions 371 358 416 458 438
Appeals 46 46 32 47 25
Special forms of procedure 22 23 28 36 33
Total 1 178 1 191 1 300 1 308 1 237
 State aid    Competition  Staff cases
 Other direct actions    Appeals    Special forms of 
procedure
 Intellectual property
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11.  Cases pending as at 31 December — Subject-matter of the 
action (2008–12) (1)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Access to documents 35 44 42 40 37
Agriculture 84 57 65 61 40
Arbitration clause 20 22 19 18 15
Area of freedom, security and justice 3 2 2 3 1
Commercial policy 31 33 34 35 41
Common fisheries policy 24 8 27 25 16
Common foreign and security policy 1 1 1
Company law 1
Competition 236 247 288 227 200
Consumer protection 3 3 1
Culture 1
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff 11 6 6 15 15
Economic and monetary policy 2 3 4
Economic, social and territorial cohesion 13 16 38 32 24
Education, vocational training, youth and sport 1 1 1 1
Energy 2 1 1
Environment 30 25 34 18 13
External action by the European Union 3 8 5 2 3
Financial provisions (budget, financial framework, own 
resources, combatting fraud) 3 2 2 2 1
Free movement of goods 2
Freedom of movement for persons 2 2 3 1
Freedom to provide services 3 5 4 1
Intellectual and industrial property 317 355 382 361 389
Law governing the institutions 29 41 32 40 39
Public health 3 4 6 5 15
Public procurement 34 41 40 43 42
Registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of 
chemicals (REACH Regulation) 8 7 8
Research, technological development and space 3 8 8 7 7
Restrictive measures (external action) 19 18 29 90 108
Social policy 10 6 4 4 4
State aid 184 160 152 178 151
Taxation 1
Transport 2 2 1 1
Total EC Treaty/TFEU 1 106 1 119 1 235 1 223 1 176
Total CS Treaty 1 1 1 1 1
Total EA Treaty 1 1
Staff Regulations 48 48 35 48 27
Special forms of procedure 22 23 28 36 33
OVERALL TOTAL 1 178 1 191 1 300 1 308 1 237
(1)  As a result of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on 1 Decem-
ber 2009, it has been necessary to change the presentation of the subject-matter of actions. The data for the 
period 2008–09 have been revised accordingly.192  Annual Report 2012
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12.  Cases pending as at 31 December — Bench hearing action 
(2008–12)
Distribution in 2012
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Appeal Chamber 46 46 32 51 38
President of the General Court 3 3 3
Chambers (5 judges) 67 49 58 16 10
Chambers (3 judges) 975 1 019 1 132 1 134 1 123
Single judge 2
Not assigned 90 75 75 104 63
Total 1 178 1 191 1 300 1 308 1 237
Chambers 
(3 judges) 
90.78%
Not assigned 
5.09%
Appeal
Chamber 
3.07%
President of the 
General Court 
0.24%
Chambers (5 judges) 
0.81%Annual Report 2012  193
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13.  Miscellaneous — Proceedings for interim measures (2008–12)
 New    Brought to a conclusion
Distribution in 2012
New 
applications 
for interim 
measures
Applications 
for interim 
measures 
brought to 
a conclusion
Outcome 
Granted
Removal 
from the 
register/ no 
need to 
adjudicate
Dismissed
Access to documents 1 1
State aid 3 3 1 1 1
Arbitration clause 1 1 1
Competition 6 5 3 1 1
Registration, evaluation, 
authorisation and restriction of 
chemicals (REACH Regulation) 1
Public procurement 4 5 2 3
Restrictive measures (external 
action) 4 6 2 4
Research, technological 
development and space 1 1 1
Staff Regulations 1 1 1
Total 21 23 4 7 12
58 57 24 20 41 38 44 52 21 23
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14.   Miscellaneous — Expedited procedures (2008–12) (1) (2)
 Brought     Granted  Refused    Not acted upon (3)
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Access to documents 2 2 4 4 2 1 1 2
External action by the European Union 1 1
Agriculture 1 2 3
State aid 1 1 7 5 2 2 2
Arbitration clause 1 1
Economic, social and territorial 
cohesion 1 1 1 1
Competition 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 2 2
Law governing the institutions 1 1 1 1 1 1
Environment 1 1 2 2
Freedom to provide services 1 1
Public procurement 3 1 3 2 2 2 2
Restrictive measures (external action) 4 4 5 1 2 1 10 10 30 2 12 7 11 4 17
Commercial policy 1 2 2 3 2 3 2
Social policy 1 1
Procedure 1 1
Public health 1 1 5 1 3
Staff Regulations 1 1
Customs union and Common Customs 
Tariff 1 1
Total 15 6 7 2 22 3 18 2 24 22 43 2 23 9 26 5 28 2
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(1)  The General Court may decide pursuant to Article 76a of the Rules of Procedure to deal with a case before it 
under an expedited procedure. That provision has been applicable since 1 February 2001.
(2)  As a result of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on 1 Decem-
ber 2009, it has been necessary to change the presentation of the subject-matter of actions. The data for the 
period 2008–09 have been revised accordingly.
(3)  The category ‘Not acted upon’ covers the following instances: withdrawal of the application for expedition, 
discontinuance of the action and cases in which the action is disposed of by way of order before the application 
for expedition has been ruled upon.Annual Report 2012  195
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15.  Miscellaneous — Appeals against decisions of the General 
Court to the Court of Justice (1990–2012)
Number of decisions against 
which appeals were brought
Total number of decisions open 
to challenge (1)
Percentage of decisions against 
which appeals were brought
1990 16 46 35%
1991 13 62 21%
1992 25 86 29%
1993 17 73 23%
1994 12 105 11%
1995 47 143 33%
1996 27 133 20%
1997 35 139 25%
1998 67 224 30%
1999 60 180 33%
2000 67 225 30%
2001 69 230 30%
2002 47 224 21%
2003 66 260 25%
2004 53 261 20%
2005 64 297 22%
2006 77 281 27%
2007 78 290 27%
2008 84 339 25%
2009 92 371 25%
2010 98 338 29%
2011 158 532 30%
2012 132 514 26%
(1)  Total number of decisions open to challenge – judgments, orders concerning interim measures or refusing leave to 
intervene, and all orders terminating proceedings other than those removing a case from the register or transfer-
ring a case – in respect of which the period for bringing an appeal expired or against which an appeal was brought.
   Number of decisions against 
which appeals were brought
   Total number of decisions open 
to challenge (1)
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16.  Miscellaneous — Distribution of appeals before the Court of 
Justice according to the nature of the proceedings (2008–12)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
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17.  Miscellaneous — Results of appeals before the Court of Justice 
(2012) (judgments and orders)
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Access to documents 2 2 1 5
External action by the European Union 1 1
Agriculture 4 1 5
State aid 5 1 3 9
Economic, social and territorial cohesion 1 1
Competition 23 1 6 30
Law governing the institutions 16 1 17
Environment 4 4
Freedom to provide services 2 2
Public procurement 3 3
Commercial policy 4 2 1 7
Economic and monetary policy 2 2
Common foreign and security policy 4 4 8
Social policy 1 1
Principles of European Union law 1 1
Intellectual and industrial property 25 2 5 32
Customs union and Common Customs Tariff 1 1
Total 98 12 4 15 129198  Annual Report 2012
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18.  Miscellaneous — Results of appeals before the Court of Justice 
(2008–12) (judgments and orders)
   Appeal 
dismissed
   Decision totally or 
partially set aside 
and no referral back
   Decision totally or 
partially set aside 
and referral back
   Removal from the 
register/ no need 
to adjudicate
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Appeal dismissed 51 84 73 101 98
Decision totally or partially set aside and no 
referral back 16 12 6 9 12
Decision totally or partially set aside and referral 
back 7 3 5 6 4
Removal from the register/ no need to 
adjudicate 3 5 4 8 15
Total 77 104 88 124 129
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19.  Miscellaneous — General trend (1989–2012) 
New cases, completed cases, cases pending
New cases (1) Completed cases (2) Cases pending on 
31 December
1989 169 1 168
1990 59 82 145
1991 95 67 173
1992 123 125 171
1993 596 106 661
1994 409 442 628
1995 253 265 616
1996 229 186 659
1997 644 186 1 117
1998 238 348 1 007
1999 384 659 732
2000 398 343 787
2001 345 340 792
2002 411 331 872
2003 466 339 999
2004 536 361 1 174
2005 469 610 1 033
2006 432 436 1 029
2007 522 397 1 154
2008 629 605 1 178
2009 568 555 1 191
2010 636 527 1 300
2011 722 714 1 308
2012 617 688 1 237
Total 9 950 8 713
(1)  1989: the Court of Justice referred 153 cases to the newly created Court of First Instance (now the General 
Court). 
  1993: the Court of Justice referred 451 cases as a result of the first extension of the jurisdiction of the Court of 
First Instance. 
  1994: the Court of Justice referred 14 cases as a result of the second extension of the jurisdiction of the Court of 
First Instance.
  2004–05: the Court of Justice referred 25 cases as a result of the third extension of the jurisdiction of the Court 
of First Instance.
(2)  2005–06: the Court of First Instance referred 118 cases to the newly created Civil Service Tribunal.Chapter III
The Civil Service TribunalAnnual Report 2012  203
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A — Proceedings of the Civil Service Tribunal in 2012
By Mr Sean Van Raepenbusch, President of the Civil Service Tribunal
1. The year 2012 was the first full year of activity of the Civil Service Tribunal in its new composition, 
three of its members having been replaced from 6 October 2011.
2. The judicial statistics of the Tribunal reveal a further increase in 2012 in the number of cases 
brought (178) compared with the previous year (159). This number has thus been consistently rising 
since 2008 (111).
The number of cases brought to a close (121), for its part, has fallen markedly, compared with that 
of the previous year (166), which, it must be said, represented the best result achieved by the Tribu-
nal in terms of quantity since its creation. That fall is explained by the change in the composition 
of the Tribunal in 2011. Every departing judge is required, well before the end of his term of office, 
to concentrate on finalising the cases which can be brought to a close before his departure, thus 
leaving before the Tribunal those which cannot be, while newly appointed judges do not generally 
reach their full productivity until they have been in office for several months because of the time 
required for the investigation, the scheduling and judging of cases. These difficulties are particu-
larly serious where, as in 2012, almost half of the members of the Tribunal were replaced.
It follows that the number of pending cases has risen markedly compared with the previous year 
(235 at 31 December 2012 compared with 178 at 31 December 2011). However, the average dura-
tion of proceedings has not altered much (14.8 months in 2012 compared with 14.2 months in 
2011). (1)
In addition, 11 orders for interim measures were made in 2012 by the President of the Tribunal, 
compared with seven in 2011.
In 2012, 11 appeals were brought before the General Court of the European Union against decisions 
of the Tribunal, compared with 44 in 2011. Moreover, of 33 appeals decided in 2012, 28 were dis-
missed and only four upheld in full or in part; two of the cases in which the judgment was set aside 
were referred back to the Tribunal. One appeal was removed from the register.
Finally, four cases were brought to a close by amicable settlement under Article 69 of the Rules of 
Procedure.
3. The year 2012 was also noteworthy for the adoption, on 11 August 2012, of Regulation (EU, Eura-
tom) No 741/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 August 2012 amending the 
Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Annex I thereto. (2) That 
amendment allows, inter alia, the appointment of temporary Judges to replace, in their absence, 
Judges who, while not suffering from disablement deemed to be total, are prevented from partici-
pating in the disposal of cases for a lengthy period of time. The intention is to prevent the Tribunal 
being placed, as a result of a Judge’s unavailability, in a difficult situation such as to impede its 
discharge of its judicial function. Pursuant to Regulation No 741/2012, on 25 October 2012 the Euro-
(1)  Not including the duration of any stay of proceedings.
(2)  OJ 2012 L 228, p. 1.204  Annual Report 2012
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pean Parliament and the Council adopted Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 979/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 relating to temporary Judges of the European 
Union Civil Service Tribunal. (3) That regulation lays down the conditions for the appointment of 
such judges.
4. The account given below will describe the most significant decisions of the Tribunal.
I.  Procedural aspects
Conditions for admissibility
1.  Act adversely affecting an official
In a judgment of 23 October 2012 in Case F-57/11 Eklund v Commission, the Tribunal recalled that 
an offer of a post addressed to a candidate with a view to his appointment as an official constitutes 
a mere declaration of intention since the appointment of an official may be effected only in accord-
ance with the requirements and procedures laid down by the Staff Regulations of Officials of the 
European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’). Consequently, it was held that no action for annulment 
can be brought against the withdrawal of an offer of a post. In the same judgment, however, the 
Tribunal made clear that a decision not to proceed with an offer of a post and to withdraw that 
offer when it has already been accepted by an applicant constitutes an act adversely affecting that 
person.
2.  Interest in bringing proceedings
After outlining the case-law according to which an applicant may pursue an action for annulment 
of a decision only if he has a personal, vested and present interest in the annulment of that deci-
sion after his action has been brought, the Tribunal held, in a judgment of 11 December 2012 in 
Case F-107/11 Ntouvas v ECDC, that the fact that an applicant no longer works at the agency which 
appraised him and that the appraisal report will not be disclosed to third parties is not such as to 
deprive him of his legal interest in bringing proceedings to challenge that report. The Tribunal 
based its view in that regard on the fact that an appraisal report constitutes written, formal evi-
dence of the quality of the work carried out by the person concerned and thus includes an assess-
ment of the personal qualities shown by the individual assessed in the conduct of his professional 
activities.
3.  Respect for the pre-contentious procedure 
The Tribunal recalled, in two judgments of 20 June 2012 in Case F-66/11 and F-83/11 Cristina v Com-
mission, that the legal remedy available regarding decisions of a competition selection board nor-
mally consists of a direct application to the European Union court without a prior complaint. It 
therefore held that a candidate in a competition who did none the less make a complaint to the ap-
pointing authority against such a decision is not required to wait for the decision of the appointing 
authority on that complaint before bringing the case before the court. On the contrary, a complaint 
against a decision of the selection board in a competition may not have the effect of depriving 
the person concerned of his right to bring a direct action before the competent court. However, 
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the case must be brought within the period of three months and 10 days of the notification of the 
decision adversely affecting the person concerned.
Court proceedings
1.  Immunity of parties’ representatives
In a case where an applicant requested the waiver of the immunity of the defendant’s represen-
tatives in respect of words spoken or written during the proceedings, in its judgment of 23 Octo-
ber 2012 in Case F-44/05 RENV Strack v Commission, the Tribunal had to interpret Article 30 of its 
Rules of Procedure which authorises it to waive that immunity. The Tribunal first found that that 
article protects the parties’ representatives from proceedings being brought against them, that 
the article does not allow a request for waiver of immunity to be brought by one of the parties and 
that the freedom of expression of those representatives helps to ensure a fair hearing, and went 
on to hold that a request for the waiver of immunity may only be made by a court or a competent 
national authority and may not be made by a party.
2. Costs
As European Union law does not lay down any provisions on rates for recoverable fees, it is for the 
judicature itself to assess the amount of such fees. The Tribunal held, in that connection, in an order 
of 22 March 2012 in Case F-5/08 DEP Brune v Commission, that the hourly rate which it had to apply 
could not be set by reference to the average rate charged by a lawyer at the Brussels Bar, because 
such a solution would act as an incentive for applicants to choose lawyers registered at that Bar 
and would affect the freedom to provide services. However, the hourly rate set may be that of 
a specialist lawyer where the dispute may appear, for a reasonably informed party, to raise particu-
larly difficult questions of law or where it has a particular importance for that party.
II. Merits
General conditions for validity of measures
1.  Breach of a procedural requirement
In its judgment in Strack v Commission the Tribunal recalled that a breach of a procedural require-
ment may result in an annulment only if, had it not been for that irregularity, the outcome of the 
procedure might have been different. It pointed out, in that connection, that the applicant need 
not demonstrate that the contested decision would necessarily have been different if it had not 
been affected by the irregularity in question, but it suffices that it cannot be entirely ruled out that 
the administration might have adopted a different decision, in order for the existence of that ir-
regularity to result in annulment.
2.  Rights of defence and right to participate in a procedure
In order not to impose an unreasonable burden on the administration before the adoption of any 
act adversely affecting staff, the Tribunal, following the line of its previous case-law, held, in a judg-
ment of 18 April 2012 in Case F-50/11 Buxton v Parliament, that the rights of defence are not applic-
able to a procedure for awarding merit points to an official, because such a procedure, which is 
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against that official. Similarly, in a judgment of 16 May 2012 in Case F-42/10 Skareby v Commission, 
it held that the alleged victim of psychological harassment could not invoke her rights of defence 
because an inquiry procedure initiated following her request for assistance cannot be compared 
to an inquiry procedure opened against her. Finally, in its judgment of 6 November 2012 in Case 
F-41/06 RENV Marcuccio v Commission, it held that the work of an Invalidity Committee does not 
constitute a procedure brought against the official concerned and, consequently, there is no requi-
rement that he should be heard by such a committee in order to respect the rights of the defence.
However, in its judgment in Skareby v Commission, the Tribunal added that, in the light of the gen-
eral principle of good administration laid down by Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union (‘the Charter’), the alleged victim of psychological harassment may claim 
procedural rights that are separate from the rights of defence and are not as extensive as those 
rights. The Tribunal essentially reiterated that case-law in its judgment in Marcuccio v Commission�
Also in its judgment in Skareby v Commission, the Tribunal held, specifically, that the applicant, who 
had had the opportunity to put forward her arguments, could not invoke the abovementioned 
procedural rights to claim access to a final report and to the evidence obtained in the course of 
compiling it nor to claim that she should have been heard on the content of those documents 
before the decision refusing assistance was made. In the judgment in Marcuccio v Commission it 
was held that the procedure before the Invalidity Committee respects the procedural rights of the 
official in that his interests are safeguarded by the presence on that committee of the doctor repre-
senting him, by the appointment of the third doctor by agreement of the two members appointed 
by each party and by the fact that the official concerned may put before the Invalidity Committee 
all the reports and certificates of the practitioners he consulted.
3. Impartiality
The Tribunal annulled a decision rejecting a request for assistance in a case of psychological harass-
ment on the ground of the lack of objective impartiality of the person who had conducted the in-
quiry underlying that decision. In its judgment of 18 September 2012 in Case F-58/10 Allgeier v FRA 
the Tribunal observed that the investigator was chairman of the board of an institute which had 
concluded an important contract with the defendant, a contract capable of being renewed repeat-
edly, and concluded that the importance of that business relationship was such as to give rise to 
justified concern on the part of the applicant that the investigator, because he wanted to maintain 
that business relationship, would be guided by the aim of protecting the reputation of the Agency.
4.  Obligation to observe a reasonable time-limit
Under the principle of good administration, the authority has an obligation to act within a rea-
sonable time in conducting any administrative procedure. In that regard, the Tribunal held, in its 
judgment in Strack v Commission, that the duration of a pre-contentious procedure organised un-
der Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations could not, as a matter of principle, be excessive since, 
as a result of the time-limits laid down by those provisions, it cannot exceed 14 months and 10 days 
where it begins with a request, and 10 months and 10 days where it begins with a complaint.
5.  Obligation to disapply an unlawful provision
In its judgment of 8 February 2012 in Case F-11/11 Bouillez and Others v Council, the Tribunal held 
that, where a decision of a general nature taken by an institution derogates unlawfully from higher-
ranking provisions, that institution must disapply that decision of a general nature. That is the case, 
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faced with a general implementing provision which disregards a higher-ranking rule of law. In such 
a case, the institution must decide on the individual situation of the person concerned without 
applying the unlawful general implementing provision.
6.  Plurality of grounds
In its judgment of 28 March 2012 in Case F-36/11 BD v Commission, the Tribunal recalled that where 
a contested decision is based on several grounds, the fact that one of those grounds is erroneous 
cannot result in the annulment of that decision if the other grounds provide justification which is 
sufficient in itself.
7.   Cancellation of acts
In the context of an action leading to its judgment of 5 December 2012 in Case F-110/11 Lebedef 
and Others v Commission, the Tribunal had occasion to state that every legislative authority is under 
a duty, first, to check, if not constantly at least periodically, that the rules which it has imposed still 
meet the needs which they were intended to meet and, second, to amend or even repeal the rules 
which have ceased to have any justification and are thus no longer appropriate in the new context 
in which they must produce their effects. According to the Tribunal, such a check is required, in 
particular, when correction coefficients are updated.
In its judgment in Eklund v Commission, after recalling the distinction to be made, in accordance 
with the theory of cancellation of administrative acts, between acts which create rights and those 
which do not, the Tribunal held that an offer of a post addressed to a candidate with a view to his 
appointment as an official constitutes a mere declaration of intention and does not create rights, 
so that the administration has the option of withdrawing it at any time. It also made clear that the 
fact that the person concerned accepts that offer does not have the effect of giving rise to an act 
which creates rights within the meaning of that theory. As was explained above, an appointment 
may only be made in accordance with the procedural rules and conditions laid down by the Staff 
Regulations.
8.  Implementation of a judgment annulling a measure
Taking the view that the administration may seek an equitable solution to resolve the particular 
case of a candidate unlawfully excluded from an open competition, the Tribunal held, in a judg-
ment of 13 December 2012 in Case F-42/11 Honnefelder v Commission, that, where a decision not 
to include a candidate on a reserve list was annulled because of an irregularity affecting the whole 
competition, the decision to re-open the procedure in the competition only for that candidate 
appears to be such as to allow the full implementation of the judgment annulling the first decision, 
although it cannot entirely remedy the irregularity found.
Career of officials and other staff
1. Competitions
In its judgment of 1 February 2012 in Case F-123/10 Bancale and Buccheri v Commission, the Tribunal 
held that the requirement of professional experience acquired after the obtaining of a diploma 
giving access to a competition is an appropriate means for the administration to recruit the ser-
vices of officials who have the qualities called for by the first subparagraph of Article 27 of the Staff 
Regulations and, therefore, to safeguard the interest of the service. Professional experience ac-
quired after a diploma is obtained and relevant to it is more likely to give the candidate concerned 208  Annual Report 2012
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a clear picture of the application of scientific approaches to practical problems than professional 
experience gained before a diploma is obtained. It follows that the appointing authority is entitled 
to decide, in the exercise of its wide discretion, to limit access to competitions to candidates who 
have professional experience which is more valuable in that it is obtained after their university 
diploma was obtained and is relevant to that diploma.
In its judgment of 18 September 2012 in Case F-96/09 Cuallado Martorell v Commission, the Tribunal 
held that a procedure provided for by the notice of competition giving candidates the option of 
making a request for additional information within a period of one month after notification of the 
results of the competition and requiring the administration to reply within a month, is a procedure 
which is intended to allow candidates to exercise a specific right of access to certain information 
of direct and individual concern to them. The Tribunal therefore took the view that strict respect 
for that specific right, both as regards its content and the time-limit for reply, ensures compliance 
with the obligations derived from the principle of good administration, the right of access to public 
documents and the right to an effective remedy, pursuant to Articles 41, 42 and 47 of the Charter. 
Consequently, failure to respect that right is liable not only to lead rejected candidates to lodge ap-
peals or complaints without having sufficient data, but also to constitute maladministration which 
could, in appropriate cases, require compensation to be paid.
In a judgment of 5 December 2012 in Case F-29/11 BA v Commission, an action brought by an appli-
cant who was of Romanian nationality, but whose first language was Hungarian, led the Tribunal 
to clarify the knowledge of languages which can be required in recruitment competitions linked 
to an enlargement. While accepting that the obligation to sit a written test in Romanian might 
place the applicant at a disadvantage compared with candidates whose mother tongue is Roma-
nian, the Tribunal held that any such disadvantage would not constitute a breach of the principle 
of equality. Given that, in the light of the needs of the service, the administration may specify the 
language or languages of which thorough or satisfactory knowledge is required, the Tribunal held 
that the requirement of a test in Romanian had, in this case, to be considered legitimate, because 
it was justified by higher-ranking requirements deriving precisely from the accession of Romania, 
which had selected only Romanian as its official language. In addition, the difference in treatment 
appeared proportionate to the objective pursued in that it occurred during a transitional period, 
following that accession and in that knowledge of Romanian was such as to appear to be useful, or 
even necessary, because the administrators recruited would be taking part in various tasks within 
the institutions and, where appropriate, in relation to economic and social operators in the Mem-
ber States. The contested requirement thus did not breach the principle of equality. However, the 
Tribunal excludes the case where the Member State in question has recognised as a language of 
the Union, as regards its participation in the work of its institutions, a minority language which is 
spoken on its territory although it is not one of its official languages.
2. Reports
As a matter of principle, an official may not be penalised in his appraisal because of justified ab-
sences. However, that does not mean that reporting officers must refrain systematically from taking 
account of absences justified by illness when they assess the performance of the persons concer-
ned. In its judgment of 2 October 2012 in Case F-52/05 RENV Q v Commission, the Tribunal made 
clear that the mark for performance of an official who has met his objectives may be increased so 
as to take account of the fact that the time he had worked was less because of such absence. Simi-
larly, before a poor mark is awarded for performance, reporting officers must take account of the 
fact that the performance of the official was affected by his absence on grounds of sickness.Annual Report 2012  209
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3. Promotion
In its judgment of 8 February 2012 in Case F-23/11 AY v Council (under appeal to the General Court 
of the European Union), the Tribunal held that the certification of officials in function group AST 
constitutes further training and instruction within the meaning of Article 24a of the Staff Regula-
tions which must be taken into account for purposes of promotion in the careers of the persons 
concerned. That obligation must be reflected in the content of appraisal reports. As such reports 
are, according to Article 45(1) of the Staff Regulations, one of the matters to be taken into account 
in the consideration of comparative merits with a view to promotion, and promotion is one of the 
aspects of the progress of an official’s career, the Tribunal held that the appointing authority can-
not, without breaching Article 45, fail to take any account of certification when considering com-
parative merits in a round of promotions. Consequently, it also held that, when considering com-
parative merits of officials eligible for promotion, the appointing authority may not leave out of 
account the fact that an official was selected to take part in a training programme for the purposes 
of his certification and that he has passed the tests certifying that he has followed that programme 
successfully.
Rights and obligations of officials and other staff
1.  Equal treatment of men and women
Having recalled that Article 1e(2) of the Staff Regulations provides that officials in active employ-
ment are to be accorded working conditions complying with appropriate health and safety stand-
ards at least equivalent to the minimum requirements applicable under measures adopted in 
these areas pursuant to the Treaties, the Tribunal held, in its judgment of 17 July 2012 in Case 
F-54/11 BG v European Ombudsman, that the objective of Directive 92/85 (4) is precisely to improve 
the working environment by strengthening the protection of the health and safety of pregnant 
workers. Consequently, it held that that directive binds the institutions and that they must there-
fore provide pregnant officials and other staff with protection equivalent to the minimum protec-
tion offered by that directive. However, although Directive 92/85 prohibits the dismissal of a preg-
nant worker, it excludes the case where the grounds for that dismissal are not connected with 
the pregnancy and are allowed by the legislation and/or practice. The Tribunal held, in that regard, 
that, although the Staff Regulations do not contain any provision expressly establishing an excep-
tion to the prohibition on dismissal of pregnant workers, those regulations must be interpreted as 
meaning that Article 47(e) thereof constitutes such an exception in that it provides for the possibili-
ty, entirely by way of exception, of termination of the service of an official in the event of a decision 
to remove an official from post following a disciplinary procedure.
2.  Prevention of conflicts of interest
It follows from the judgment in BD v Commission, that Article 11a of the Staff Regulations is in-
tended to guarantee the independence, integrity and impartiality of officials and, consequently, of 
the institutions which they serve by imposing on the persons concerned a preventive duty to in-
form the authority intended to allow that authority to take appropriate measures where necessary. 
Having regard to the fundamental nature of the objectives of independence and integrity pursued 
(4)  Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements 
in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are 
breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC) (OJ 1992 
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by that provision and to the general nature of the obligation imposed on officials, the Tribunal held 
that Article 11a must be acknowledged to have a wide scope, covering any situation in the light 
of which the person concerned must reasonably understand, given the duties he performs and 
the circumstances, that it is such as to appear, in the eyes of third parties, to be a possible cause of 
impairment of his independence. In addition, it made clear that the independence of officials vis-
à-vis third parties must not be assessed only from a subjective viewpoint. Such independence also 
requires the avoidance, particularly in the management of the finances of the European Union, of 
any conduct objectively likely to affect the image of the institutions and undermine the confidence 
which they should inspire in the public.
3.  Outside activity
As Article 12b of the Staff Regulations obliges officials wishing to engage in an outside activity, 
whether paid or unpaid, to obtain permission, the Tribunal recalled, in its judgment in BD v Com-
mission, that that obligation applies without exception and no distinction is to be made according 
to the nature or extent of the activity. On that basis, it held that the obligation to obtain such per-
mission applies not only to officials who, in the course of their career, envisage engaging in such 
activity, but also to recruits who wish to continue an activity which they pursued before being 
recruited and which becomes an ‘outside’ activity from the time they take up their duties.
4.  Psychological harassment
The Tribunal had held, in its judgment of 9 December 2008 in Case F-52/05 Q v Commission, set 
aside in part by the judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2011 in Case T-80/09 P Commis-
sion v Q, that, in order to constitute harassment, the conduct at issue must have ‘led objectively 
to … consequences’ such as to discredit the victim or impair her working conditions. The Skareby 
v Commission case, already discussed, led it to specify that a classification as harassment is subject 
to the condition that the abusive nature of the conduct in question should be objectively suffi-
ciently real, in the sense that an impartial and reasonable observer, of normal sensitivity and in the 
same situation, would consider it to be excessive and open to criticism. It follows that recognition 
of the existence of harassment, within the meaning of Article 12a of the Staff Regulations, is subject 
to the intentional nature of the physical behaviour, spoken or written language, gestures or other 
acts in question, but does not require that it be demonstrated that such acts were committed 
with the intention of undermining the personality, dignity or physical or psychological integrity of 
a person, provided that they lead objectively to consequences that discredit the victim or impair 
her working conditions.
In a judgment of 15 February 2012 in Case F-113/10 AT v EACEA, the Tribunal held, with regard to 
a dismissal for professional incompetence, that a member of staff may reasonably argue that he has 
not been able to perform his duties satisfactorily as a result of psychological harassment and that, 
consequently, the professional incompetence given as the ground for the decision he disputes is 
vitiated by a manifest error of assessment. In particular, the existence of a background of psycho-
logical harassment may also be taken into account in order to establish that the dismissal decision 
was adopted with the aim of harming the staff member where the author of the harassment took 
part in the assessment on the basis of which the dismissal decision was taken or is the signatory of 
that decision.
5.  Right of disclosure
Article 22a(3) of the Staff Regulations provides that an official who becomes aware of facts which 
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detrimental to the interests of the Union’ or of a serious failure to comply with the obligations of 
officials and without delay informs either his immediate superior or OLAF directly ‘shall not suffer 
any prejudicial effects on the part of the institution …, provided that he acted reasonably and 
honestly’.
In its judgment of 25 September 2012 in Case F-41/10 Bermejo Gardev EESC, the Tribunal clarified 
the conditions to be fulfilled for an official who has disclosed such information to be regarded as 
having acted ‘reasonably and honestly’ within the meaning of Article 22a of the Staff Regulations.
First, the irregularities disclosed must, where they actually occurred, be of an obviously serious 
nature. Second, the accusations made must be based on correct facts, or, at the very least, have 
a ‘sufficient factual basis’. The exercise of freedom of expression, which encompasses the possibility 
of an official’s denouncing psychological harassment or the existence of unlawful circumstances 
or of a serious failure by officials to fulfil their obligations, carries with it duties and responsibilities 
and any person who chooses to disclose such information must carefully verify, to the extent per-
mitted by the circumstances, that it is accurate and reliable. Third, the official must use appropriate 
means to make the disclosure and, in particular, must disclose the matter to the authority or body 
responsible, namely, ‘his immediate superior or his Director-General or, if he considers it useful, the 
Secretary-General, or the persons in equivalent positions, or [OLAF] direct’. Fourthly and finally, dis-
closure motivated by a personal grievance or animosity or by the prospect of personal advantage, 
including financial gain, cannot be considered to be a disclosure made reasonably and honestly.
6.   Duty to have regard for the interests of officials
Although, according to settled case-law, a member of the temporary staff who is the holder of 
a fixed-term contract does not, in principle, have any right to the renewal of his contract, which 
is a mere option, subject to the condition that such renewal is consistent with the interest of the 
service, the Tribunal none the less made clear, in its judgment of 13 June 2012 in Case F-63/11 Mac-
chia v Commission (under appeal to the General Court), that, before refusing a member of staff 
any further employment within the organisation, it was incumbent on the authority empowered 
to conclude contracts, by virtue of its duty to have regard for the interests of officials, to consider 
whether there was another temporary staff post in respect of which the applicant’s contract could, 
in the interest of the service, have legitimately been renewed. In the present case, the Commission 
intentionally omitted to make any assessment in that regard because it was seeking to work in 
favour of the ‘refreshing’ of its staff’s knowledge, and to avoid any extension of a contract or conti-
nuation of an employment relationship which might, eventually, lead to the conclusion of contracts 
for an indefinite period.
Emoluments and social security benefits of officials
According to Article 12(2) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations, officials or other staff members 
under 63 years of age with at least one year of service whose service terminates for reasons other 
than death or invalidity without their qualifying for an immediate or deferred retirement pension, are 
entitled to a severance grant, provided that, since taking up their duties, they have, in order to esta-
blish or maintain pension rights, paid into a national pension scheme, a private insurance scheme 
or a pension fund of their choice which satisfies the requirements set out in Article 12(1) of that 
Annex. The Tribunal made clear, in its judgment of 22 May 2012 in Case F-109/10 AU v Commission, 
that the mere fact that, without paying in to a national pension scheme, the person concerned conti-
nued to acquire pension rights in his home country could not confer entitlement to a severance 
grant on him. Similarly, taking out a private insurance policy for the constitution of pension rights 
which can be cancelled before term with reimbursement of the capital sums paid in cannot confer 212  Annual Report 2012
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entitlement to a severance grant because, under Article 12(1)(b) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regula-
tions, that entitlement is available only to those whose private insurance fulfils certain conditions, 
which include precisely the condition that the capital will not be repaid to the persons concerned.
In its judgment in Marcuccio v Commission, the Tribunal held that the decision to consult the Inval-
idity Committee must be distinguished from the individual decisions concerning its composition, 
which can be changed where that proves necessary. Thus, the gradual replacement of one or more 
members of an Invalidity Committee does not automatically cause its mandate to expire. In addi-
tion, new members of the Invalidity Committee, appointed to represent the institution and the 
official concerned respectively, cannot be denied their power to appoint a new third doctor by 
agreement between them, despite the fact that the previous one was appointed ex officio by the 
President of the Court of Justice. That solution can be explained inter alia by the fact that the option 
which the institution’s doctor and the doctor of the official concerned have of appointing a third 
doctor by agreement between them favours the choice of a doctor whose medical knowledge 
reflects the professional requirements they consider necessary and ensures their confidence in that 
third doctor.
Finally, according to settled case-law a new rule applies, save as otherwise provided, immedia-
tely to situations yet to arise and to the future effects of situations which arose, but were not fully 
constituted, under the old rule. In a judgment of 13 June 2012 in Case F-31/10 Guittet v Commission, 
the Tribunal held, as regards insurance against the risk of accident and of occupational disease and, 
in particular, the application of the scale for rating physical or mental impairment (‘disability rating 
scale’), that the situation of an insured party is not fully constituted until after the consolidation of 
his injuries. Consequently, the Tribunal considered that Article 30 of the new Insurance Rules, in so 
far as it provides that the scale annexed to those rules is applicable to insured parties who are vic-
tims of an accident or an occupational disease and whose injuries consolidated before the date of 
its entry into force, refers, in the case of those insured parties, to situations fully constituted under 
the disability rating scale annexed to the old Insurance Rules, so that that article gives retroactive 
effect to the scale annexed to the new rules. On that basis, the Tribunal recalled that the principle 
of legal certainty precludes a European Union act from taking effect as from a date prior to its entry 
into force, save, exceptionally, where the purpose to be achieved so demands and where the legi-
timate expectations of those concerned are duly respected. It held that, in the present case, those 
conditions were not fulfilled.
Disciplinary measures
Article 25 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations lays down the principle that ‘criminal prosecutions’ 
cause disciplinary proceedings to be suspended until after a final judgment has been handed 
down by the court hearing the case where they concern the same facts. In the absence of any clear 
definition of criminal prosecution in the Staff Regulations and in the light of several express or 
implied references made to national law in that regard by the European Union legislature, the Tri-
bunal took the view, in its judgment BG v European Ombudsman, that it could not identify an inde-
pendent definition of the concept and needed to refer to the law of the Member States as regards 
the application of Article 25, and specifically to the law of the State whose criminal authorities 
consider they have jurisdiction with regard to the facts of which the official subject to disciplinary 
proceedings is accused.
In the same judgment, the Tribunal pointed out that the principle of effective judicial protection 
laid down in Article 47 of the Charter does not mean that a penalty should not be imposed first 
by an administrative authority, provided, however, that the decision of that authority is subject 
to subsequent review by a ‘judicial body that has full jurisdiction’. In addition, it recalled that, in Annual Report 2012  213
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order to be classified as a judicial body that has full jurisdiction, a judicial body must inter alia have 
jurisdiction to examine all questions of fact and law relevant to the dispute before it, which means, 
in the case of a disciplinary measure, that it should have, inter alia, the power to determine the 
proportionality between the misconduct and the penalty, without confining itself to seeking out 
errors of assessment or misuse of powers.
Disputes concerning contracts
The Tribunal observed, in its judgment of 27 November 2012 in Case F-59/11 Sipos v OHIM, that it 
appears from Article 1a(1) of the Staff Regulations read in conjunction with Articles 2 to 5 of the 
Conditions of Employment of Other Servants (‘CEOS’) that permanent posts in the institutions are, 
generally, to be filled by officials and that it is only by way of exception that such posts may be 
occupied by staff under contract. Thus, although Article 2(b) provides expressly that temporary 
staff may be engaged to fill a permanent post, it specifies that this may happen only temporarily. 
In addition, the second paragraph of Article 8 of the CEOS provides that a contract of employment 
as a member of the temporary staff may not exceed four years and may be renewed for a duration 
of a maximum period of two years. At the end of that period the employment as a member of the 
temporary staff must cease, either by the termination of his employment or by his appointment as 
an official under the terms laid down in the Staff Regulations.Annual Report 2012  215
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B — Composition of the Civil Service Tribunal 
(Order of precedence as at 1 January 2012)
From left to right:
R. Barents, Judge;  I. Boruta, Judge; H. Kreppel, President of Chamber; S. Van Raepenbusch, 
President of the Civil Service Tribunal; M. I. Rofes i Pujol, President of Chamber; E. Perillo, Judge; 
K. Bradley, Judge; W. Hakenberg, Registrar.Annual Report 2012  217
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1.  Members of the Civil Service Tribunal
 (in order of their entry into office)
Sean Van Raepenbusch
Born in 1956; graduate in law (Free University of Brussels, 1979); spe-
cial diploma in international law (Brussels, 1980); Doctor of Laws (1989); 
head of the legal service of the Société anonyme du canal et des ins-
tallations maritimes (Canals and Maritime Installations company), Brus-
sels (1979–84); official of the Commission of the European Communities 
(Directorate General for Social Affairs, 1984–88); member of the Legal 
Service of the Commission of the European Communities (1988–94); 
Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
(1994–2005); lecturer at the University of Charleroi (international and 
European social law, 1989–91), at the University of Mons Hainault (Euro-
pean law, 1991–97), at the University of Liège (European civil service 
law, 1989–91; institutional law of the European Union, 1995–2005; Euro-
pean social law, 2004–05); numerous publications on the subject of 
European social law and constitutional law of the European Union; 
Judge at the Civil Service Tribunal since 6 October 2005; President of 
the Civil Service Tribunal since 7 October 2011.
Horstpeter Kreppel
Born in 1945; university studies in Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt-am-Main 
(1966–72); First State examination in law (1972); Court trainee in 
Frankfurt-am-Main (1972–73 and 1974–75); College of Europe, Bruges 
(1973–74); Second State examination in law (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1976); 
specialist adviser in the Federal Labour Office and lawyer (1976); pres-
iding judge at the Labour Court (Land Hesse, 1977–93); lecturer at the 
Technical College for Social Work, Frankfurt-am-Main, and at the Tech-
nical College for Administration, Wiesbaden (1979–90); national expert 
to the Legal Service of the Commission of the European Communities 
(1993–96 and 2001–05); Social Affairs Attaché at the Embassy of the 
Federal Republic of Germany in Madrid (1996–2001); presiding judge at 
the Labour Court of Frankfurt-am-Main (February to September 2005); 
Judge at the Civil Service Tribunal since 6 October 2005.218  Annual Report 2012
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Irena Boruta
Born in 1950; law graduate of the University of Wrocław (1972), doc-
torate in law (Łodz, 1982); lawyer at the Bar of the Republic of Poland 
(since 1977); visiting researcher (University of Paris X, 1987–88; Univer-
sity of Nantes, 1993–94); expert of ‘Solidarność’ (1995–2000); professor 
of labour law and European social law at the University of Łodz (1997–
98 and 2001–05), associate professor at Warsaw School of Economics 
(2002), professor of labour law and social security law at Cardinal Stefan 
Wyszynski University, Warsaw (2000–05); Deputy Minister of Labour 
and Social Affairs (1998–2001); member of the negotiation team for the 
accession of the Republic of Poland to the European Union (1998–2001); 
representative of the Polish Government to the International Labour 
Organisation (1998–2001); author of a number of works on labour 
law and European social law; Judge at the Civil Service Tribunal since 
6 October 2005.
Maria Isabel Rofes i Pujol
Born in 1956; study of law (law degree, University of Barcelona, 1981); 
specialisation in international trade (Mexico, 1983); study of European 
integration (Barcelona Chamber of Commerce, 1985) and of Communi-
ty law (School of Public Administration, Catalonia, 1986); official of the 
Government of Catalonia (member of the Legal Service of the Ministry 
for Industry and Energy, April 1984 to August 1986); member of the 
Barcelona Bar (1985–87); Administrator, then Principal Administrator, 
in the Research and Documentation Division of the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities (1986–94); Legal Secretary at the Court of 
Justice (Chamber of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, January 
1995–April 2004; Chamber of Judge Lõhmus, May 2004–August 2009); 
Lecturer on Community cases, Faculty of Law, Autonomous University 
of Barcelona (1993–2000); numerous publications and courses on Euro-
pean social law; Member of the Board of Appeal of the Community 
Plant Variety Office (2006–09); Judge at the Civil Service Tribunal since 
7 October 2009.Annual Report 2012  219
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Ezio Perillo
Born in 1950; Doctor of Laws and lawyer at the Padua Bar; Assistant 
lecturer and senior researcher in civil and comparative law in the law 
faculty of the University of Padua (1977–82); Lecturer in Community law 
at the European College of Parma (1990–98), in the law faculties of the 
University of Padua (1985–87), the University of Macerata (1991–94) and 
the University of Naples (1995), and at the University of Milan (2000–
01); Member of the Scientific Committee for the Master’s in European 
Integration at the University of Padua; Official at the Court of Justice, in 
the Library, Research and Documentation Directorate (1982–84); Legal 
Secretary to Advocate General Mancini (1984–88); Legal Adviser to the 
Secretary-General of the European Parliament, Mr Enrico Vinci (1988–
93); also, at the same institution: Head of Division in the Legal Service 
(1995–99); Director for Legislative Affairs and Conciliations, Inter-Insti-
tutional Relations and Relations with National Parliaments (1999–2004); 
Director for External Relations (2004–06); Director for Legislative Affairs 
in the Legal Service (2006–11); author of a number of publications on 
Italian civil law and European Union law; Judge at the Civil Service 
Tribunal since 6 October 2011.
René Barents
Born in 1951; graduated in law, specialisation in economics (Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, 1973); Doctor of Laws (University of Utrecht, 
1981); Researcher in European law and international economic law 
(1973–74) and lecturer in European law and economic law at the Eur-
opa Institute of the University of Utrecht (1974–79) and at the Univer-
sity of Leiden (1979–81); Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (1981–86), then Head of the Employee Rights 
Unit at the Court of Justice (1986–87); Member of the Legal Service of 
the Commission of the European Communities (1987–91); Legal Secre-
tary at the Court of Justice (1991–2000); Head of Division (2000–09) in 
and then Director of the Research and Documentation Directorate of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (2009–11); Professor (1988–
2003) and Honorary Professor (since 2003) in European law at the 
University of Maastricht; Adviser to the Regional Court of Appeal, 
’s-Hertogenbosch (1993–2011); Member of the Royal Netherlands 
Academy of Arts and Sciences (since 1993); numerous publications on 
European law; Judge at the Civil Service Tribunal since 6 October 2011.220  Annual Report 2012
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Kieran Bradley
Born in 1957; law degree (Trinity College, Dublin, 1975–79); Research 
assistant to Senator Mary Robinson (1978–79 and 1980); Pádraig Pearse 
Scholarship to study at the College of Europe (1979); postgraduate stu-
dies in European law at the College of Europe, Bruges (1979–80); Mas-
ter’s degree in law at the University of Cambridge (1980–81); Trainee at 
the European Parliament (Luxembourg, 1981); Administrator in the Sec-
retariat of the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament 
(Luxembourg, 1981–88); Member of the Legal Service of the European 
Parliament (Brussels, 1988–95); Legal Secretary at the Court of Justice 
(1995–2000); Lecturer in European law at Harvard Law School (2000); 
Member of the Legal Service of the European Parliament (2000–03), 
then Head of Unit (2003–11) and Director (2011); author of numerous 
publications; Judge at the Civil Service Tribunal since 6 October 2011.
Waltraud Hakenberg
Born in 1955; studied law in Regensburg and Geneva (1974–79); first 
State examination (1979); postgraduate studies in Community law at 
the College of Europe, Bruges (1979–80); trainee lawyer in Regensburg 
(1980–83); Doctor of Laws (1982); second State examination (1983); 
lawyer in Munich and Paris (1983–89); official at the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities (1990–2005); Legal Secretary at the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities (in the Chambers of Judge 
Jann, 1995–2005); teaching for a number of universities in Germany, 
Austria, Switzerland and Russia; Honorary Professor at Saarland Uni-
versity (since 1999); member of various legal committees, associations 
and boards; numerous publications on Community law and Com-
munity procedural law; Registrar of the Civil Service Tribunal since 
30 November 2005.Annual Report 2012  221
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2.  Change in the composition of the Civil Service Tribunal in 2012
There has been no change in the composition of the Civil Service Tribunal in 2012.Annual Report 2012  223
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3.  Order of precedence 
from 1 January to 31 December 2012
S. VAN RAEPENBUSCH, President of the Civil Service Tribunal
H. KREPPEL, President of Chamber
M. I. ROFES i PUJOL, President of Chamber 
I. BORUTA, Judge
E. PERILLO, Judge
R. BARENTS, Judge
K. BRADLEY, Judge
W. HAKENBERG, Registrar Annual Report 2012  225
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4.  Former Members of the Civil Service Tribunal
Heikki Kanninen (2005–09)
Haris Tagaras (2005–11)
Stéphane Gervasoni (2005–11)
President
Paul J. Mahoney (2005–11)Annual Report 2012  227
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C —   Statistics concerning the judicial activity of the Civil Service 
Tribunal
General activity of the Civil Service Tribunal
  1.  New cases, completed cases, cases pending (2008–12)
New cases
  2.  Percentage of the number of cases per principal defendant institution (2008–12)
  3.  Language of the case (2008–12)
Completed cases
  4.  Judgments and orders — Bench hearing action (2012)
  5.  Outcome (2012)
  6.  Applications for interim measures (2008–12)
  7.  Duration of proceedings in months (2012)
Cases pending as at 31 December 
  8.  Bench hearing action (2008–12)
  9.  Number of applicants (2012)
Miscellaneous
  10.  Appeals against decisions of the Civil Service Tribunal to the General Court (2008–12)
  11.  Results of appeals before the General Court (2008–12)Annual Report 2012  229
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1.  General activity of the Civil Service Tribunal — 
New cases, completed cases, cases pending (2008–12)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
250
200
150
100
50
0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
New cases 111 113 139 159 178
Completed cases 129 155 129 166 121
Cases pending 217 175 185 178 235¹
The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the 
joinder of cases on the grounds of similarity (one case number = one case).
(1)  Including 25 cases in which proceedings were stayed.
 New cases    Completed cases  Cases pending230  Annual Report 2012
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2.  New cases — Percentage of the number of cases per principal 
defendant institution (2008–12)
Percentage of number of new cases in 2012
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
European Parliament 14.41 % 8.85 % 9.35 % 6.29 % 6.11 %
Council  4.50 % 11.50 % 6.47 % 6.92 % 3.89 %
European Commission 54.95 % 47.79 % 58.99 % 66.67 % 58.33 %
Court of Justice of the European Union 2.65 % 5.04 % 1.26 %
European Central Bank 2.70 % 4.42 % 2.88 % 2.52 % 1.11 %
Court of Auditors  5.41 % 0.88 % 0.63 % 2.22 %
European Investment Bank (EIB) 1.80 % 0.88 % 5.76 % 4.32 % 4.44 %
Other parties 16.21 % 23.01 % 11.51 % 11.40 % 23.89 %
Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Council 
3.89 %
European Parliament
6.11 %
Other parties
23.89 %
European Investment 
Bank (EIB)
4.44 %
Court of Auditors 
2.22 % European Central Bank 
1.11 %
European  
Commission
58.33 %Annual Report 2012  231
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Distribution in 2012
3.  New cases — Language of the case (2008–12)
Language of the case 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Bulgarian 2
Spanish 1 1 2 2 3
Czech 1
German 10 9 6 10 5
Greek 3 3 2 4 1
English 5 8 9 23 14
French 73 63 105 87 108
Italian 6 13 13 29 35
Lithuanian 2
Hungarian 1 1
Dutch 8 15 2 1 6
Polish 1 1 2
Portuguese 1
Romanian 2
Slovak 1
Total 111 113 139 159 178
The language of the case corresponds to the language in which the proceedings were brought and not to 
the applicant’s mother tongue or nationality.
Italian
19.66 %
Dutch
3.37 %
Polish
1.12 %
Romanian
1.12 % French
60.67 % Bulgarian
1.12 %
Spanish
1.69 %
German
2.80 %
Greek
0.53 %
English
7.87 %232  Annual Report 2012
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4.  Completed cases — Judgments and orders — Bench hearing 
action (2012)
Chambers sitting 
with three Judges
93.39 %
Single judge
1.65 %
President 
4.96 %
Judgments 
Orders for removal 
from the register, 
following amicable 
settlement (1)
Other orders 
terminating 
proceedings
Total
Full court
Chambers sitting with three 
Judges 6 6
Single judge 62 4 47 113
President 2 2
Total 62 4 55 121
(1)  In the course of 2012, there were also 18 unsuccessful attempts to bring cases to a close by amicable settlement 
on the initiative of the Civil Service Tribunal.Annual Report 2012  233
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5.  Completed cases — Outcome (2012)
Judgments   Orders
Total
A
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
u
p
h
e
l
d
 
i
n
 
f
u
l
l
A
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
u
p
h
e
l
d
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
t
A
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
d
i
s
m
i
s
s
e
d
 
i
n
 
f
u
l
l
,
 
n
o
 
n
e
e
d
 
t
o
 
a
d
j
u
d
i
c
a
t
e
A
c
t
i
o
n
s
/
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
[
m
a
n
i
f
e
s
t
l
y
]
 
i
n
a
d
m
i
s
s
i
b
l
e
 
o
r
 
u
n
f
o
u
n
d
e
d
A
m
i
c
a
b
l
e
 
s
e
t
t
l
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
b
e
n
c
h
 
h
e
a
r
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
a
c
t
i
o
n
R
e
m
o
v
a
l
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
 
o
n
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
g
r
o
u
n
d
s
,
 
n
o
 
n
e
e
d
 
t
o
 
a
d
j
u
d
i
c
a
t
e
 
o
r
 
r
e
f
e
r
r
a
l
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
u
p
h
e
l
d
 
i
n
 
f
u
l
l
 
o
r
 
i
n
 
p
a
r
t
 
(
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
 
f
o
r
m
s
 
o
f
 
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
)
Assignment/Reassignment  1 2 1 4
Competitions 13 3 1 5 22
Working conditions/Leave 1 1
Appraisal/Promotion 1 5 4 2 8 20
Pensions and invalidity allowances 1 1 1 1 4
Disciplinary proceedings 4 4
Recruitment/Appointment/ 
Classification in grade 2 1 4 1 1 1 10
Remuneration and allowances 1 5 2 2 10
Termination or non-renewal of the 
contract of a member of staff 1 5 2 4 12
Social security/Occupational disease/
Accidents 2 4 1 7
Other  1 7 7 7 5 27
Total 5 7 50 20 4 30 5 121234  Annual Report 2012
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6.  Applications for interim measures (2008–12)
Applications for interim 
measures brought to 
a conclusion
Outcome
Granted in full or in 
part Dismissal Removal from the 
register
2008 4 4
2009 1 1
2010 6 4 2
2011 7 4 3
2012 11 10 1
Total 29 1 22 6
7.  Completed cases — Duration of proceedings in months (2012)
New cases
Average duration
Duration of full 
procedure
Duration of procedure, 
not including duration of 
any stay of proceedings 
Judgments 62 19.4 19.3
Orders 59 12.3 10.1
Total 121 15.9 14.8
The durations are expressed in months and tenths of months.Annual Report 2012  235
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8.  Cases pending as at 31 December — Bench hearing action 
(2008–12)
Distribution in 2012
Chambers sitting 
with three Judges 
87.23 %
Single judge 
3.40 %
Cases not yet 
assigned
8.94 %
Full court
0.43 %
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Full court 5 6 1 1
President 2 1 1 1
Chambers sitting with three Judges 199 160 179 156 205
Single judge 2 8
Cases not yet assigned 11 8 4 19 21
Total 217 175 185 178 235236  Annual Report 2012
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9.  Cases pending as at 31 December — Number of applicants 
The pending cases with the greatest number of applicants in 2012
Number of 
applicants
Fields
535 (2 cases)
Staff Regulations – Remuneration – Annual adjustment of the remuneration and pensions 
of officials and other servants – Articles 64, 65, 65a of and Annex XI to the Staff Regulations – 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1239/2010 of 20  December  2010  – Correction coefficient  – 
Officials posted to Ispra – Staff Regulations – Promotion – Promotion year 2005 – Additional 
grades provided for by the new Staff Regulations 
169 Staff Regulations – ECB staff – Reform of the pension scheme – Staff Regulations – Promotion – 
Promotion year 2005 – Additional grades provided for by the new Staff Regulations 
37 (26 cases)
Staff Regulations – Pensions – Article 11(2) and (3) of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations 
concerning the transfer of pension rights – Staff Regulations – Promotion – Promotion year 
2005 – Additional grades provided for by the new Staff Regulations 
33
Staff Regulations – EIB – Pensions – Reform of the pension scheme – Staff Regulations – 
Promotion  – Promotion year 2005  – Additional grades provided for by the new Staff  
Regulations 
25
Staff Regulations  – Promotion  – Promotion years 2010  and  2011  – Fixing of promotion 
thresholds  – Staff Regulations  – Promotion  – Promotion year 2005  – Additional grades 
provided for by the new Staff Regulations 
19
Staff Regulations – Staff Committee of the Parliament – Elections – Irregularities in the 
electoral  process Staff Regulations  – Promotion  – Promotion year 2005  – Additional 
grades provided for by the new Staff Regulations 
16 (3 cases)
Staff Regulations – Remuneration – Family allowances – Education allowance – Conditions 
for  granting  Staff Regulations  – Promotion  – Promotion year 2005  – Additional 
grades provided for by the new Staff Regulations 
13
Staff Regulations  – Member of the auxiliary staff  – Member of the temporary staff   – 
Conditions of engagement  – Duration of contract  – Staff Regulations  – Promotion  – 
Promotion year 2005 – Additional grades provided for by the new Staff Regulations 
10
Staff Regulations – Members of the contract staff – Member of the temporary staff  – Conditions 
of engagement – Duration of contract – Staff Regulations – Members of the contract staff – 
Member of the temporary staff  – Conditions of engagement – Duration of contract
10 (2 cases)
Staff Regulations – Open competition – Notice of competition EPSO/AD/204/10 – Non-
admission to the next stage of the competition as a result of the selection made on the 
basis of qualifications  Staff  Regulations –  Promotion –  Promotion  year  2005 – 
Additional grades provided for by the new Staff Regulations 
10 (10 cases) Staff Regulations  – Procedures  – Taxation of costs  – Staff Regulations  – Promotion  – 
Promotion year 2005 – Additional grades provided for by the new Staff Regulations 
The term ‘Staff Regulations’ means the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the 
Conditions of Employment of other servants of the Union.
Total number of applicants for all pending cases (2008–12)
Total applicants Total pending cases
2008 1 161 217
2009 461 175
2010 812 185
2011 1 006 178
2012 1 086 235Annual Report 2012  237
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10.  Miscellaneous — Decisions of the Civil Service Tribunal which 
have been the subject of an appeal to the General Court 
(2008–12)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
   Number of decisions against 
which appeals were brought 
   Total number of decisions 
open to challenge (1)
Number of decisions against 
which appeals were brought 
Total number of decisions 
open to challenge (1) 
Percentage of decisions 
against which appeals were 
brought (2)
2008 37 99 37.37 %
2009 30 95 31.58 %
2010 24 99 24.24 %
2011 44 126 34.92 %
2012 11 87 12.64 %
(1)  Judgments, orders – declaring the action inadmissible, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, orders 
for interim measures, orders that there is no need to adjudicate and orders refusing leave to intervene – made 
or adopted during the reference year.
(2)  For a given year this percentage may not correspond to the decisions subject to appeal given in the reference 
year, since the period allowed for appeal may span two years.238  Annual Report 2012
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11.  Miscellaneous — Results of appeals before the General Court 
(2008–12)
   Appeal dismissed    Decision totally or 
partially set aside 
and no referral back
   Decision totally or 
partially set aside 
and referral back
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Appeal dismissed 14 21 27 23 29
Decision totally or partially set aside and 
no referral back
4 9 4 3 2
Decision totally or partially set aside and 
referral back
3 1 6 4 2
Total 21 31 37 30 33Chapter IV
Meetings and visitsAnnual report 2012  241
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A —   Official visits and events at the Court of Justice, the General Court 
of the European Union and the European Union Civil Service 
Tribunal in 2012
Court of Justice
12 January Ms R.D. Iftimie, Ambassador of Romania to Luxembourg
31 January Mr J. Peumans, President of the Flemish Parliament, accompanied by 
a delegation of members of the Flemish Parliament
6 February Mr R. Montgomery, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the European 
Union
9 February Visit on the occasion of the regional meeting of Ambassadors of the French 
Republic to Europe
9 February Mr H.M. Szpunar, Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Poland
9 February Mr D. Reynders, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
External Trade and European Affairs of the Kingdom of Belgium
12 to 14 February Delegations from the Highest German-speaking Courts (‘Sechser-Treffen’)
16 February Ms M. Nĕmcová, President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of 
the Czech Republic
16 February Mr M. Schulz, President of the European Parliament
27 February Mr V.A. Chizhov, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the European 
Union
1 March Mr D. Christofias, President of the Republic of Cyprus
5 March Mr A. Dastis Quecedo, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Spain 
to the European Union
7 March Mr A. Avello Díez del Corral, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Spain to 
Luxembourg
14 March Ms P. Kaukoranta, Director-General of the Legal Service of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Finland
22 and 23 March Delegation from the Supreme Administrative Court of the Kingdom of 
Sweden
29 March Mr L. Teirlinck, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Belgium to Luxembourg, 
and Mr J.-F. Terral, Ambassador of the French Republic to Luxembourg
23 and 24 April Delegation from the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic
23 to 25 April Delegations from the Court of Justice of the Economic and Monetary Com-
munity of Central Africa (EMCCA), the Court of Justice of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Court of Justice of 
the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)
27 April Mr D. Teixeira de Abreu Fezas Vital, Permanent Representative of the Portu-
guese Republic to the European Union
3 May Mr K. Massimov, Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan
3 May Mr X. Bettel, Mayor of Luxembourg242  Annual report 2012
Meetings and visits  Official visits
14 May Mr W. Hoyer, President of the European Investment Bank
30 May Ms S. Day O’Connor, former Judge of the Supreme Court of the United 
States of America
6 June Mr D. Gros, Mayor of Metz
11 June  Mr D. Vaughan, Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgets of the European 
Parliament
15 and 16 June Conference of the Association amicale des référendaires et anciens référen-
daires of the Court of Justice of the European Union
25 June Official return of a painting by J. Birkemose loaned to the Court by the 
Kingdom of Denmark, in the presence of Mr N. Wammen, Minister for Euro-
pean Affairs of the Kingdom of Denmark
25 to 27 June Delegation from the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS)
11 July Mr J.-U. Hahn, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Justice, Integration 
and European Affairs of Hesse (Germany)
16 July Mr O. Miljenić, Minister for Justice of the Republic of Croatia, Mr B. Hrvatin, 
President of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia, and Mr S. Petrović, 
Professor at the Law Faculty of the University of Zagreb
14 September Cypriot Members of the European Parliament
24 and 25 September UK and Ireland Judicial and Academic Visit
25 September Mr A. Seban, President of the Centre Pompidou
2 October Ms C. Gläser, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to 
Luxembourg
8 October Presentation of a ‘Festschrift’ to Ms P. Lindh, former Member of the Court
25 October Mr F. Mulholland, Lord Advocate of Scotland
7 November Delegation of senior judges from south-eastern Europe
12 and 13 November 6th Luxemburger Expertenforum zur Entwicklung des Unionsrechts
26 November Delegation from the European Court of Human Rights
30 November Mr N. Stefanovic, President of the National Assembly of the Republic of 
Serbia
3 and 4 December Judges’ Forum 
4 December Presentation of the commemorative stamp for the 60th anniversary of the 
Court by the Luxembourg Post and Telecommunications Undertaking 
12 December Mr M. Entin, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to LuxembourgAnnual report 2012  243
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General Court
24 January Visit of a Belgian delegation regarding judicial productivity
3 February Visit of a delegation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg
11 May  Visit of a delegation from the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Croatia
6 June Visit of a delegation from the ‘Public Law Discussion Forum’
23 October Visit of the ‘Working Party on External Relations — Sanctions’, composed 
of Agents of the Member States, the EEAS and the Legal Services of the 
Commission and the Council
Civil Service Tribunal
12 September  Visit of Ms M. de Sola Domingo, Mediator of the European Commission
26 September Visit of Mr P.N. Diamandouros, European OmbudsmanAnnual report 2012  245
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B — Study visits 
1.  Distribution by type of group (2012)
Number of groups
National civil 
servants
9.45%
Students/Trainees
42.10%
Others
11.68% National 
judiciary
18.21%
Lawyers/
Legal advisers
12.54%
Law lecturers, 
teachers 
4.30%
Diplomats/Parliamentarians
1.72%
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3.  Judges’ Forum (2012)
4.  Trend in number and type of visitors (2009–12)
BE 6
BG 2
CZ 2
DK 3
DE 8
EE 1
IE 2
EL 5
ES 5
FR 8
IT 3
CY 2
LV 3
LT 3
LU 2
HU 3
MT 1
NL 7
AT 3
PL 5
PT 4
RO 4
SI 2
SK 3
FI 3
SE 0
UK 5
Total 95
2009 2010 2011 2012
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 National judiciary
 Diplomats/Parliamentarians
 Others
 Lawyers/Legal advisers
 Students/Trainees
 Law lecturers, teachers 
 National civil servants
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2009 2 463 1 219 156 262 7 053 1 016 1 854 14 023
2010 2 037 1 586 84 193 6 867 870 2 078 13 715
2011 2 087 1 288 47 146 6 607 830 1 507 12 512
2012 1 538 1 173 182 221 6 566 1 231 1 718 12 629Annual report 2012  249
Formal sittings  Meetings and visits
C — Formal sittings
14 May Formal sitting on the occasion of the partial replacement of the Members of 
the European Court of Auditors
14 May Formal sitting on the occasion of the partial replacement of the Members of 
the European Court of Auditors
8 October Formal sitting on the occasion of the partial replacement of the Members of 
the Court of Justice, involving the departure from office of President of Cham-
ber J.N. Cunha Rodrigues, First Advocate General J. Mazák, Judge K. Schie-
mann and Judge E. Cremona and the entry into office of Mr J.L. da Cruz Vilaça 
as Judge, Mr M. Wathelet as Advocate General and Mr C. Vajda as Judge, 
and on the occasion of the entry into office of Mr E. Buttigieg as Judge at the 
General Court
28 November Formal sitting on the occasion of the departure from office of Advocate 
General V. Trstenjak and the entry into office of Mr N. Wahl as Advocate 
General at the Court of Justice
4 December Formal sitting on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the CourtAnnual report 2012  251
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D — Visits and participation in official functions
Court of Justice
1 January Representation of the Court at the ceremony for the exchange of New 
Year greetings, at the invitation of the President of the Republic of Malta, 
in Valletta
3 January Representation of the Court at the New Year reception organised by the 
Court of Cassation of Belgium, in Brussels
9 January Representation of the Court at the formal sitting of the Court of Cassation 
of the French Republic, in Paris
11 January Representation of the Court at the New Year reception given by HRH the 
Grand Duke, in Luxembourg
12 January Representation of the Court at the New Year reception given by the 
President of the Federal Republic of Germany, in Berlin
19 January Representation of the Court at the New Year reception organised by the 
Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of Belgium to the European 
Union, in Brussels
20 January Representation of the Court at the official ceremony organised on the 
occasion of the entry into office of Mr R. Mellinghoff as President of the 
Federal Finance Court, in Munich
24 January Representation of the Court at a dinner organised by the Danish Presi-
dency of the European Union, in Brussels
26 January Representation of the Court at the ceremony inaugurating the legal year 
of the Supreme Court of Cassation, in Rome
27 January Participation of a delegation from the Court at the formal sitting and the 
seminar ‘How can we ensure greater involvement of the national courts 
in the Convention system?’, organised by the European Court of Human 
Rights, in Strasbourg
30 January Representation of the Court, at the invitation of the University of Bologna, 
at the ceremony for awarding the title of Doctor honoris causa in interna-
tional relations to Mr G. Napolitano, President of the Italian Republic, in 
Bologna
8 February Representation of the Court at the ‘Rechtspolitischer Neujahrsempfang’, 
at the invitation of the Minister for Justice of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, in Berlin
1 March Representation of the Court at the ceremonies for the entry into office of 
the new President of the Republic of Finland, Mr S. Niinistö, in Helsinki
15 and 16 March Representation of the Court at a seminar organised on the occasion of the 
Danish Presidency by the Danish Ministry of Justice on the topic ‘The Prac-
tical Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, in Copenhagen
22 March Participation of the President of the Court in the round-table conference 
on the topic ‘Europe after the crisis’, organised on the occasion of the State 
visit of the Queen of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, at the University of 
Luxembourg252  Annual report 2012
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2 to 6 April Official visit of a delegation from the Court to the Russian Federation
4 April Representation of the Court at the General Assembly of the Constitutional 
Court, and the giving of a speech on the topic ‘Requests for preliminary 
rulings from the Constitutional Court’, in Warsaw
16 to 19 May Representation of the Court at the ‘Second Petersburg International Legal 
Forum’, in Saint Petersburg
16 to 20 May Official visit of a delegation from the Court to Romania
17 to 19 May Representation of the Court at ‘The 9th Ibero-American Conference on 
Constitutional Justice’, in Cadiz
22 and 23 May Representation of the Court and contribution on the topic ‘Recent 
devel  opments in the case-law of the Court on direct taxation as regards 
citizens’, as part of the Fiscalis programme organised by the Directorate-
General for Taxation and Customs Union of the European Commission, 
jointly with the Ministry of Finance of Cyprus, in Nicosia
30 May to 2 June Participation of a delegation from the Court in the 25th FIDE Congress, in 
Tallinn
1 June Representation of the Court, at the invitation of the President of the Italian 
Republic, at the ceremony organised on the occasion of the National Day, 
in Rome
25 and 26 June Representation of the Court at the 23rd colloquium of the Association 
of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the 
European Union, in Madrid
5 July Representation of the Court at the ceremony inaugurating the Cypriot 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union, at the invitation of the 
President of the Republic of Cyprus, in Limassol
24 July Participation of the President of the Court at the reception given by the 
President of the Hellenic Republic, on the occasion of the anniversary of 
the restoration of the Republic, in Athens
1 to 4 September Official visit of a delegation from the Court to the Republic of Cyprus
4 to 7 September Representation of the Court at the ‘16th Symposium of European Patent 
Judges’, in Dublin
21 September Participation of a delegation from the Court at the ‘69. Deutscher 
Juristentag’, in Munich
28 September Participation of the President of the Court in the conference of the Euro-
pean Law Institute and giving of the closing speech, in Brussels
1 October Representation of the Court at the ‘Opening of the Legal Year’, in London
1 October Representation of the Court at the ‘Opening of the Legal Year’, in London
2 October Representation of the Court at the conference on the topic ‘Effective en-
forcement of the competition rules in the EU’, organised by the Commis-
sion for the Protection of Competition of the Republic of Cyprus, in Nicosia
3 October Representation of the Court at the ceremonies organised as part of the 
‘Tag der Deutschen Einheit’, in MunichAnnual report 2012  253
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26 October Representation of the Court at the 5th colloquium of the Network of the 
Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the European Union, on the 
topic ‘Appointment of Judges to the European Court of Justice and the 
European Court of Human Rights’, in Paris
9 November Representation of the Court at the ‘Roundtable discussion on leading 
asylum cases’, at the European Court of Human Rights, in Strasbourg
15 and 16 November Representation of the Court, at the invitation of the Cypriot Presidency of 
the Council of the European Union, at the symposium ‘Fundamental rights 
in the EU; three years after Lisbon’ and giving of a speech on the topic 
‘Fundamental rights in the EU — The Luxembourg perspective’, at the 
College of Europe, in Bruges
23 November Representation of the Court at the seminar organised by the Association 
of the Councils of States and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the 
European Union, on the topic ‘Citizens’ access to justice and judicial bod-
ies in environmental matters — National particularities and influences of 
European Union law’, in Brussels 
29 November Representation of the Court at the Romanian National Day, in Brussels
6 December Representation of the Court, at the invitation of the President of the Re-
public of Finland, at the annual reception organised on the occasion of 
Independence Day, in Helsinki
20 December Representation of the Court, at the invitation of the President of the Con-
stitutional Court, at the reception for the National Day of the Republic of 
Slovenia, in Ljubljana
General Court 
8 February Representation of the Court at the reception ‘Rechtspolitischer Neu-
jahrsempfang 2012’ of the Federal Minister for Justice, in Berlin
8 March Representation of the Court at the British Embassy in Luxembourg, on the 
occasion of the visit of the Secretary of State for Justice
22 May Representation of the Court at the ‘Queen’s Royal Garden Party’, at 
Buckingham Palace
27 to 29 May Representation of the Court on the occasion of the official visit to Vilnius at 
the invitation of the President of the Republic of Lithuania
30 May to 2 June Representation of the Court at the 25th FIDE Congress in Tallinn, Estonia
23 June Representation of Court at the celebration of the solemn Te Deum fol-
lowed by a reception at the Grand Ducal Court, on the occasion of the 
Luxembourg National Day
8 to 10 July Representation of the Court at a study visit to the French Council of State, 
in Paris
1 October Representation of the Court at the formal celebration of the 92nd anni-
versary of the enactment of the Constitution of the Republic of Austria, in 
Vienna
1 October Representation of the Court at the ceremony for the Opening of the Legal 
Year at Westminster Abbey, in London254  Annual report 2012
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3 October Representation of the Court at the reception organised by the President 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, on the occasion of the National Day
29 to 31 October Representation of the Court on the occasion of the official visit to Sofia at 
the invitation of the Vice-President of the Republic of Bulgaria
6 December Representation of the Court at the official reception organised by the Pres-
ident of the Republic of Finland on the occasion of Independence Day, in 
Helsinki
20 December Representation of the Court at the Day for Constitutionality, at the invita-
tion of the President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia
Civil Service Tribunal
29 and 30 October  Visit to the Council of State of the Italian Republic, in RomeAbridged organisational 
chart256  Annual report 2012
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